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Conflict in the Niger Delta holds profound implications for the democratic and developmental 
transformation of Nigeria. The analysis of the causes and impacts of the oil conflict in the 
region, and of strategies to resolve it, requires an understanding of the traditionally and 
constitutionally enshrined resource rights of the marginalised inhabitants. Patterns of resource 
appropriation by multinational oil companies and the mismanagement of resource revenue by 
federal government, and the associated environmental pollution, remain a legacy of the top-
down approaches that have been employed in an attempt to resolve conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
These approaches have largely failed to effectively address the complex issues affecting the 
indigenes and have even triggered further dissention amongst various local communities. Using 
grounded theory as a research method, this thesis explores the grassroots approach to conflict 
resolution in the Niger Delta region as a socio-political paradigm for developing substantive 
content for the resolution of conflict in this oil-rich region of Nigeria. Drawing on history and 
using social and conflict theories, the paper investigates the potential for the bottom-up 
approach to be applied to the conflict resolution paradigm, in order to advance a sustainable 
peace process and promote economic, political and social transformation in Nigeria – and, in 
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Chapter One: Studying Conflicts in the Niger Delta: Analysis of Causes, 
Impacts and Resolution Strategies 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This research explores conflicts in Nigeria, specifically the on-going violence in the region of 
the Niger Delta. By looking at the fundamental causes of the protracted conflict in this area, 
the study mainly focuses on proffering conflict resolution strategies that would bring 
sustainable peace and foster development in the region, as well as the country as a whole.  
Following the 1960s wave of independence that swept over several African countries, the 
African continent is still struggling to identify and confirm its true social, economic and even 
cultural identity. This can be partially explained by the maxim that „after colonisation equates 
to during colonisation‟ (Gimba 2014); meaning that the international emancipation from 
colonial masters has not brought any significant positive change to the people. Rather, the 
current socio-economic situation in these countries looks even worse than it was prior to, and 
during colonial times. From within, as from without, Africa is still perceived as the most 
backward continent on earth, with its economy far removed from its full potential. A few 
flaws, including a rapid population growth, corruption, poor leadership, external debt, 
diseases, illiteracy, high rate of poverty and conflict, are still being underlined as causes 
intensifying this stationary situation. For example, Bekoe (2002:232), one of the prominent 
scholars with an extensive knowledge of African issues, stated: 
Each passing year reinforces Africa‟s grim statistics of a continent in which many 
states are overtaken by poverty and conflict. In 2001, to cite just one statistic, 75% of 
the countries in Africa (39 of 54) were classified as low income-meaning that [Gross 
National Income] GNI was below USD 745 annually. Equally dismal conflict and 
instability in all the sub-regions continue to spread refugees. 
Ghani et al. (2008:22) concurred with Bekoe, being of the view that:  
[I]n the past twenty years, for example, USD 300 billion has been spent in Africa 




million people a year die of AIDS, three thousand children die every day of malaria, 
and forty million received no schooling at all.  
Although Africa is the world reservoir of natural resources, which could be seen as a 
potential to drive the world economy to an unprecedented level, however, media and news 
have been repeatedly reporting that many of its countries are characterised by several 
problems, including authoritarianism and insecurity, weak institutional structures, corruption 
and poor governance, human rights deficits, high mortality rate, poverty, environmental 
pollution, in addition to high and low-intensity conflicts. The continent delivers enormous 
and diverse economic resources including energy minerals, metallic minerals, non-metallic 
minerals and agricultural resources. Its gigantic population serves as source of human capital 
and a large market to be served. However, it is also incongruous that amidst these rich natural 
resources and human capital, Africa is ensnared in a malicious web of profound and 
persistent poverty and violence caused by its rich natural resources. Central to this problem is 
the contention concerning the issue of ownership and control of natural resources; a problem 
which finds its root-causes from the interplays of historical, political and social factors. 
Although several efforts have been made, in different ways and levels, to tackle this issue, 
little success has been achieved, however. In my own opinion, it seems to be that in order for 
Africa to achieve its full potential, thereby contributing immensely to its people‟s wellbeing 
and the world economy, there is a need to address the problem pertaining to the reign of 
violence and abject poverty which holds the continent hostage. This requires a better 
understanding of the contemporary conflicts in the continent in order to find and apply more 
suitable solutions and development management plans which could bring long-lasting peace 
and development to the continent. This idea has been useful in shaping the conception and 
elaboration of this research. 
1.2 Setting the context 
1.2.1 Nigeria  
Nigeria is a federal state in West Africa, with its southern coast laying on the Gulf of Guinea 
in the Atlantic Ocean. It has four borders; Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east 
and Niger in the north. Administratively, Nigeria is composed of 36 states, of which the Niger 
Delta is the subject of this study. With a territory of 923,768 km² and a population of 186 
million, Nigeria is Africa‟s most populated country, with oil and gas playing a predominant 




approximately 30 billion barrels (bbl) of crude oil and 180 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural 
gas (Fidelis Allen 2014). It is Africa‟s second largest economic power following South Africa 
and hydrocarbon resources alone have brought to the country an income estimated at USD 
340 billion over the past 40 years (Obi 2010: 224), making it Africa‟s largest oil producing 
and exporting country and the sixth in the world (Omolade Adunbi 2015). However, the 
sharing of the hydrocarbon income has not been done in an efficient way for the betterment 
of the whole nation and for the Niger Delta region in particular. As the 2006 United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Report on the region summarised: 
Some amazing paradoxes have come from the development of the Niger Delta region. 
Ordinarily, the Niger Delta should be a gigantic economic reservoir of national and 
international importance. Its rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed 
methodically into the international economic system, in exchange for massive 
revenues that carry the promise of rapid socio-economic transformation within the 
Delta itself. In reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative 
neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social 
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict. Enormous 
possibilities for industrial development abound in terms of the abundance of raw 
materials in the region, but these remain unrealised. Beyond vast oil and gas deposits, 
the Delta is blessed with good agricultural land, extensive forests, excellent fisheries, 
and a large labour force. But juxtaposed against the potential for economic growth 
and sustainable development are deteriorating economic and social conditions that 
have been largely ignored by contemporary policies and actions. With local 
inhabitants subjected to abject poverty and suffering in the midst of plenty, some view 









Figure 1.1 Map of the Federal State of Nigeria  
 
Source: Courtesy of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Masterplan.  
In the early 1990s, the country had sunk into violent crisis, as the armed insurgency in the 
Niger Delta region surfaced with elemental fury. Since then, the Niger Delta has been 
portrayed as the Nigerian epicentre of not only militant actions against the exploitation of oil, 
but also as an example of the indigenous struggle over resource rights in the country. The 
1990s violence resumption in this region had reached an unprecedented level in 2007 and 
caused massive waves of assaults on oil and gas installations, as well as the kidnapping of 
foreign oil companies‟ workers in the country. Violent actions against oil companies in the 
Niger Delta have been depicted as a mass consciousness-raising and arming of youths against 
the discriminatory exploitation of oil by the federal state and multinational oil companies. 
These actions have stimulated a radical revolution leading to grave consequences for the 
stability of the state and that of the region of the Niger Delta.  
1.2.2 The Niger Delta 
The Niger Delta is one of the federated states in the federal republic of Nigeria. It is a 
territory of 70,000 Km
2
 (27,000 sq. mi.) located in the South region of the country and makes 
up 7.5% of Nigeria‟s land mass (Obi 2010). As a federated state, the Niger Delta is 
administratively made of nine entities namely; Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, 
Port Harcourt (Rivers) which are all located in the south south geopolitical zones; Ondo 




east geopolitical zone. The Niger Delta is a multi-ethnic federated state with some 31 million 
people of more than 40 ethnic groups, speaking about 250 different dialects (Alao 2007:162; 
Michael Peel 2011). 
Figure1.2 Map of the Niger Delta 
 
Source: Courtesy of NDDC Master plan. 
 
The Niger Delta region covers a very dense rain forest and most of the people in this region 
traditionally work in fishing and farming. The region also produces and supplies abundant 
food made available for trade and consumption all year round. Formerly described as oil 
Rivers because of its palm producing potential, the rain forest in this region opens up into the 
Atlantic Ocean and makes the Niger Delta one of the most important wetlands with a rich, 
complex, but fragile, ecosystem (Kingsley Kuku 2012). Internationally known as the region 
with the richest petroleum reservoir, the Niger Delta is also a terrain conducive to conflicts, 
with the more prominent ones being the 1966 revolt, the 1990 peaceful protest and the recent 
widespread militancy attacks (Alao 2007). It is also home to several popular social 
movements and groups, including the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Ijaw Youth 
Congress (IYC), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the 
Chikolo Movement (FNDIC), that have all been fighting for indigenes‟ rights over their 
natural resources in this region. Likewise, it has been a region of international controversy 
over pollution, corruption and human rights violations based on oil and gas operations 
ongoing for the last fifty years (Orbach 2011). Neglected by successive Nigerian 
governments and the oil companies operating within the region, the Niger Delta has become a 
poor region with widespread poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation 





The history of this federated state demonstrates that, even before the discovery of oil, the 
indigenes of the region had been in struggle with external domination over their 
environmental resources. For example, Kingsley Kuku (2012) states that there were cases 
where natives of the region clashed physically with British traders over palm oil produce. 
However, the discovery of oil at Oloibiri (a town currently in Bayelsa state) in 1958, shortly 
before the independence of Nigeria, changed the dimension of the conflict, switching the 
mode of struggle from palm oil to crude oil, which placed the Niger Delta in a strategic spot 
nationally as well as internationally (Obi 2010). Hydrocarbon discovery metamorphosed the 
region into an oil hub in the black continent, housing 600 oilfields and over 300 oil 
production and storage facilities scattered within its wetlands, mostly run by foreign oil 
companies including Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron, Agip, Elf and Texaco, in joint 
partnership with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (World Bank 2011).  
As stated above, the Niger Delta oil potentials make Nigeria the largest oil producer in Sub-
Saharan Africa. However, if oil has contributed to some extent to the consolidation of 
prosperity of a few countries in terms of poverty alleviation and strong economic 
development, as is the case with Norway and Alaska to mention just two examples (Kingsley 
Kuku 2012), it is also noteworthy to point out that the presence of hydrocarbons has also 
been the source of a high incidence of corruption, violent conflict and poor economy in 
several other oil-rich countries including Nigeria (Obi 2010). The abundance of hydrocarbons 
in the region of the Niger Delta, offers an obvious example of resource paradox, portraying 
the region as one of the classic patterns of a resource-rich country where people are 
experiencing abject poverty. The non-involvement of the local people in the management of 
their resources and their marginalisation from a fair sharing of the oil revenue have created a 
social malaise which has given rise to a generalised social frustration and an aversion against 
the oil companies and state authorities. According to Omolade Adunbi (2015), the crisis in 
the Niger Delta has been thought to be due to the government‟s inattentiveness to the 
concerns regarding the development of the region where the bulk of oil revenue is generated; 
the nonchalant conduct of the oil multinationals who dedicate insignificant means towards 
corporate social responsibility (CSR); the poor oil production policies applied by oil 
companies associated with the environmental disasters triggered by oil spills and gas flaring, 
as well as the demands of the peoples of the Niger Delta for increased participation in the 




All of these are believed to have triggered the agitation amongst the Niger Deltans. Olatunde 
(2009:8), for instance, offers that: 
from the earliest forms of protests, the pioneers of the social movement such as Isaac 
Adaka Boro, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Ogoni and Christopher Okigbo had one thing in 
common; the genuine liberation of their people…. These gallant men, particularly 
Okigbo and Ken, organised protest rallies in civilized manner not minding the bashing 
and injustice meted out to them and their kinsmen by the Nigerian state. Their 
relentless spirit never gave up and their protest was always devoid of violence.  
Social movements led by Isaac Boro and Ken Saro-Wiwa (Cyril Obi 2010) activated the call 
for fair dealing in the Niger Delta. Ken Saro-Wiwa, in the spirit of restoring justice for his 
people, formed the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) which increased 
the tempo and publicity of the agitation for environmental justice. In 1966 his powerful 
speech delivered an insightful and tragic summary of the injustice in the Niger Delta, stating 
that: 
The present structure reinforces indigenous colonialism-a crude, harsh, unscientific 
and illogical system. Twenty years after the civil war, the system of revenue 
allocation, the development policies of successive Federal administrations and the 
insensitivity of the Nigerian elite have turned the delta and environs into an ecological 
disaster and dehumanized its inhabitants. The notion that the oil-bearing areas can 
provide the revenue of the country and yet be denied a proper share of that revenue 
because it is perceived that the inhabitants of the area are few in numbers is unjust, 
immoral, unnatural and ungodly (Ken Saro-Wiwa 1996:63). 
The MOSOP claim was for the people to have rights of political autonomy, as well as their 
access to, and control of, their economic resources for Ogoni development (Crisis group 
2006). The uprising of the MOSOP was a sign of awareness for indigenes and set out an era 
which has been characterised by protests and subsequent repression. However, it is of note 
that although the MOSOP advocated non-violence, conflict broke out all over the region 
along many axes; between ethnic groups, within ethnic groups, within communities, between 
generations, between the state and communities, and between oil companies and communities 
(Karl Maier 1998). There has been widespread violence in the region, which has paved the 




forces have been deployed and as demands for local ownership of land and oil resources grew 
amongst the ethnic groups in the region, security conditions and instability grew worse. From 
2005 to 2007, between 120 and 150 cases of violent conflicts have been recorded annually in 
the Niger Delta region, prominently in Rivers and over fifty armed groups with over 20,000 
armed youths have been fighting in the oil region (UNDP 2007:3). With the emergence of 
MEND in December 2005, violence involved hostage taking and attacks on oil facilities. In 
the period between January 2006 and February 2007, 33 cases of kidnapping were recorded 
with over 200 victims being oil workers (Africa Masterweb 2007). In addition, between 2000 
and 2007, 12,770 cases of sabotage of oil pipelines and installations mostly in the Niger Delta 
region have been documented (Nwankwo and Ezeobi 2008).  
The Niger Delta, as an oil-bearing region of Nigeria, is of strategic importance to the 
country‟s economic survival and to global energy stability. This appears to be undeniable as 
the Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on crude oil and gas, most of which is in the 
reservoirs concentrated in the Niger Delta, which in turn accounts for 80% of the 
government‟s revenue, 95% of export receipts and 90% of foreign exchange earnings 
(Kingsley Kuku 2012). The consequences of the Niger Delta crises are too enormous to be 
ignored. At the local level, the conflict has a significant impact on the indigenes in terms 
insecurity and continual environmental problems in the region. At the national level, the 
Nigerian state is incurring the loss of revenue amounting to over N150.5bn in eight years 
(Nwankwo and Ezeobi 2008). At an international level, the global energy market has been hit 
by the upsurge of the crude oil price which rose to USD 100 per barrel in January 2008 
(Arowolo 2008) and later to about USD 120 a barrel in April 2014 (Fidelis Allen 2014). 
However, since late 2014 up till today, oil price is still struggling to hit the cap of USD 60 per 
barrel.   
Due to the economic strategy of the Niger Delta, the government has developed various 
mechanisms of response to different conflicts that are rooted in this region. These 
mechanisms, in most cases, have been heavy-handed repression led by security forces. On the 
other hand, in some cases, new states, local government associations (LGAs) and special 
institutions were created with the intent to develop the Delta, while at the same time constant 
but indecisive renegotiation of oil revenue has been retained by oil-producing states (USIP 
2011). These various responses that the government embarked on provided avenues for 
enriching political actors at both local and federal levels, while the ordinary Niger Deltans 




former Niger Delta militants has brought some level of peace to the region, this approach, 
however, still seems to be a cosmetic solution to the problem, since different factors driving 
and sustaining the conflicts are yet to be addressed. Responding to the root-causes of the 
conflicts in the Niger Delta remains vital to checking the resurgence of instability in the 
region. This is what justified the essence of the questions that this research seeks to answer. 
1.3 Research: Problem, Objectives and Questions 
The Niger Delta has the prospect of being a massive economic powerhouse for Nigeria, 
and also one of international significance, but a few noticeable inconsistencies have 
come from its development. Endowed with rich oil and gas resources, the Niger Delta 
region connects into international economics, receiving huge revenues that could lead to 
swift socio-economic changes within the Delta itself. Perversely, however, the region is 
still bound by many issues ranging from governmental neglect, decaying social 
infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, extreme poverty and 
internal conflict. Huge potential for industrial development exists: there is wealth of raw 
materials in the region, but this potential has yet to be realised (UNDP 2006:25). Crises 
in this region have been described as the result of the unfair use of resources by the 
multinational oil companies (MNOCs) in collusion with the federal government. The 
nonchalant attitude of the oil multinationals to dedicate substantial resources towards 
corporate social responsibility, the substandard oil production practices engaged by oil 
corporations – with oil spills and gas flaring damaging the environment, and the lack of 
adequate responses to demand of local communities for increased participation in the 
administration and allocation of resources have all accrued frustration and anger among 
different local communities within the region. This has resulted in the rise of animosity, 
militancy and violence as the indigenes‟ means of claiming a fair share of resources from 
the MNOCs and government. Local communities‟ demands suddenly turned into 
political autonomy and the demand for the use and control of their economic resources 
(Crisis group 2006). This fuelled a deadly conflict that has spilled all over the region. 
The level of violence in the region also intensified as weapons became more accessible, 
more state-armed forces were being deployed and as claims for indigenous 
proprietorship over lands and oil resources grew high amongst the ethnic groups in the 
region (UNDP 2007:3; Africa Masterweb 2007; Nwankwo and Ezeobi 2008). This is one 




Niger Delta – including our analysis of causes, the impacts and possible resolution 
strategies. 
The purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of the factors that have contributed to 
the violent conflict in Niger Delta so that the most appropriate conflict resolution strategies 
will be adopted in this vast and severely deprived region rich in oil and gas. Overall, the aim 
and objectives pursued in this research are: 
➢ To review other existing and unresolved issues driving and sustaining the Niger Delta 
conflict moving beyond economic and factor endowments. 
➢ To analyse the past trends of conflict resolution adopted in the region in order to 
highlight the weaknesses and potential pitfalls, and find why they failed to address the 
issue. 
➢ To evaluate the effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies and reflect on what 
might help with bringing sustainable peace and preventing another cycle of violence 
in the region. 
Therefore, the overarching question that this research aims to address is: in what ways and to 
what extent do the responses of different actors to conflict in the Niger Delta contribute to its 
resolution? 
Similarly, the research aims to address the following specific research sub-questions: 
1. What is the relevance of resource curse and rentier state theories to conflicts in oil-
bearing settings? 
2. What are the background and other causes of the conflict?  
3. In what ways has the state responded to the conflict in the Niger Delta? How 
successful have its initiatives been?  
4. In what ways have the companies engaged with the state and communities in their oil 
operations and production? What are relevant factors that influence conflict 
management initiatives of oil companies in the Niger Delta? 
5. In what ways have the communities been affected by and responded to the issues of 




Conflict management initiatives directly relate to the conflict resolution process. Drawing on 
the reviews and the analysis of the fieldwork, the range of conflict management initiatives by 
the oil companies, local communities‟ responses to these conflict management initiatives, 
state-sponsored management initiatives and the analysis of the past and present conflict in the 
Niger Delta have all been used to frame this thesis. Conflict resolution and/or its management 
entails a process of change and transformation occurring at three levels; namely, personal, 
collective and relational (Luckham 2007). Therefore, to understand these conflicts, an 
investigation of how the aforementioned dimensions have (or have not) impacted on local 
communities, on all these three levels was undertaken. From an economic view, the resource 
curse is examined with an emphasis on oil-conflict. By studying the conflict-resolution 
initiatives of the MNOCs in relation to state-sponsored-conflict resolution initiatives, one can 
relate oil-conflict theory to rentier theory and, in turn, relate this to resource curse theory. 
Equally, this research also examined the history of the conflicts in the Niger Delta region in 
order to bring together economic, social and political aspects that have built themselves 
around the current oil-based conflict. By looking into local communities‟ responses to 
conflict management initiatives by MNOCs, the implementation of the conflict resolution 
approaches was explored. At this point, it is argued that conflict management initiatives by 
the MNOCs are driven by the assumption that the bottom-up approach is indispensable for 
successful conflict resolution following decades of violence in the Niger Delta region. 
Finally, this thesis considered local communities‟ responses to conflict management 
initiatives by the government and MNOCs. 
1.4 Limitation of the Study and Contribution to Knowledge 
In the upcoming sections, challenges regarding methodology are discussed. This section 
however reflects on other limitations such as the accessibility of literature with regard to the 
topic being explored. This research looks at a case which arises from ongoing violence in an 
oil-rich setting. Its results may not be extrapolated for application in other settings where the 
conflict resolution process emerges from a local community‟s involvement. Yet, there are 
nevertheless lessons to be drawn from each case. Also, whilst the path and type of the 
conflicts in the Niger Delta indicates a conflict with consequences and root-causes that have 
been neglected since colonial times,
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holistic and comprehensive approach. One suggestion in this regard was to consider the local 
community‟s opinion in the conflict management and resolution plan, which in the long-term 
would lead to the implementation of a grassroots-up approach to conflict. Hence, dismissing 
this aspect from the research seems to be a necessary limitation to me because the focus in 
this research is on analysis of causes, impacts and resolution strategies of the conflicts in the 
Niger Delta. Therefore, it makes sense to focus only on the conflict resolution initiatives by 
the MNOCs and the local communities‟ responses to them rather than including all aspects of 
the Niger Delta oil conflict. 
Studying conflicts in the Niger Delta, analysing their causes and impacts, as well as 
investigating their resolution strategies in particular, are crucial for a sustainable and 
successful peace-building. Although connections between the aforementioned concepts, the 
post-conflict recovery and peace-building could obviously be established in a number of 
post-conflict countries (Nwankwo and Ezeobi 2008), in the Niger Delta situation, however, 
conflicts-oil have been proven to be true, but their resolution and management initiatives by 
the MNOCs, and the local communities‟ responses to them, are largely less studied. It is this 
gap that stimulated this research and thus is the main objective pursued throughout this study. 
Following the succinct backdrop as set out earlier, including the context outlined in the 
introduction in this Chapter, conflict management and its resolution by the MNOCs and the 
local communities‟ responses to the MNOCs actions, as discussed in Chapters Six, Seven and 
Eight, constitute the core theme of this research.  
1.5 Organisation of the Research  
This thesis comprises nine Chapters which includes this introduction (Chapter 1) and a 
conclusion (Chapter 9).  
Chapter One offers the context of the study and its framework. It sets out the research aim, 
objectives and questions, as well as the gaps in the literature. It also provides the contribution 
to knowledge and the organisation of the research.  
Chapter Two describes the research methodology and different approaches that have been 
used for the collection and analysis of data which assisted in the development of this 
research. It also provides the initial experience and motivations that prompted the author to 




Chapter Three reviews the literature on the paradox of plenty and oil curse theory, providing 
an account of the economic motivations and opportunity created by oil and weak governance 
in fuelling armed conflict. It particularly focuses on resource curse theory, rentier state 
theory, reality of mineral-based development, role and engagement of corporation in oil 
development, conflict prevention, resolution and management. 
Chapter Four studies the dynamics of the conflicts in the Niger Delta region by exploring the 
factors triggering different conflicts in this setting. The chapter principally majors on the 
early history of Nigeria, colonial rule and the creation of Nigeria, modern Nigeria and the 
Niger Delta region. 
Chapter Five exclusively focuses on the analysis of the conflicts in the Niger Delta region. It 
contextualises all the multi-layered conflict motivations that underline the on-going violence 
in this region. It primarily explores structural factors causing conflict in the Niger Delta 
region and factors driving violence in the Niger Delta region.  
Chapters Four and Five complement each other since the understanding of the dynamics of 
the conflict implies the knowledge of motivations underlining these dynamics.  
Chapter Six investigates the state-sponsored conflict management initiatives. In particular, 
this chapter presents and analyses the state‟s attempts towards managing the conflicts in the 
Niger Delta region. This chapter mainly focuses on the establishment of development 
intervention agencies, revenue allocation, use of military force and amnesty programme. 
Chapter Seven examines conflict management initiatives by the MNOCs. It discusses various 
approaches developed and adopted by the MNOCs to respond to the concerns of local 
communities. It emphasises on various conflict management initiatives adopted by the 
MNOCs, mainly the use of violence and the divide and rule principle as a conflict-settlement 
approach. 
Chapter Eight substantiates the local communities‟ responses to conflict management 
initiatives carried out by the government and MNOCs. It sheds light on the perception of 
indigenes vis-à-vis the government and MNOCs attitudes towards their concerns. It expands 
on succinct overview of the adverse effects of oil and local community opposition in the 
Niger Delta. 
Chapter Nine presents a synthesis of, and conclusion to, this study. This is done based on the 
research questions raised at the beginning of this study. The analytical framework applied in 




regarding conflict resolution and/or its management in the Niger Delta region. It presents 






Chapter Two: Methodology and Research Design 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter explains the research process used in this study including the problems, 
objectives and questions. It starts with a succinct discussion of the theoretical basis to the 
research, presenting the research design as well as the ontology and epistemology underlying 
this study. The research methodologies are also defined, including the field study setting, 
sampling, data collection tools, data analysis and ethical considerations. The researcher‟s 
personal reflection on the fieldwork and the limitations of the study are presented in the last 
sections. 
2.2 Qualitative Research Paradigm 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to study the conflicts in the Niger Delta. Therefore, 
to analyse the causes, impacts and resolution strategies, the investigation and results of this 
study are grounded in the experiences, narratives and opinions of participants and 
respondents, including the MNOCs‟ representatives, government, local communities and 
academic analysts. To complement these findings, the paper also provides a cross-cultural 
review.   
In this research, terms such as „conflict-resolution‟ and „conflict-management‟ are defined as 
„concepts‟, hence, they are subject to misunderstanding due to the fact that they are generic 
terms that cover various and different nuances; moreover, their meaning and understanding 
depend on the way they are being used in the field by various researchers. This alerts 
researchers who should be clearly demarcating concepts that are meant to be used within 
their research, whilst they are determining their case study. Searching on the conflicts in the 
Niger Delta – analysis of causes, impacts and resolution strategies is one field covering 
several other fields and disciplines. I am exploring a cross-cut topic which not only involves 
issues such as; conflict-resolution, conflict management, peace-building and political 
economy to name a few, but also would require a build-up of cross-cut approach to the 
subject Druckman (2009:119). Druckman‟s support to the use of cross-cut approach in this 




the overlap between the various grounds (Ibid). In the same way of thinking, Della-Porta and 
Keating (2008a:34), supporting a cross-cut approach to a cross-cut research study, advises 
that the cross-cut analysis involves „triangulation‟ when a researcher puts in place an 
analytical framework which encompasses various analytical approaches that allow 
verification and comparison between different analytical approaches that have been used. In 
order words, there are several ways of examining a situation and, similarly, numerous likely 
explanations. In the words of McCandless (2007:140): 
Data gathering obtained by the use of several methods guarantees that results are not 
skewed from coming from a single data source. It is therefore arguable that using 
cross-referring or cross-cut approach would be significant to validate, explain and 
extrapolate the research data collected from a case study. 
The case study being looked at uses the qualitative paradigm as the research methodological 
approach. Defined as a social fact encompassing thoughts, beliefs, methods and goals set 
around common tools that guide the actions of human beings, a paradigm is a blend of 
ontological, epistemological and methodological principles (Guba 1990; Della-Porta and 
Keating 2008b). In qualitative research, data have a subjective and interpretive nature and the 
analytical approach to interpret concepts involves a lengthy process, while in quantitative 
approach the numerical variables constitute their findings (Flick 2007; Della-Porta and 
Keating 2008b). Merriam (2009:5) corroborates with Flick, Della-Porta and Keating‟s and 
asserts;  
Qualitative researchers are often interested in discovering the signification of a 
phenomenon of those involved…[by] understanding how people appreciate their 
experience, how they build their worlds, and what explanation they offer to their 
experiences rather than defining cause and effects, forecasting or telling the 
distribution of some attribute among a population… 
An individual‟s explanation of conflict resolution depends on the subjective views that they 
have about these concepts: thus, what one person considers to be conflict resolution or 
management could mean something else to another. Also, as the emphasis of this research is 
on individuals‟ experiences and perceptions about the conflicts in the Niger Delta; analysis of 




technique which might be used in handling and understanding the information delivered by 
the informants and participants involved this research. 
This research lies within a social constructivism methodological approach. Sarantakos 
(2005:37) defines as “neither objective reality nor objective truth…, but a constructed 
reality”. As the groundwork of qualitative methodology, Social Constructivism is therefore 
presented as a „Ping-Pong‟ process or an interaction between one who knows and the 
knowledge and aims to understand a social reality (Gergen 1994). In social sciences, 
particularly in conflict-resolution and/or –management studies, practice is reflective. This 
implies that the building of understanding of the meaning of conflict-resolution and/ or 
conflict-management in these disciplines would be the result of what has been drawn from 
the people‟s understanding and knowledge about how they interconnect in the construction of 
social phenomena (Lederach et al. 2007). Hence, due to its significance in approaching issues 
of a subjective nature, Social Constructivism philosophy seems to be relevant to conduct 
research on conflict-resolution and/ or conflict-management -related activities such as the 
conflicts in the Niger Delta; analysis of causes, impacts and resolution strategies, which 
comprises a number of players including the MNOCs, government and local communities. 
2.3 Pre-Field Preparations and Literature Reviews 
My pre-field preparations were preceded by a substantive review of the literature in the field 
of my research for several reasons. Firstly, I had to be in conformity with Coventry 
University‟s requirement in line with the examination process in order to confirm my 
registration; secondly, it was important that I familiarise myself with the key concepts to be 
used in my research; thirdly, it was compulsory for me to locate my research within the field 
of conflict resolution and management in the Niger Delta. I conducted further literature 
reviewing, and wrote the thesis after data gathering and analysis; the combined process was 
directed by the update of the review and the fieldwork‟s information. Although the first 
literature reviews completed before the fieldwork were regarded as secondary data, the 
reviews done more recently, after the fieldwork, helped to evaluate and draw the line between 
the empirical results obtained from the field and the existing published articles.  
2.3.1 Research Setting and Fieldwork 
The research location of the study originally should have been in the Niger Delta Region. 




me against travelling to the Niger Delta because it was considered a high risk location. I had 
to lessen this challenge by starting the fieldwork in Abuja, Ibadan and Lagos. The choice of 
these cities was guided by the fact that they are safe and home to several MNOCs regional 
offices and it was less difficult for me to meet potential respondents and participants, 
including some Niger Deltans who have chosen these cities as their new settlement. Notably, 
conducting interviews from Abuja, Ibadan and Lagos also enabled me to locate some of the 
Niger Delta‟s community leaders who helped me with interviewing local communities‟ 
leaders, by telephone, email and Skype. During my first round of interviews in Abuja, Ibadan 
and Lagos, it was possible to identify and liaise with potential participants and respondents 
both within and beyond the country. I thus started my first round of fieldwork between June 
and August 2014. In this round, fieldwork was conducted in Abuja and by remote interview 
with participants in the Niger Delta region. However, a second round of fieldwork was 
conducted between October 2015 and March 2016 in Lagos, Ibadan and London. 
The choice of the fieldwork areas also considered the geographical balance between regions. 
Apart from these three Nigerian cities, I also had some informal contacts with the Niger 
Deltan Diaspora in London. Whilst it is true that the settings that involve conflict-oil between 
the MNOCs and indigenes are located in the Niger Delta region, I could not cover fieldwork 
in these particular environments due to security reasons. This difficulty arose as a limitation 
to the research setting of the study. However, this limitation was minimised by conducting 
remote interviews – email discussions and telephone calls, with a few individuals living in 
the Niger Delta region. 
2.3.2 Two Rounds of Fieldwork 
The conflict in the Niger Delta is very dynamic and unpredictable, as the context of violence 
continuously changes. When I first imagined the idea of this research in 2012, the Nigerian 
government and MNOCs‟ conflict resolution blueprint was to offer a period of amnesty 
during which most of the militants surrendered their arms to the government. During that 
same time, oil-communities had high expectation that their locally born president, Goodluck 
Ebele Jonathan, would improve socio-economic and environmental issues that they were 
facing. In reference to the conflicts, it was decided to explore mechanisms towards 
preventing the conflicts in the Niger Delta region. However, following the conclusion of the 
first round of the fieldwork from June to August 2014 in Abuja, the situation changed 
entirely. In November 2014, local communities became agitated, accusing the MNOCs of not 




result, there was an uprising of criminal activity, oil bunkering and the kidnapping of 
MNOCs‟ foreign employees. In these changing contexts and in agreement with my 
supervising team, it was decided to incorporate the different attempts at conflict resolution 
and management made by the MNOCs and the responses of local communities to them, 
whilst retaining the overall aims and objectives of the research. I also sensed the need to take 
into account the new context and its inferences in order to understand not only the conflict 
management initiatives by the MNOCs, but also the local communities‟ responses to these 
initiatives and the federal government‟s posture vis-à-vis this situation. Consequently, a 
second fieldwork study was conducted in Lagos, Ibadan and London between October 2015 
and March 2016 in order to be updated on the situation adjustment from oil company 
representatives, government agency officials, academic experts, civil society organisations 
and Niger Delta indigenes based in these cities but directly involved in the peacebuilding 
developments in the region. This thesis is constructed using both primary and secondary data. 
2.3.3 Recruitment of Participants 
The selection of participants was primarily done based on the sampling method used in 
Constructivist methodology. The selection of other respondents was done through a partial 
use of purposive sampling, since the results in the field are not mismatched with the 
Constructivist approach. Sampling in Constructivist Theory is a process which is conducted 
together with data gathering and analysis. It draws away from determining participants prior 
to data collection and is a strategy which easily determines respondents using the common 
trend emerging from data analysis (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). Coined as a “theoretical 
sampling” process by Glaser and Strauss (1967:45), the Constructivist approach gives the 
researcher the opportunity to select the people to be interviewed and to decide on the content 
of the interview questions, on the grounds of the emerging concepts from the continuing 
interviews and analysis. Applied to my research, I commenced my fieldwork by interviewing 
some oil company representatives, government agency officials and academic experts in 
Abuja. At this stage of my fieldwork, the choice of my research‟s participants was planned 
already, for the simple reason that this has been set as an initial access point for my 
fieldwork. Information I gleaned from my prime literature review undertaken before my 
fieldwork helped me in the selection of potential respondents during this initial phase of the 
fieldwork project. The interview further helped me in the collection of primary information 
on the whereabouts of participants and respondents. Hence, when I began the fieldwork, the 




selected method through which the choice of interviewees is directed based on the basis of 
the need expressed by the researcher and the specific topic being examined. Purposive 
sampling suits a case study where the researcher already has some ideas and knowledge of 
the people being explored (Brewer and Hunter 1990), as in my own case.  
In my first fieldwork trip, I undertook interviews with four individuals working for oil 
companies, six government officials, four academics and one member of civil society in 
Abuja. During my second fieldwork‟s trip, my interviews were held with one government 
official, six members of civil society organisations, ten Niger Delta indigenes, two ex-
militants based in Lagos, four academics in Ibadan and two oil company employees in 
London. Apart from the two ex-militants, most interviews were conducted with the Niger 
Delta indigenes, academics, civil society members and oil employees because I could easily 
reach out to them and because they are acquainted with the developments of the conflicts in 
the Niger Delta region. It is likewise significant to equate and compare the witnesses of the 
respondents mentioned above with supplementary information gleaned from militants and 
even other opposing groups (Barrett 2011). At this point, I conducted further semi-structured 
interviews with ex-militants and a few oil-communities‟ leaders. By doing this, I was 
convinced that in order to have a credible analysis of conflict resolution and conflict 
management, it is critical to take note of what the participants in violence think about the 
crisis in their region (Graham 2007). I was assisted by local and national facilitators in 
building a network of contacts, in recording notes in the field and in collecting information 
supplied by interviewees. 









 round of 
fieldwork 
Total % 
1 N. Delta Indigenes 0 10 10 25 
2 Ex-militants 0 2 2 5 
3 MNOCs Reps. 4 2 6 15 
4 Government Officials 6 1 7 17.5 
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5 Academics 4 4 8 20 
6 Civil Society 1 6 7 17.5 
 Total number  40 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2014-2016. 
 
2.3.4 The Semi-Structure Interview 
Also known as in-depth interview, the semi-structure interview is a collective and interactive 
technique of communication which is used as the main data gathering tool in this study. I 
have used semi-structured questions during my in-depth interviews. Semi-structured 
interviewing includes questions that facilitate dialogue and debate and allows the interviewer 
to explore specific subjects or responses further. It allows interviewees to go beyond 
specified responses. Questions from semi-structured interview are used to appreciate how 
inputs work and how they could be improved. It is a technique whereby participants and 
respondents can feel free to discuss with the researcher and to voice issues that might not be 
taken into account in the researcher‟s agenda during the planning stage of the fieldwork 
(Neuman 2003). The process is also a useful and appropriate tool for gathering data in 
various stages. In the context of this thesis, in-depth semi-structure interviews were 
elaborated around three different themes namely; conflict analysis, conflict resolution and 
management, as well as community involvement. After that, I coded each respondent based 
on the reference number given to each interview. 
To assess the preliminary stage of my interview, I structured open questions set in three 
different themes. They were concisely phrased in order to avoid the effect of prearranged 
proofs which could have some impacts on the interviews. Rather, semi-structured questions 
were asked in a way harmonious with the situation in order to elicit further information. All 
respondents were asked the same questions, but according to their knowledge regarding the 
theme.
3
 For example, I always started interviewing respondents using open questions which 
offered them the opportunity to express their opinion about their understanding of the 
immediate causes of the conflicts. Once a respondent answers this question, further correlated 
questions were asked including: what is your opinion about the ongoing amnesty programme 
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in the Niger Delta? What do you think is the main reason why militants are participating in 
the programme? In your opinion, to what extent do you think issues surrounding the conflicts 
have been adequately addressed? What does peace in the Niger Delta mean to you?  What 
roles do you think the MNOCs have in achieving sustainable peace in the region? The in-
depth interviews with some oil-community‟s members were principally used to collect data 
and cross-verify the responses gathered from the MNOCs‟ and government‟s officials. 
Interviews were undertaken in English and sometimes in the local dialect, later translated into 
English. The English version is provided when citing. In a few cases, terms in the indigenous 
language were used to highlight the original meaning, though their translation into English 
was given. Once I felt that no further information was transpiring from the conversation, I 
would then end the interview. 
2.3.5 Focus Group Discussion (FGDs) 
Focus group discussion is another tool that this research used for data collection. It is 
different from the in-depth interview which includes a private and individual conversation. 
Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2008:375) define a focus group discussion as a “collective 
conversation.” Liamputtong (2011) suggests that focus group method is often mistaken for a 
group interview or a focus group interview. In reality, explain Fontana and Frey (2000), it is 
more formal than the group interviews. However, Morgan (1997) argues that the formality 
criteria might be a problematic concept for it is not often likely to differentiate formal from 
informal interaction in focus group discussions. Indeed, this difficulty or confusion could 
emerge from within the preference of the researcher and the background of a focus group 
discussion. 
When a FGD sides with in-depth interview, a quandary as for the pre-eminence of 
preference, in terms of which of both needs to be used first, emerges. However, for myself, I 
drew on Morgan‟s (1997:22-23) model; my fieldwork started with in-depth interviews. They 
were of much help in increasing information, learning and understanding the process of the 
study phenomena, of which in turn I have had more insights, e.g. selecting population cluster, 
environment, venue and time for the FGD. I conducted three focus group discussions during 






Table 2.2: Details of FGDs 
FGD 
N0 
Date Number of 
participants 
Location Comments 
o.  Male Female   
1 2014 4 2 Abuja Discussion facilitated by a 
member of the civil society. 
2 2015 5 3 Ibadan Discussion facilitated by a 
member of the civil society. 
3 2016 4 6 Lagos Discussion facilitated by a 
member of the civil society. 
Source: Fieldwork, 2014-2016 
Gender debates regarding FGD participants are still topical (Morgan 1997; Liamputtong 
2011). In my research, I have drawn from Morgan‟s (1997) model in selecting homogenous 
groups of participants, as I supported his opinion that homogeneity may assure open and 
flowing discussions amongst participants. Additionally, lessons learned from in-depth 
interviews suggest that respondents from the Niger Delta indigenes and independent 
associations were more open and even available to communicate with me than others, 
particularly those from MNOCs and government.  
Below is detailed the way the FGDs were conducted: 
- In terms of the time: one and a half hours were allocated to each FGD. 
- In terms of organisation: there was an agreement between the local facilitator and the 
researcher: the former was organising the FGDs whilst the latter conducting 
discussions. 
- In terms of procedure: each FGD started with a succinct induction to inform 
participants and clarify the objectives of the discussion and the expectations placed on 
them. 
- In terms of communication: English was used as the discussion language during the 
FGDs. 
It is noteworthy that more than three respondents have been able to link me with other 
participants who have been of much help in terms of supplying information. This process, also 
known as the snowballing technique, consisted of one participant linking the researcher to 




participants (Gimba 2014). The snowballing approach in the context of my research also aimed to 
exploit the social system of the individuals who were able to offer me a good number of 
knowledgeable participants for my fieldwork (Vogt 1999; Faugier and Sargeant 1997; Thomson 
1997). Here it is important to emphasise the fact that the case under study falls under qualitative 
research and is of a subjective nature. Thus, the use of the snowballing technique particularly 
through interviews is justifiable (Hendricks et al. 1992). On the other hand, due to security 
problems existing within the region of the Niger Delta, I was compelled to limit my fieldwork 
within secured areas. As a result, I could not be in the Niger Delta in order to have direct 
conversations with the Niger Deltans. The snowballing technique in this context functioned as a 
formal method of reaching a cluster of people who would not have been easy to meet using other 
sampling methods (Snijders 1992; Faugier and Sergeant 1997); in particular, the identification of 
the Niger Delta indigenes in the areas that I was safely able to access.  
On my first fieldwork trip I went to the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Environment 
in Abuja. These Ministries have allegedly been working on new policies regarding conflict 
management and environmental clean-up in the Niger Delta. It was during those visits that I met 
four key government agency officials. There was the opportunity to have interviews with them, 
after which they connected me with other environmental experts of Shell and ExxonMobil who 
helped me to conduct remote interviews with some oil company-based environmental engineers 
in the Niger Delta region. Following my interviews with them, they were able to give me referrals 
for further insights regarding the topic being studied with their colleagues in London. Similarly, 
there were visits to academic experts in Ibadan. Finally, I went to a research institute based in the 
University of Lagos. Here I carried out focus group discussions with officials, researchers and 
specialists. Owing to the conflicting and political orientation of the topic under study, referrals 
made by links through the snowballing technique assisted me in developing trust with different 
individuals selected to participate in the research. I could get hold of more research participants 
most of whom were not known to me. 
2.3.6 Secondary Data 
The use of secondary sources of data in qualitative research is usual in social science research 
(Neuman 2003). In this thesis, I have used secondary sources to substantiate and support the 
analysis and arguments. The findings gleaned from secondary sources mainly encompassed 
published and unpublished documents, technical reports and agreements from the 
government and various United Nations (UN) agencies. In addition, reports and news 
coverage in a range of newspapers and news magazines published in Abuja have been used. 




at the thesis writing time so as to supplement information from the field. Such data are 
referenced to as, or incorporated in, footnotes, where applicable.  
2.3.7 Data Analysis 
This research and its data analysis techniques fall within the constructivist approach 
(Charmaz 2000; 2006). The analysis of findings involves an epistemological approach based 
on two aspects: Firstly, the interpretation and understanding of the significance of the 
participants‟ knowledge regarding the subject under study and, secondly, the 
contextualisation of the subject, in terms of its conflicting and political orientation, particular 
time, environment, place and culture (Ghezeljeh and Emami 2009). In the constructivist 
approach, data analysis goes along with data collection (Ezzy 2002) in an integrated way. 
The integrated research method enables the researcher to have a desirable number of regular 
exchanges with participants (Gimba 2014), useful as a guidance when the researcher 
develops the theoretical framework from emerging theoretical implication (Charmaz 2000; 
Ezzy 2002; Gimba 2014). Figure 2.3 below shows the change from a traditional disconnected 
approach, in which data collection and analysis are separate processes, to that of an integrated 
approach in which data collection and analysis are interrelated. 







Source: Ezzy (2002:62). 
In the constructivist method, data coding remains the entry-point toward analysis. According 
to Charmaz (2006), coding is a bipartite constituent composed of open coding and focused 
coding. Open coding is a word-naming process that helps the researcher to think of the 
meaning which might be related to the data (Charmaz 2000). Focused coding, however, is the 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 




identification and categorisation of more recurrent concepts from the data by the researcher 
(Charmaz 2006). Selective focused coding assists the researcher in choosing themes that are 
the groundwork of the analysis and theory which arises directly from the analysis of the data 
(Gimba 2014: 55-56).  
During my research fieldwork, I concurrently collected and analysed data after the coding 
process. First, the results categorising the respondents were clustered into themes or subjects: 
Theme A (conflict analysis), Theme B (conflict resolution and management) and Theme C 
(community involvement). After that, I coded each respondent based on the reference number 
given to each interview. For example, different interviews undertaken under different themes 
were coded as TA1, TA4, TA6 and TA8. The same applied to interviews under Themes B 
and C. 
The record of data was carefully kept for each theme. Interview résumés, comments and 
copies were reviewed closely on a regular basis to identify key ideas. The choice of „open 
codes‟ during interviews remained the prime point of analysis. This technique applied equally 
to all responses to different open questions from interviews and focus group discussions. 
After the selection of open codes, the most repeated ones arising out of interviews were the 
subject of comparison and contrast. These codes are called focus codes in the constructivist 
approach (Charmaz 2006), which I call „concepts‟ in this study. Concepts are wider samples 
drawn from the open codes that have produced some large subjects considered as „themes‟ in 
this research. Chapters in line with analysis in this thesis are grounded on the concepts or 
themes that fit together. Since themes are constituents of results and the analytical basis of 
this thesis, chapters in connection with analysis are presented in a way that explains different 
interlaced main themes and concepts.  
2.4 Ethical Consideration 
 Ethical authorisation for this study was approved by the Research Ethic Committee at 
Coventry University after the processing of proposed research.
4
 For anonymity and ethical 
reasons, as set out in the research ethical approval, and based on most of the participant‟s 
wishes, respondents and some of their direct quotations have been kept anonymous. 
However, a pseudonym was provided where it happened to be necessary. Each respondent 
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was given a briefing sheet
5
 before each interview and before obtaining an interviewee‟s 
consent.
6
 Moreover, I explained the rationale of the research to each respondent and 
participant and what I expected from them. I also told them that it would be possible for them 
to cancel an interview for any reason at any time they desired to. At the conclusion of an 
interview, I gave each interviewee an opportunity to ask questions about me and my research, 
or to request for any explanation of any worry or issue which could transpire. I have 
guaranteed that all participants were adults of over 18 years of age and that any kind of 
discrimination was rigorously avoided. 
2.5 Personal Reflection on the Fieldwork 
My research is parastatal-funded under the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources. Several years before my doctoral reading, I worked for a state‟s oil company for a 
few years where I have some networks. During my fieldwork I have used these networks to 
access potential participants that I needed for my research. It should be noted at this stage that 
initially these potential participants were reluctant, as they were not convinced about the 
educational purposes of my research. I needed to provide academic documents, such as ethic 
approval, in order for them to accept any conversation with me. Before answering questions, 
some interviewees even admitted to Googling my centre and myself, just to be certain. I 
would say that the oil company representatives were more professional, but were obviously 
not too eager to respond honestly to my interview questions. During my conversations with 
them, they always had politically correct answers with a very defensive undertone. Maybe 
this was because they were tired of the bias and blame they received from the media, the 
International Community, Niger Delta Communities and Nigerians at large. Most oil 
company representatives and government agency officials in the field approached interviews 
as an attack. I was able to change my strategy, putting their mind at ease and engaging in 
conversation about policy and current events. My fieldwork concomitantly coincided with the 
outbreak of the Ebola virus, while at the same time Boko Haram insurgency was at its peak. 
These two events made me cautious with the respondents who often showed themselves to be 
reserved in responding to some questions.  
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Niger Delta indigenes were the most difficult to interview from my experience in the field. 
These respondents reminded me of what it meant to be a young female from the north of the 
country. It was through their eyes that I realised Nigeria has serious cultural and religious 
issues. They bear a lot of resentment towards the Muslim north and still hold a grudge against 
the political power blocs that had been created by the colonial administration. Niger Delta 
and Igbo ethnic groups believe the British favoured the Northern, predominantly Muslim, 
part of Nigeria. The three dominant ethnic groups in this area are Yoruba, Igbo and 
Hausa/Fulani; these groups regard the colonialists‟ favouritism as the root of their political 
and economic marginalisation. Most times I felt like a prey; they saw me as entitled and took 
a lot of convincing, but they were adamant that being a female Hausa/Fulani Muslim 
Northerner, as they call us, I would never understand the struggle and challenges they faced.  
Niger Delta indigenes are tough and very pessimistic, so I understand why there is a high risk 
for a researcher to travel to the Niger Delta State. Niger Delta oil resource conflict is a 
sensitive issue, so not all questions will be perceived well by Niger Delta indigenes. Being 
from another tribe, or white oyinbo, as they call white people, is not an advantage. They are 
angry and guarded. They also see themselves as different to every other Nigerian citizen 
because they believe that anything to do with oil belongs to them. They were suspicious that I 
wanted to interview to take advantage and capitalise on them as is their usual experience. 
However, indigenes agreed with my research objective to tackle the problem: they 
understood the need for accurate information sharing, so it was on that basis that they gave 
their inputs.  
Travelling in Abuja was easy although I did face challenges contacting lecturers to arrange 
appointments in Lagos and Ibadan due to busy schedules. My interviews with the academics 
were most insightful: the lecturers were involved with peace and conflict studies 
programmes. They gave me tips and a lot of relevant materials. They felt encouraged by the 
prospect of dialogue; something which convinced me that my research could help as a tool 
for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. Focus group discussions and observation with civil 
society organisations were entertaining as well as useful, and overall very informative. It was 
a learning experience for me. The youth groups were inspiring: they believe in their activism 
and their mission and are hopeful that one day their voices will be heard by the Federal-
State‟s Government and Multinational oil companies. Civil Society also believed that their 
continued activism highlights the responsibilities of the multinational oil companies, the State 




determination, social justice, environmental protection and the end to senseless killings by 
the government‟s joint task force. They raise awareness of the abject poverty in the Niger 
Delta communities, the polluted environment and lack of development in the region that is 
earning Nigeria billions of dollars in oil revenue.  
I did face personal setbacks in the field: adjusting to the weather conditions (it was very hot 
in the field); lack of electricity and poor Internet service. There were also difficulties in 
movement due to security challenges in the capital because of the Boko Haram insurgency. 
Ironically, another minor challenge to my study of the Niger Delta was the relative peace 
achieved through the amnesty programme, which meant that respondents were instead more 
concerned about the Boko Haram Insurgency and the Ebola epidemic. Overall, the account of 
my fieldwork experience shows that holding interviews with women was easier because they 
were more encouraging and eager to answer questions. Women were impressed by my study 
and were excited at the prospect of contributing any information that could potentially help 
with conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. I did not experience any trust issues with them: 
most women wanted to wander off from the topic and talk about the importance of girls‟ 
education; maybe I served as a reminder to them of a cause dear to their heart. Ultimately the 







Chapter Three: The Curse of Oil for Hydrocarbons-Rich and -Producing 
Countries 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the literature in reference with the subject being researched, namely the 
analysis of causes, impacts and resolution strategies for conflicts in the Niger Delta, and 
addresses the research questions pertaining to the background and other causes of the 
conflict. It casts some light on the relevance of resource curse theory and its implications 
including; rentier state, social movements, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and conflict 
management etc., in order to examine and provide guidance in addressing the main research 
question of this study.  
Resource curse hypothesis, also referred to as „paradox of plenty‟ or „adverse effect of 
abundance‟,
7
 mainly claims that natural resources abundance in general encourages civil war 
for they offer motive and opportunity for conflict and create and enable indirect institutional 
and economic causes of instability. Going hand-in-hand with resource curse theory, the 
rentier state theory, however, suggests that mineral-dependent regimes rely on resources 
revenue, through the use of patronage, significant distributive policies and real violence, to 
buy off peace. Politically, it is arguable that such rentier states tend to be more stable and less 
exposed to conflict. Both theories thus imply ambivalent effects of resource abundance on 
conflict flare-up; something which would need further insight in order to understand the role 
of resources in the development of resource-rich and resource-dependent states. This chapter 
sets down part of a solution to this noticeable problem in the case of oil-/mineral-dependent 
countries. The main argument here is that in order to establish the link between mineral/oil 
and long-lasting conflict in resource-dependent states, there would be the need for factoring 
into both resource wealth per capita and degree of resource dependence, since only the 
availability of very high per capita revenues from oil and/or minerals allows governments to 
achieve internal stability. The substantiation of this argument is done through the review of 
the appropriate literature on mineral-based state development, elaborated in the following 
sections; resource curse and rentier state, reality of mineral-based development, role and 
                                                 
7




engagement of corporations in oil development, and conflict prevention, conflict resolution 
and conflict management. 
3.2 Resource Curse and Rentier State  
Rentier state theory and the paradox of plenty thesis are the two main theoretical approaches 
that hinge around resource abundance (Mähler 2010) and might be seen as belonging to the 
same paradigm, since they both posit that the state-building process and the development of 
its institutions during the time of resource abundance are locked into development 
trajectories. This is a process which always yields negative development endings, including 
poor economic performance, growth failures, a great degree of corruption, ineffectual 
governance and higher political unpredictability (Poteete 2009). The following sections will 
shed light on the resource curse and rentier state theories for an appropriate understanding of 
mineral-led conflicts as they occur in the Niger Delta. 
3.2.1 Resource Curse Theory 
Countries with fewer or no resources have both opportunities and challenges: economic, 
political and social. When resource wealth is efficiently used, these resources may be a 
source of greater prosperity for present and forthcoming generations. However, when poorly 
managed, they may be a triggering factor of economic uncertainty, social conflict and lasting 
environmental damage. The resource curse theory alludes to the failure of resource-rich 
countries to use their wealth to fully benefit the development of their country and that of their 
people, (Burgis 2015) due to the failure of their institutions to effectively live up to public 
welfare needs. The resource curse as a concept refers to the significant social, economic and 
political challenges that are particular to minerals-rich countries. While it could be argued 
that after a country discovers natural resource wealth, better development outcome is 
expected, resource-rich countries however tend to have a great number of conflicts and 
authoritarian institutions, and high rates of economic instability and economic development, 
compared to non-resource-rich countries (Williams 2016). Drawing on political and economy 
theories about why some resource-rich countries do not do as well as expected, political 
scientists and economists put forward that mineral wealth, particularly hydrocarbons, is 
different from other types of wealth due to its large rents, scale price, production volatility, its 
non-renewable nature and the secrecy of the industry (Beblawi and Luciani 2016). On the 
grounds of resource curse theory, it might be held that many of mineral-rich countries are still 




countries also appear to be more authoritarian, more disposed to conflict and economically 
instability compared to those without these resources (Williams 2016). While mineral-rich 
countries generally face unique challenges linked to oil, mining and gas extraction, 
governments might produce policy decisions that could help address the negative 
consequences of extraction, hence maximising the benefits. However, how could the special 
characteristics of natural resources revenues create additional challenges for countries? The 
following prominent observations and theories attempt to shed light on this question. 
Political scientists in general have been of the view that when government expenditure is 
dependent on citizen taxation, they have to be more receptive to their populations and are 
more likely to transition to democracy. On the contrary, however, when large revenues of the 
country stem from natural resources, such as rents from oil (as explained later), they tend to 
be less reliant on levying taxes on citizens, thus the people feel less invested in the national 
budget. As a direct result, asserts Williams (2016), politicians and government officials are 
also less directly concerned with citizens‟ requests or demands. In addition, when resource 
revenues are undisclosed, citizens lack a clear sense of the resource revenues management 
and whether they are being rationally spent or not. Those who support this view (Downey, 
Bonds and Clark 2010; Okunola and Ikuomola 2012; Green and Otto 2014) hold that 
transparency and accountability of revenues builds up trust between government and citizens. 
Through these processes, citizens are directly involved in planning or the direct distribution 
of wealth; one way which could help to mitigate the tendency toward authoritarianism. 
As regards to conflict, some studies (Picton-Turbervill 2014; Beblawi and Luciani 2016; 
Williams 2016) have proved that natural resources could trigger internal conflicts as different 
armed groups tend to fight for control of the resources, or use natural resources to fund their 
fighting. Since 1990, suggestions from political scientists (Alao 2007; Chidi 2010, Williams 
2016) advise that oil-rich countries in Africa have been twice as likely as expected to have a 
civil war compared to non-oil-producing countries. Angola, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Iraq, Libya and Nigeria are examples which illustrate this tendency (Picton-
Turbervill 2014; Williams 2016). In the Persian Gulf however, petro-aggression, the 
tendency of oil-producing states to instigate or be targets of international conflict, has been 
identified in some cases, such as Iraq‟s invasion of Iran and Kuwait (Picton-Turbervill 
2014:102). But there is still an ongoing debate as to whether the data support the conclusion 





Inefficient expenditure and borrowing are one of the prevailing characteristics of resource-
rich countries. A few researchers in the field have been of the consensus that the amount of 
resource revenues collected by mineral-rich governments could fluctuate greatly from year to 
year owing to changes in commodities prices and production (Downey, Bonds and Clark 
2010; Okunola and Ikuomola 2012; Green and Otto 2014). In essence, these scholars are of 
the view that in resource-rich countries, a governments‟ tendency is to overspend on things 
such as government salaries, inefficient fuel subsidies and large monuments, while health, 
education and other social services are allocated meagre budget. In effect, spending 
fluctuations and unpredictable revenues are problematic. One of the endemic concerns in 
most of mineral-rich countries is that during boom-bust cycles governments often get trapped 
as they tend to spend on legacy projects, including airports and monuments, when revenues 
are increasing and then have to make painful cuts or impose austerity when revenues drop 
(Picton-Turbervill 2014). This lack of discipline in public finance often goes together with 
over-debt. That is to say that when governments have enhanced credit-worthiness at the time 
of revenue growth, they often over-borrow. This type of management ends in debt crises 
when revenues decline, as was the case in Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela in the 1980s. The 
private sector can equally be affected, as it might over-invest in boom times and then face 
widespread bankruptcy during busts (Schubert 2006; Okunola and Ikuomola 2012). 
A large increase in natural resource revenues could have a negative impact on other sectors of 
the economy by triggering inflation or exchange rate appreciation and changing labour and 
capital from the non-resource sector to the resource sector (Beblawi and Luciani 2016). 
Dutch disease offers a perfect illustration of this stance. In the same vein of thinking, some 
(Schubert 2006; Downey, Bonds and Clark 2010; Okunola and Ikuomola 2012) have held 
that while inflation and exchange rate appreciation could deteriorate large swathes of the 
economy within a few years, their impacts can last for decades. This argument concurs with 
the documentation of the disadvantageous effect of natural resources on other economic 
sectors and/or industries as occurred in Iran, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, all 
of which have either underdeveloped manufacturing sectors or have experienced a rapid 
deterioration in manufacturing (Bonds and Clark 2010). However, these impacts could be 
reduced, provided that the country develops the absorptive capacity to transform resource 
revenue inflows into palpable investments, namely roads and electricity. To this end, the 
government would need to spend resource revenues investing in the economy that yields 
growth for the non-resource sector; or to invest a share of its resource revenues in foreign 




Norway and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have successfully overcome Dutch disease 
over the last 25 years by investing oil revenues in the parts of the economy that produce non-
resource sector growth. 
Mineral-rich countries tend to experience patriarchy and gender-based challenges. The 
political economy of resource curse as developed by Beblawi and Luciani (2016) and 
Williams (2016) suggests that mineral-endowed countries tend to have a very limited number 
of women in the workforce and their representation in the government is also smaller. The 
impact of natural resource wealth on women is disproportionate compared to men. One 
reason could be that industries such as export-oriented manufacturing, that usually offer work 
opportunities to women, are less likely to thrive in resource-rich countries due to Dutch 
disease (Beblawi and Luciani 2016). Furthermore, a few studies (Beblawi and Luciani 2016; 
Williams 2016) have established that in resource-rich regions women are highly prone to 
HIV/AIDS and other life-threatening diseases. It has also been shown that the large inflow of 
male individuals to communities surrounding mining zones significantly increases the rates 
of gender-based violence. This tendency is particularly frightening as a continual set of 
studies note that gender reform is crucial to long-term poverty reduction (CORDAID 2014). 
As a panacea to this, researchers advise countries to initiate policies that protect 
manufacturing so as to avoid Dutch disease. Also, the development plans of governments 
surrounding resource-rich areas would need to incorporate gender perspectives (Beblawi and 
Luciani 2016). 
In most mineral and hydrocarbon-producing countries, governments have a limited capacity 
to amass resource benefits. In some cases, just a little portion of the production value of the 
resource remains in the country (Alao 2007). One reason is that the existence of several fiscal 
regimes and the rules regarding the share of profits between companies and governments 
always fails to recompense the state and communities for exhausting their wealth and the 
related environmental destruction or loss of livelihood (Johnston 1994; Gordon, Paterson and 
Usenmez 2011). These unorthodox and bad arrangements may often occur when countries 
are so keen to promote resource extraction that they reduce the rates for taxes and royalties 
with little knowledge of the real worth of their resources. Mazeel‟s (2010) work suggest that 
countries such as Argentina, Canada, the United States and South Africa have less than 50 
per cent of the average effective tax rate (AETR) on many oil projects, while Cameroon, 
DRC, Peru and the Philippines have 40 per cent of the AETR on many mining projects. In 




AETR on many oil projects. Furthermore, in capital-intensive (but not labour-intensive) 
extractive industries, few non-tax benefits, such as jobs, go to local people. Even though 
mineral-producing countries could often have very high prospects for employment, inland 
business development and enhancement of workforce skills (also referred to as local content), 
the real number of opportunities might remain few. One explanation of this is that the 
industry has a very small employment rate relative to the scope of investments and those jobs 
seem to be tremendously specialised, while the appropriate equipment required to implement 
them is commonly imported from abroad, (Picton-Turbervill 2014). 
Beblawi and Luciani (2016) put forward that in mineral-producing countries, leaders are 
unlikely to invest in industrious enterprises, such as job-creating manufacturing industries. 
Instead they fight for control of resources. Furthermore, this elites‟ rent-seeking pursuit 
always results in weaker institutional development. It might be argued that the high weakness 
of institutions in resource-rich countries is the result of the ease with which elites can access 
large sums of money for themselves (Williams 2016). Those who support this theory further 
submit that large single-point sources of revenue, like an oil project, can be managed outside 
the required budget practice, hence making it relatively easy to be seized by potent elites. 
Sovereign wealth funds, national oil companies and contractors for extractive operations are 
often used as examples of tools utilised to capture revenues. In a few circumstances, 
politicians or state officials have also been using what is termed „rent-seizing‟ which consists 
of purposefully dismantling societal checks or developing new regulations to access these 
resources or to provide access for friends or family (Green and Otto 2014, Burgis 2015). The 
main argument in this theory is that the pursuit of rent-seeking and rent-seizing by elites in 
mineral-rich countries encourages corruption and is harmful to institutional development. 
Those countries whose elite are rent-seekers and rent-seizers end up having weaker 
institutions and lower levels of public service delivery. The data supporting this theory are 
hotly debated, even though Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Tunisia offer well-documented 
examples as evidence (Burgis 2015). 
Sharing and compensating for resources such as land, water and minerals could be source of 
conflict between the extraction companies and the communities. Social and environmental 
problems arise when the extractive industries attempt to balance their needs against those of 
the community and the protection of the environment. Kadafa (2012) advises that the point-
source nature of extractive industries frequently goes together with conflicts when attempting 




withDowney, Bonds and Clark‟s (2010) view that extraction projects often entice great 
arrivals of people, whether or not supplementary employment is really available. Failure to 
reconcile both needs could be a source of grievance as mining minerals always involves 
disturbance on economic, social and cultural relations (Downey, Bonds and Clark 2010; 
Kadafa 2012). It is also worth underlining that many of the political and economic problems 
described above result in the violation of human rights. On this point, the contract between 
the government and the extraction company could set out these issues and elucidate who 
would be accountable for managing these impacts. This is where the greediness of those in 
power and the grievance of local community, as developed further, collide and would often 
end in open conflict.  
3.2.2 Rentier State Theory: Oil Rents 
Political and international relations scientists define a rentier state as a state which draws its 
revenues from the rent of local resources to external clients (Omeje 2006:11; Basedau and 
Lay 2009). Rents are usually defined as revenue received from exported natural resources 
(Beblawi 1990:85). The theoretical basis of the rentier state model draws its source from 
Hussein Madhavy‟s work (Madhavy 1970). The rentier state concept was formulated in the 
study of the patterns and economic problems associated with oil-producing states in the 
Middle East, particularly in Iran and the Gulf Monarchies. Subsequently, the theory was used 
to study the source of institutional instability within resource-rich countries in Africa and 
South America (Basedau and Lay 2009; Beblawi and Lucianai 2016). Rents are believed to 
be exterior to the economy because they are not derived from internal productive structures 
but are externally derived, courtesy of global capital. Drawing from this view, a rentier state 
could be defined as a state that depends highly on taxes and royalties paid by multinational 
companies (MNCs) and on profits from its equity interests in MNCs‟ investments (Forrest 
1993:142; Karl 1997). In the World Bank classification of a mineral economy, rentier 
economy or rentier state is alluded to as a country in which mineral production contributes to 
at least 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while its exports represent at least 
40 per cent of total exports (Nankani 1979). Most African resource-rich countries, including 
Nigeria, could be classified as a rentier state as their economies largely derive from the 
mining, oil and gas sectors which constitutes 80% of its revenue (GDP) and 90% of its export 
earnings (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011).  
The main point that rentier theory holds is that the rents generated by rentier states are 




rather than the welfare of the society in general. The state elites lack incentives to develop 
sets of reciprocal obligations with citizens through the nexus of domestic taxation by 
depending on „unearned‟ income (in the form of mineral rents). Consequently, the state is 
free to distribute the rent the way it deems fit especially in a manner that will buy off peace 
and stability. While dependence on rents thus may destroy institutional value, development 
and democracy, rents also afford ruling elites with enormous resources, hence compensating 
for the indirect effects on stability (Beblawi 1987; Luciani 1987:7; Karl 1997: 21-22). The 
following mechanisms have been pointed out as the possible means through which the ruling 
elites distribute rent in a rentier state. 
Firstly, the state could spend the rents in acquiring a repressive security apparatus to keep any 
form of rebellion at bay. Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 567) have explained the fact that 
resource abundant states such as Saudi Arabia have been able to avoid conflict by using oil 
resources to keep every potential upheaval at bay. Secondly, rentier state elites might decide 
to distribute the rent in a proactive way to buy off democratisation pressures. This could be in 
the form of engaging in extensive distributive or „populist‟ policies (Le Billon 2001: 565), 
which involves free basic services (healthcare and education), distributing subsidies and large 
public sector employment. Thirdly, state elites could decide to create clientist networks 
whereby a selective and small group of leaders benefit from the rent distribution. In this case, 
rent is distributed among a trivial part of the population which includes potential political 
rivals. This is equally a strategy used to maintain political stability (Le Billon 2003; Basedau 
and Lay 2009). Alliances could be formed with external support, especially in the case of 
major oil producing countries, to help deter any form of rebellion. Major powers might help 
to ensure political stability in order to secure their supply of energy or other vital 
commodities (Humphreys 2005:533). 
A state‟s elites could use any of the mechanisms mentioned above as long as the state does 
not have further tax or the domestic economy for revenue (Luciani 1990). The case being 
studied shows that Nigeria‟s ruling elites use heavy security apparatus and clientist network 
mechanisms as a means to achieve stability. Clientist networks emphasise the link between 
the rentier state and neopatrimonialism. Meanwhile, neopatrimonialism provides the 
apparatus to distribute and manage resource wealth among the ruling elites to sustain the 
regime. 
All regimes involve leaders and a small cartel of important elites who negotiate with others to 




privilege, and build new elites as circumstances dictate. However, the particular style adopted 
in the rentier state is one in which the head of state is at the centre of all, requiring absolute 
submission from its subordinate elite (Beblawi and Luciani 2016). These subordinate elites 
further create their own patron-client networks down the neopatrimonial system, extending 
into organisations and social components which serve as a conduit for resources and political 
control to these components, in return for political and other information as requested by the 
higher elite.  
There is a blurred distinction between public and private domains which results in 
inefficiency of institutions as well as uncertainty and irregularity about the behaviour and role 
of both institutions and agents (Basedau and Lay 2009; Erdmann and Engel 2006), something 
which hinders institutional quality and growth (Karl 1997: 21-22). Nevertheless, rentier state 
elites adopt expenditure policy rather than a well-articulated economy diversification policy 
(Luciani 1990), something which often results in prevalent economic inefficiency. The two 
fundamental effects of dependence on economic rents include economic inefficiency and, as 
a consequence, the impediment of socioeconomic development (Beck 2007: 46). Undeniably, 
this is inevitable since the rents are spent in building a network (a bloated public sector) that 
will sustain the elite‟s political power rather than pursuing economic development agendas. 
Basedau and Lay (2009) support Beck‟s stance and add that resource wealth is connected to 
poor economic growth, inadequate economic diversification, susceptibility to external shock 
and other economic problems such as Dutch disease effect. 
Applied to the case being studied, one might argue that the proportion of the annual budget 
that goes into recurrent expenditure in order to patronise the state clients and to maintain law 
and order in their interest indicates that there is, to some extent, a link between oil abundance 
and authoritarianism, and therefore the appropriateness of the rentier theory to understanding 
the crux of conflict in the Niger Delta. Whilst the application of the rentier theory appears 
valid to the case, it however fails to provide an explanation for the instability experienced in 
this region. Furthermore, data from contemporary studies depict that resource-rich countries 
such as Botswana, Chile and Norway, to name but a few, experience economy prosperity and 
the existence of democracy (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2006; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Di 
John 2007; Basedau and Lay 2009). Thus, there is a need for an additional theoretical 
separation of the debate, as suggested by some scholars. To them, the impact of certain 
conditions is responsible for the presence or absence of prosperity and stability in resource 
abundant countries (Boschini, Peterson and Jesper 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). 




rentier state would be imperative in explaining the link between resource and violence. Di 
John (2007) and Rosser (2006), for example, hold that understanding rentier state involves 
taking into account external, social and historical forces at play. In my opinion, however, I 
might argue that the view that rentier state leads to political stability, as developed earlier, 
remains debatable as the resource management model applied by each country differs from 
one to another, depending on whether one is an authoritarian state or a democratic one. Thus, 
despite the criticisms in the thesis, it remains undoubtedly useful in explaining the conflict 
and behaviour of the state elites, particularly in some African oil, gas and mineral-producing 
countries.  
Conversely, rent-seeking authoritarian rule and political instability are recorded as principal 
characteristics of resource curse, for resource revenues in these types of countries are 
destined for increased expenditures rather than for investments, undermining positive 
development outcomes (Karl 1999; Sachs and Stiglitz 2007; Torvik 2009; Bridge and Le 
Billon 2013). It behoves each state to use its discretionary power to allocate its resources. 
This is also relevant to a state‟s power vested into its leaders. This power, however, has often 
been a tool of individual interests‟ acquisition in mineral-endowed countries (Bridge and Le 
Billon 2013). Compared to non-mineral-endowed economies, Bridge and Le Billon (2013) 
believe that oil economies are set to be exposed to a higher level of rent-seeking and 
corruption. This stance was contested by William (2016) due to its limitation in explaining 
why mineral abundance would not be central to the development of manufacturing, while 
countries such as Botswana, Angola and Nigeria have been pointed out as some good 
examples regarding the long run variation and change in growth of mineral economies. On 
the other hand, Bridge and Le Billion were criticised for not explaining economic growth in 
non-mineral economies countries, such as China, Malawi, Tanzania, or the recent growth 
accelerations in aid-dependent economies, such as Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Ghana. Furthermore, corruption is a general issue and would not only be pointed out in 
mineral-abundant economies, for even in non-mineral-abundant economies with a liberal 
policy, corruption matters more than the levels of rents (Di John 2010). Overall, the adverse 
effects of resource abundance and its corollary, rent-seeking theory, are weak and limited due 
to their lack of comparative or historical evidence. Moreover, the extent to which resource-
rich countries manage their resource outcomes, i.e. „resource-based development‟, will 
largely depend on the nature of the state, politics, authorities and the structure of ownership 
in the export sector (Basedau and Lay 2009; William 2016). Therefore, since some countries 




seeking theories to all resource-rich countries would be analytically limited and weak, partly 
because not all resource-bearing countries have the same socio-political realities and 
experience. Furthermore, these countries, particularly those of Africa, are still shaped by 
colonial legacies, where the state‟s authorities are more predatory rather than state 
accountants.  
Broadly, discussion on rentier state and conflict tells us that in most of resource-rich 
countries resources present a horrendous absurdity. Resource is source of enormous wealth 
and means of patronage to the rentier state and multinationals. However, to the local 
resource-bearing communities resource remains a source of anxiety and misery. A resource 
management model put in place by the state prohibits indigenous communities from asserting 
or holding any consequential stakes in their wealth. Many a time the state uses policies that 
privilege authorities and business partners, leaving the local oil-bearing communities with no 
rights to their resource, hence, they turn to violent protest. 
3.3 Importance of Resource Governance: Reality of Mineral-based Development 
Natural resource governance is a major source of conflict. Transforming resource curse into 
blessing would require reflecting on the efficiency, transparency and accountability of 
authorities in the management of resources for the public good. Most of developing countries, 
particularly resource-reliant ones, access to, and use of natural resource often result in 
significant governance issues. In many countries, natural resources have been nationalised, 
but of paramount importance to the livelihoods of resource-bearing communities. Laws, rules 
and regulations that apply to their governance and use are often restrictive, incomplete, vague 
or discriminatory (Alao 2007). This is where confusion and even conflict, abuse of power and 
discrimination happen to emerge. Stakeholders such as indigenes and peasant communities, 
small farmers and other people often have fewer opportunities to partake of decision-making 
processes related to the governance and use of the natural resources on which they depend. It 
is believed that it is of prime importance to define and improve such governance issues in 
order to ensure equitable and fair distribution and use of natural resources, as most of the 
communities that directly rely on natural resources are often the poorest in the region. Hence, 
improving management of resource is an important factor in securing livelihoods and 
encouraging sustainable natural resource use and preservation (Alao 2007; Williams 2016). 
Sustainable natural resource use as a result of a new resource management paradigm makes 




guidance. However, even though governance principles have been developed for various 
situations, their accessibility for sustainable natural resource governance is very limited. In 
response, a set of governance principles for natural resource governance, that has general 
applicability and significance at local, subnational, and national scales, has been suggested 
(Alao 2007). These principles could serve as a guide for the design of governance institutions 
that are legitimate, transparent, accountable, inclusive, and fair and that also show functional 
and structural integration, capability, and adaptability. Together, they can also be used as a 
platform for developing governance monitoring and evaluation instruments, crucial for both 
self-assessment and external audit purposes for sustainable governance of natural resource 
(Williams 2016).  
Kaggwa (2014) advised that the system of the governance of natural resource is expected to 
be fair and equitable in the exercise of the authority conferred onto the authorities in charge 
of its management, principally in reference with the share of power, the treatment of 
participants, recognition of varied values, respect of existing and forthcoming generations, 
and the improvement of mechanisms to share costs, benefits and responsibilities of decision-
making and action. The principle of competency refers to the acknowledgement of new 
problem and challenges which usually require attention to the appropriateness of available 
institutional, organizational and human resources. In this context, key resources would 
comprise leadership, access to knowledge, organisational systems, and sufficient financial 
and human resources. Figure 3.1 below depicts Slunge and ÖlundWingqvist‟s natural 
resource governance chart which encapsulates various actors indispensable for the efficiency 












Figure 3.1 Good natural resource governance involves multiple actors. 
 
     Source: Slunge and ÖlundWingqvist 2011 
In that in oil-bearing nations, the existing resource managerial model, as translated through 
oil contracts, plays a significant role in determining economic development. This section 
discusses the real impacts of the development of resource governance, looking at share of 
revenue and burden as relevant initiatives towards understanding and addressing these 
impacts.  
3.3.1 Share of Benefits 
Revenue-sharing and decentralisation 
In oil-rich countries, intended or unintended socio-economic benefits arise from the oil 
business. For instance, individual or collective compensation payments for the loss of land 
have been viewed both as benefits and measures to substitute what was lost. Revenue-sharing 
and decentralisation in oil-dependent states are determined and set by the assessment team 
responsible for guaranteeing local members‟ interests following oil exploitation agreements. 
The assessment team is often assigned the role of ascertaining potential benefits and 
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determining positive side effects of the oil business (Zimmer 2009; CORDAID 2014). As for 
employment opportunities for local community‟s members, it is of note that oil companies 
offer indigenes only very limited access to employment. One reason could be that as a highly 
capital-intensive industry, the multinational oil corporations are not interested in many 
domestic employees. Their trained staffs are expats or highly skilled people coming from 
outside the countries. Those few community members employed by oil companies are mostly 
on short-term work contracts (CORDAID 2014). However, this issue could find a sustainable 
solution if the country has embarked on a revenues decentralisation process which gives heed 
to local development. 
Mineral revenues decentralisation in oil-dependent states could be approached through three 
ways, namely: tax levying (on the resource industry), direct transfer collection (from a central 
defined share of revenue) and indirect transfers (from the national budget where preferential 
treatment for producing regions is given). However, the degree of decentralisation of these 
three approaches varies, depending on certain criteria such as population, equity, needs and 
the national interest (Mazeel 2010; Gordon, Paterson and Usenmez 2011; Ticton-Turbervill 
2014). In the more decentralised approaches, collection of tax from the mineral industry is 
done directly by local governments, while the collection of transfers from defined shares of 
the central government‟s resource revenues are done on the basis of a set formula (Ticton-
Turbervill 2014). However, these two decentralised approaches have limitations; firstly, 
when sudden changes of price occur in the international market, domestic economy, which is 
extremely dependent on its resource base, may barely be insulated from the affects. Secondly, 
in the case of post-conflict settings where institutions are weak, local institutions are often 
even weaker and would run the potential risk associated with unstable resource revenues 
(Williams 2016). In this context, local governments may not be able to implement 
countercyclical fiscal policies; neither could it be fit to balance the budget which enables 
income and expenditures to balance over time (Mazeel 2010).  
In a decentralised system, to competently absorb the new investments made possible by 
resource revenues, local governments have a greatly inferior capacity than do national 
institutions. This happens because they do not really have the managerial capacity to enforce 
taxes and are less capable to run complex types of taxation, or to tax large foreign firms 
(Paterson and Usenmez 2011). Some scholars, such as Mazeel (2010), Gordon, Paterson and 
Usenmez (2011) and Ticton-Turbervill (2014), are of the view that when local governments 




national taxes. However, indirect transfers from the central government, which is the least 
decentralised approach, offer some advantages. Firstly, the duty of dealing with the transfers 
could be delegated to a particular department which had its capacity built up to handle this 
specific assignment. Secondly, local governments are not compelled to be involved in 
budgeting, to manage spending, or create or reinforce local taxation capability. Thirdly, tax 
payments would be constant and able to resist vacillations in commodity prices (the payment 
for instance, could be set as a fixed annual fee that is adjusted for inflation). Fourthly, in post-
conflict environments particularly, transfers could be exchanged with schools or other 
infrastructure projects, thus serving as peace payments.  
However, a case can be made for the two most decentralised approaches to revenue 
distribution, mainly in the post-conflict situation. Local governments have the rights to access 
revenues that would provide compensation for the social, environmental and infrastructure 
costs associated with extraction. In some cases, they could even access compensation for 
damage caused by conflicts over resources (Mazeel 2010; Gordon, Paterson and Usenmez 
2011; Ticton-Turbervill 2014). Besides, centralised distribution speaks for the issues of self-
determination and resource control that pertains to the inhabitants of some regions, as is the 
case in the Niger Delta (Alao 2007). In the short term, the more decentralised approaches 
could politically be advantageous in helping to sustain a peace agreement, as occurred in 
Sudan (Beblawi and Luciani 2016). No matter what type of decentralisation method is put in 
place, it is vital to ensure that the agreed-upon sums are in fact transferred and that the 
beneficiary local government is liable for their use. In mineral-bearing nations, whereby 
much of the development relies on resource revenue, corruption, as referred to later, is a 
means of enrichment for the people in office. In light of the review above, one could infer 
that revenue-sharing and decentralisation would depend on the capacity of a state to delegate 
its authority to decentralised entities. The more that local entities are vested with power to be 
involved in local governance and development, the more a strong state and bottom-up state‟s 
development would emerge; something which would favour a fair revenue-sharing. All 
stakeholders thus have a significant role to play, particularly in making the revenue 
distribution successful in the areas of transparency and trust building.  
Corruption 
In resource curse literature, corrupt behaviour refers to the use of state office by legitimate 
authorities to satiate own interests to the detriment of the public interest associated with the 
sharing of resource rents (Karl 2004). Believed to be the result of bad institutions, corruption 




et al. (2013), for example, contend that poor oil management could negatively affect the 
provision of healthcare in oil-producing countries. As a result, corruption between authorities 
and petroleum companies is set to be a substantial stumbling-block to optimise hydrocarbon 
production. Seen under this lens, corruption could take different forms including, bribery and 
cash or payments in kind by oil multinationals to state authorities to protect access to the 
national resources. 
The involvement of a state in the production of oil in oil-producing countries via national oil 
companies might be an influential factor for increased corruption amid officials associated 
with the hydrocarbon or mining sector. Arezki and Bruckner (2011), at this point, advise that 
the ownership arrangement of oil companies has a pivotal role to play in the incidence of 
corruption in the mining and resources sector. Additionally, rent-seeking or rentier states are 
offered larger power over resource thriving, and consequently oil rents directly happening to 
the state budget could lend more opportunities for corrupt state leaders associated with 
petroleum production due to bad institutional practices and a dearth of transparency. 
Subsequently, rentier states‟ efforts to decrease political rights in order to encourage their 
individual profits are the most likely reasons for violence and civil war (Ross 2001). 
Equally, Angola and Venezuela case studies, as developed by Hammond (2011), suggest that 
high political control over oil industries and state participation in hydrocarbon production 
have stimulated corruption. Nigeria is another often-quoted case of a corrupt country related 
to oil revenues (Osoba 1996; Watts 2004). General corruption in Nigeria has culminated in 
ineffectiveness in terms of national investment and low-quality projects, both of which are 
believed to negatively impact on economic development; something which would call for 
transparency and accountability.  
Transparency and accountability 
A dearth of good institutional structures within mineral-rich or mineral-producing countries 
has been pointed out as the main root-cause of resource curse. On the contrary, (mineral)-
producing-friendly institutions could be a panacea to the rise of the resource curse and 
encourage wealth creation within resource-rich countries (Mehlum et al. 2006). These 
producing-friendly institutions would need transparency and accountability, a useful back-up 
which might offer considerable opportunities to raise productive activities that would 
stimulate long-term economic development. One stance from Kolstad and Wiig (2008) 
suggests that transparency is the principal factor in stopping the negative effects of the 




resource revenue information and that of its public spending may decrease corruption and 
patronage. Kolstad and Wiig are of the view that the rise of various international initiatives 
could make extractive countries improve the quality of their institutions, thus encouraging 
transparency. Good institutions could boost human resource development, which is central to 
economic growth. This concurs with Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya‟s (2010) view that 
producing-friendly institutions could heighten human resource capacity in resource-rich 
nations. 
Transparency and accountability application could produce an increase in public trust, 
something much needed for conflict resolution in resource-producing and -exporting 
countries. Herringshaw (2004), for instance, puts forward that the poor economic 
performance of resource-rich states could be the result of a lack of transparency and 
accountability in resource revenue management. The governments of various African 
resource-rich countries, for example, are unable to handle resource income efficiently in 
order to improve the wellbeing of their people, primarily because of poor institutional quality. 
In such situations, social contention is highly likely. 
 
3.3.2 Share of Burden 
Environmental degradation and Loss of livelihoods 
Oil production has a twofold result; revenue production and environmental changes. In terms 
of eco-system degradation, as far as this section is concerned, the production of hydrocarbon 
always results in the destruction of large zones of the eco-system. The eco-system has always 
been the key source of livelihood to the indigenous people. Ndubuisi and Asia (2007), for 
instance, suggest that at the occurrence of oil spills or gas flaring, toxic substances from the 
oil are released over a wide zone of the environment damaging both land and marine 
resources. Kadafa (2012) agrees with Ndubuisi and Asia (2007) adding that in certain 
circumstances, some spills or flaring would result in fresh water contamination, a change of 
ecological system, loss of forest and farming land, obliteration of fishing surroundings and 
decline of fish species that are the main survival source for resource-bearing communities. 
This would often compel local communities to completely leave the contaminated lands. A 
community‟s migration often then leads to the loss of archaeological monuments and 
ancestral heritages. Environment degradation and its impacts on the population generally 
cause massive immeasurable fatalities to a local community‟s members and would create 




development of the oil-bearing countries. Tolulope (2004) and CAB (2009), for instance, tell 
that all over time, oil has always been a source of great benefit for oil-producing states and 
their peoples as a whole. However, the environmental pollution resulting from oil production 
has massive negative effects on the eco-system, fishing and agricultural activities. It is of 
note that without proper clean-up and remediation of the affected environment, oil pollution 
and its effects would last longer in the environment. Kadafa (2012),for example, warns that 
following remediation, the eco-system takes up to 15 years to recover. However, geological 
factors of the affected zone, the type and quantity of oil spilled, as well as the type of clean-
up method will also have a major role to play in determining the recovery period (Ndubuisi 
and Asia 2007). Anifowose (2008) concurs and adds that the occurrence of oil spillage in 
Ogoniland before the early 1990s was not remediated. There have been other recent ones that 
have turned the region into a wasteland and have serious effects on the environment and the 
people, causing social movements in the communities.  
Social Movements 
Social movements are large, sometimes informal, clusters of peoples or associations that 
convey, resist, or undo a social change. They are continually and continuously believed to be 
closely associated with democratic political systems. Some (Freeman and Johnson 1999; ILO 
2009; Yashar 2005), for instance, argue that social movements do not have a clear definition, 
but are in between a political party or interest group and a mass fad or trend. Being mainly 
characterised by their involvement in conflicting relations with clearly identified opponents, 
suggestions from De la Porta and Diani (2006: 20) tell that social movements are connected 
by solid informal networks and share a distinct collective identity. Considered as structured 
yet informal social entities (Westra 2008; Fischer 2009), social movements play an important 
role in extra-institutional conflict that is oriented towards a goal, such as explicit and narrow 
policy or cultural change. 
Some of the initial works on social movements were focused on understanding collective 
action of people and determining necessary conditions to incite social movements (Macionis 
2001; Gilbert 2007). These works hinged on mass society theory, in which the emphasis was 
on the growing industrialisation of society. However, they were blamed for raising a sense of 
alienation among peoples as ancestral social organisations and support networks were 
disregarded (Colechester 2010; Orbach 2011). Social movements as specific social processes 
with specific patterns, as studied today, broke forth from this perspective and gradually 




ferment, popular excitement, formalisation and institutionalisation (De la Porta and Diani 
2006:150). Nowadays, these stages have been refined and renamed as emergence, 
coalescence, bureaucratisation and decline (Rice 2012); yet they still keep themes relatively 
the same. However, although the concept „decline‟ could sound negative, it does not translate 
with a negative meaning, rather marking the end of the objective assigned to the movements. 
To this point, the social movements decline stage could result from several reasons including 
success, organisational failure, co-optation, repression, or establishment within mainstream 
society (Laplante and Nolin 2014; Acuña 2015). 
The confrontation between multinationals and social movements in resource-bearing societies 
has largely been shaped by the globalisation of capital. Saurin (1996: 42), for example, 
argues that international firms are the heart of a „global system of material amassing which 
concurrently accumulates fortune and energy in certain locales‟. The emergence of local 
militancy within resource-bearing communities is generally triggered by indigenes‟ 
frustration at being deprived of their resource control and ownership (Rice 2012). 
Additionally, many internal policies propounded by the governments and multinationals that 
gave rise to dehumanisation, associated with outside factors like the globalisation of the 
international structure, also play a strong role in creating social movements (Laplante and 
Nolin 2014). The interchange between the internal and external factors therefore sets down a 
strong nexus between local NGOs, social movements and international NGOs, and enables 
the environment for the internationalisation of conflict (Laplante and Nolin 2014; Acuña 
2015). Therefore, local militancy takes shape and becomes locally grounded.  
It is important to note that in some oil-endowed communities, particularly in Africa, 
multinationals are making profits from the oil exploitation, yet the environment is ruined as a 
result of oil production without any remediation and clean-up plan (Acuña 2015). There is a 
lack of basic infrastructure, while resource owners are constantly repressed by both oil 
companies and the authorities (Rice 2012). Within these states, contends Giddens (1990: 18), 
the state legislation referring to resources does not confer control of the land to the people; 
the land and all the resources laying under it have been co-opted into the globalised capitalist 
economy. The transformation of this grievance into a mass social movement may find 
expression in the presentation of the Bill of Rights to the state authorities who need to be 





3.4 Role and Engagement of Corporations in Oil Development 
In reflecting on the role and engagement of corporations in oil development, it is arguable 
that social performance analysis of major infrastructure and projects initiated by oil 
companies in local communities has crossed traditional boundaries of ethical funds and 
socially responsible investors (Dobrynskaya and Turkisch 2010). Tabata (2012), for instance, 
suggests that mainstream investors and companies which advise on fiscal services to oil 
companies are having more consideration to the social performance of companies anywhere 
that they run their activities not only for ethical reasons, but also because they are of the view 
that environmental and social performance can influence a project‟s delivery on time and on 
budget, overall operational success and long term financial sustainability (Ereibi 2011). The 
Equator Principles and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards 
set main provisions for (financed) project compliance such as applying impact assessments 
and building appropriate impact management systems. They also comprise specific 
guidelines for company-stakeholder interaction (Abdullah Auzer 2017). As local well-
established clusters, NGOs could be of help for companies in terms of understanding local 
communities‟ problems, something which would help them in identifying developmental 
sectors that they could prioritise when working with the community.  
In most oil-producing countries, NGOs and civil societies give ample feedback to companies 
as the latter attempt to improve and fine-tune the environmental and social aspects of their 
projects. However, sometimes the feedback from NGOs and civil societies differs 
considerably in quality, from timely and valuable, to deplorably ignorant and lacking in 
suitable comprehension (King, Deng and Metz 2012). Abdullah Auzer (2017), however, is of 
the contrary view that sometimes the degree to which NGOs present communities or local 
stakeholders as being affected by suggested project activities is exaggerated. Nevertheless, 
well-expressed oil companies-NGO collaboration quite often begins during recognised public 
discussion activities, and sets a starting-point transparency tool for company and civil 
society. When NGOs and civil society approach the discussion in a productive way, they may 
influence decisions affecting the environment and society (Aghalino 2009). In oil 
communities, NGOs and civil society could also play a crucial role in helping community 
members to understand the location of project activities, and whether those activities would 
positively or negatively impact on their lives (Abdullah Auzer 2017). However, this 




the latter in challenging positions, mostly when it is to do with corporate influence, revenue 
and transparency (Eno-Abasi 2011). 
As mentioned above, NGOs and civil society have an important role to play in helping 
communities and company representatives understand each other‟s plans, interests, concerns, 
expectations and priorities (King Deng and Metz 2012). This understanding is vital to oil-
sponsored community development programmes. Abdullah Auzer (2017) argues that in oil-
communities, effective delivery of development projects regularly rests on both exceptional 
engineering and project management, and the social licence to operate granted by host 
communities. A social licence to operate deeply relies on the degree to which companies 
cope with their impacts, handle their obligations and contribute to the development of the 
community (Aghalino 2009; Eno-Abasi 2011). Indigenes often have substantial expectations 
as regards to company-sponsored community initiatives, whose management may fall beyond 
the expertise and/or resources of oil and gas project staff. This is where NGOs and civil 
society are most needed to play important roles in helping development projects initiated by 
the Oil Companies in order to meet community development goals. In doing so, they become 
implementing partners and may contract directly with companies to deliver development 
projects. They may also play an advisory role; assisting both companies and community 
groups in the understanding of how to best use the Oil Company‟s resources and skills in 
service of sustainable community development (Reider and Haastrup 2013). They could also 
advocate with local government and business community members to become part of the Oil 
Company‟s community project initiatives and help construct development economies of 
scale. NGOs and civil societies could even enable dialogue between company and 
community about the roles that business can and cannot take on, helping to manage 
expectations (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011), playing the role of partner to community and 
company. 
Numerous examples can depict how NGOs, civil society and oil companies have graduated 
from hostile interactions to models approaching partnership. Here are several examples: 1) 
NGOs and civil society taking on crucial financial and human rights consultations with land 
owners in a major pipeline project (Reider and Haastrup 2013). 2) NGOs lending their 
expertise to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) development efforts specifically 
tuned to oil and gas supply chain requirements (Eno-Abasi 2011). 3) Cultural heritage 
partnerships being formed between oil company projects and NGOs to enable companies to 




artefacts (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011). 4) Microfinance projects subsidised by oil companies 
but fulfilled by NGOs and civil society, which have provided useful elements in investment 
exit strategies (Reider and Haastrup 2013). 5) Environmental NGOs assisting in impact 
management planning and implementation in host communities, and community NGOs 
helping to deliver information about safety and environment on behalf of, and alongside, oil 
companies. 
Without any doubt NGO-civil society and oil company relationships have always been 
contentious, but the tension of balancing interests can be fruitful to those who understand and 
manage it well. The confrontational watch-dog role favoured by many NGO representatives 
and community members has a significant place in public discourse. Multinational Oil 
Companies have begun to understand how to assess and make use of the valuable inputs that 
a few NGOs deliver to their projects. There are growing opportunities for NGOs and civil 
society to act as local partners, able to have real input and meaningful influence as major oil 
company projects in local communities fail and prove non-productive. 
3.5 Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management  
Conflict is a disagreement which transpires from thoughts, process, attitudes, understanding, 
interests, requirements and even perceptions. Conflict could erupt among individuals, 
countries, political parties and states. It would often result in loss of peace and harmony, and 
if not settled at the appropriate moment and in the appropriate way, would lead to a large war 
or rifts among antagonists leading to major unrest and disharmony (Ackermann 2003; 
Carment and Schnabel 2003). This research examines and utilises the concept „conflict 
resolution‟, but would also endeavour to define conflict prevention and conflict management 
to draw the line between these different concepts which are often misused and 
misunderstood.  
Conflict prevention does not have a single definition. This concept alludes to different things 
according to different people. During the Cold War, for instance, preventive actions were 
regarded by a few practitioners and academics as identical to pre-emptive strikes (Berkovitch 
1991). After the Cold War preventive measures have received a new meaning and the focus 
has switched to the peaceful prevention of disputes (Boutros-Ghali 1992:11; Wallensteen 
2002). Conflict prevention involves direct prevention and structural prevention. Carment and 
Schnabel (2003) indicate that direct conflict prevention aims to avert short-term, often 




long-term measures that speak for the fundamental root-causes of a potential conflict along 
with possibly rising and triggering factors (Rupesinghe 1998; Ackermann 2003). Carment 
and Schnabel (2003) argue that conflict prevention is a medium and long-term pre-emptive 
operational or structural strategy used by actors to identify and create positive conditions for 
a stable and more predictable international security setting. It primarily entails diplomatic or 
non-constraining measures. In a more all-encompassing definition of the concept, prevention 
refers to any structural or intercessory which could relieve intrastate or interstate tension and 
disputes from rising into substantial violence and use of armed forces, to reinforce the 
abilities of potential parties to violent conflict to settle disputes peacefully, and to 
progressively lessen the fundamental problems that create these issues and disagreements 
(Lund 2002; Carment and Schnabel 2003). This definition covers any measures that avoid 
violent conflicts and reinforce the ability of concerned actors to act organisationally to 
decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. 
Conflict management however provides the restriction, alleviation and/or containment of a 
conflict without necessarily solving it. It involves a change in the mode of interaction from 
destructive to constructive. It means eradicating violent and violence-related actions and 
leaving the conflict to be dealt with on the political level (Wallensteen and Möller 2003; 
Lund 1996). This definition has been somewhat criticised following the emergence of NGOs, 
academic institutions and others as important actors which now influence the conflict 
management process. The process of conflict management is the foundation for more 
effective conflict resolution. A difference between conflict management and conflict 
resolution is, however, needed as a starting point as the concepts often are confused or 
integrated in an inappropriate manner.  
Conflict resolution refers to the resolution of the fundamental incompatibilities in a conflict 
and shared acceptance of each party‟s existence (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:99), 
while conflict management refers to measures that limit, alleviate and/or encompass a 
conflict without necessary solving it (Wallensteen 1998). Conflict resolution can be both 
formal and informal and can either aim at settling or ending conflicts in an open and 
foreseeable process in line with legal principles (Michael Lund 1996), or focus on efforts to 
increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and develop their relationship by 
addressing the conditions that led to the dispute (Deadly 1997), fostering positive attitudes 
and allaying distrust through reconciliation initiatives, and constructing or reinforcing the 




management and conflict prevention have, in a similar way, been argued to be different sides 
of the same coin. Conflict management is required in order to permit the initiation of 
preventive measures aiming at settling the dispute. There is a slight difference in theory 
although both concepts are involved in the practical implementation process (Deadly 1997: 
xvii). Preventive measures are intended to resolve, contain and manage conflicts in order to 
prevent the eruption of violent conflicts (Wallensteen 1998). This makes conflict 
management an important part of conflict prevention. It is important to underline that conflict 
management can be applied at all levels of a conflict spiral and that it is broadly used in crisis 
management and war situations.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the reviews on the resource curse of oil for hydrocarbons-rich and 
hydrocarbon-producing countries. It contended that in order to establish the link between 
mineral/oil wealth and long-lasting conflict in resource-dependent states, there is a need to 
factor in both resource wealth per capita and resource dependence, since only the availability 
of very high per capita revenues from oil and/or minerals allows governments to achieve 
internal stability. The chapter has mainly browsed through the literature on the challenges 
that oil-dependent states face in their development process; particularly it focused on 
resource curse theory and its implications; rentier state thesis and other adverse effects of 
resource abundance as developed in various studies, as well as some concepts relating to the 
prevention, resolution and management of conflict.  
Broadly, the literature has established that the resource curse theory with all its corollaries is 
a controversial subject (Di John 2009; Basedau and Lay 2009; Williams 2016), since the 
socio-economic performance in resource-bearing countries, particularly the oil sector, 
strongly depends on the existing resource managerial model and the administrative design 
already in place. In light of the literature, it has been established that when resources are 
poorly managed by corrupt officials, state resource revenue is shared among the minority in 
power (or a cluster of elites) at the detriment of the majority of the people. Conversely, when 
authorities use an effective model of management, resources and/or the oil sector become the 
vector of national economy development, whereby resource revenue is effectively channelled 
to, and shared among, the people, with the national economy being supported (Heller and 
Marcel 2012; Lahn et al. 2009; Thurber et al. 2010a, b; 2011; Luong and Weinthal 2006). 




would be a result of whether the model of governance for resources is effective or not, which 
in turn would influence the efficacy of the management of resources and revenues.  
As alluded to in the preceding chapter, this thesis explores conflicts in the Niger Delta region 
and analyses their causes, impacts and their resolution strategies for sustainable and 
successful peacebuilding. It addresses the question related to the background and other causes 
of the conflict. The review of literature on resource curse, rentier state, social movements, 
conflict prevention, conflict resolution and conflict management in this context, would not 
only contribute, as secondary data, to understand various meanings of these different 
concepts used in this research, but mostly would serve as a roadmap which would help with 
analysing primary data collected from the fieldwork. Thus, chapter‟s main contribution to 
this thesis is to appraise various scholarly opinions pertaining to the subject being studied and 
to identify research gap in the existing literature in order for it to be addressed further in this 
study. It also helps usher the subject of study into its historical settings for a better 





Chapter Four: The Niger Delta Conflicts 
 
4.1       Introduction 
The Niger Delta region abounds with large mangrove forests and is the source of Nigeria‟s oil 
wealth. It is also known as the cradle of the operational bases of a kaleidoscope of ethnic 
militia and insurgent organisations devoted to the socio-economic freedom of the Deltan 
indigenes. These operational bases of a series of ethnic militia and insurgent organisations 
have turned this into a region of anarchy and chaos: a hot bed of violence, insurgency, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, oil pipeline sabotage, crude oil theft, gang wars and internecine 
struggle. This instability has become so rooted in the region that it has become a modus 
vivendi which has supplanted the traditional mechanism of conflict-solving and managing, 
simply because of the negligence of the rights of aborigines over their resources and lands. 
Thus, this chapter provides detailed context for the research, specifically on the history of the 
conflicts in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta. It engages with the evolution of the 
current conflicts in the region from the perspectives of the Nigerian State and Nigerian 
Nation, with a more particular regard to the relationship between the Niger Deltans and the 
oil resources. In doing so, the chapter identifies and analyses the links existing between 
ethnic groups, land and resources, and conflicts; a major challenge, which, if not dealt with in 
a fair way, would persist for longer and threaten any attempts to sustainable peace in this 
region. Hence, the argument developed in this chapter is that conflict in the Niger Delta 
might still be agreeably managed and resolved, if the modern legal system governing the 
federal state and federated states worked in harmony with the indigenes‟ customary rights. 
The chapter finally responds to the first sub-question regarding the background and other 
causes of the conflict in the region of the Niger Delta. 
Oil-conflict in the Niger Delta region is complex and is related to both national politics and 
communal conflicts. The corollaries of the latter are complex and their implications on ethnic 
groups in the oil-bearing communities of the country have been of negative impacts. Alao 
(2007:195-198), for example, identified 16 multi-layered nature of conflict in the Niger Delta 
namely; among different oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta, between the federal 




government, between the state government and oil-producing communities within the state, 
between oil multinational companies and oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta, 
between federal government and oil companies, between youths from the Niger Delta and 
youths from other parts of the country working with oil companies in Niger Delta, among 
ideologically opposed groups within the same ethnic group of the oil-producing communities, 
between youths and the traditional rulers, between militant youths and older leaders of the 
Niger Delta struggle, between local employees and their foreign counterparts, between state 
governments and oil multinational corporations, between militia groups in the Niger Delta 
and other Niger Delta indigenes working for Shell and other oil multinational companies, 
among different oil multinational companies, between foreign MNC and indigenous 
companies going into oil exploration and between militant youths and elected politicians of 
the Niger Delta origin. However, for the purpose of this research, these multi-layered natures 
of conflict in the Niger Delta have been analysed under historical and ethnological 
perspectives, looking at four different stages of the development of Nigerian nation, as 
presented in the following four main sections; the early history of Nigeria, the colonial 
history of Nigeria, the current Nigeria and the Niger Delta state.  
4.2       Early History of Nigeria 
Conflict in the Niger Delta is partially linked to the Nigerian nation- and state-building. This 
would portend that in order to understand the root-causes of conflicts in this region and come 
up with appropriate resolutions and management approaches, it would be important to trace 
back and know the socio-historical processes that have led to the building of the current 
Nigeria. In order words, Nigerian nation-and state-building has an impact on the current 
conflicts thriving in the region of the Niger Delta. This section hence endeavours to throw 
some light on the developmental process of Nigerian nation and state for a better 
understanding of the genesis of conflict in the Niger Delta.  
The current Nigeria is what was home to diverse autonomous nation states and communities 
independent of one another prior to colonial rule. At that time, this geographical space was 
composed of kingdoms such as Opobo, Bonny, Sokoto Caliphate, Brass, Calabar, Lagos and 
Oyo. A few ethnic groups including Fulanis, Hausas, Yorubas, Itsekiris, Urhobos, Igbos, 
Ijaws and Idomas to name a few, were considered to be the inhabitants of the land, but were 
not recognised as aborigines or Nigerians (Sagay 2008). Research by Usman (1979) tells that 




Fodio‟s Fulani-Jihadist movement in the 19
th
 century. The Fulanis were predominantly 
nomadic herdsmen who, due to their incessant travelling, came across Islam before the 
Hausas. The Uthman Dan Fodio „Holy War‟ islamised the region and led to the conquest of 
the Hausas by the Fulanis. As documented by Onwubiko (1982), beside the religiousness of 
the war, there was a racial undertone to it. Ayoob (1996) reported that over 1,500 leaders of 
Fulani communities rallied round to support Uthman to conquer Hausa states such as Kano, 
Gobir, Katsina and Zaria between 1805 and 1809. Thus, through the Holy War, a caliphate 
state, called Sokoto caliphate, was established comprising of over 20 emirates. 
In the western part of Nigeria, the Yoruba land and Oyo grew from a small town located at 
the northern part of the current Oyo state to an empire. By the mid-18
th
 century, the empire 
territory was bordered by Benin in the East, Togo in the west, Nupe in the North and to the 
swampy south (Onwubiko 1982). Yoruba land and Oyo rose to be West Africa‟s biggest forest 
state with well-designed political institutions. Similarly, in the mid-west, the Benin Kingdom, 
the current Edo state, rose from a small town to a vast empire hosting several tribes. By the 
17
th
 century, at the peak of its influence, the Benin Kingdom stretched from Idah in the North 
to the Coast in the South and from Lagos in the west to the Niger river (Fearon and Laitin 
1996; Bercovitch 1997; Falola and Heaton 2008). 
In the Hinterlands of the eastern part of Nigeria is the Igbo tribe. It is argued that the tribe has 
occupied this region since the 9
th
 century A.D. Onwubiko‟s (1972) account of the Igbo says 
that the region was the most densely populated in West Africa, with a particular tribal 
political organisation. Unlike other existing kingdoms with centralised political structures, 
the Igbos maintained small villages as republics where every adult had a say in governance. 
The political organisation embodied their environmental settings, livelihood, family life and 
culture, and performed well in coordinating the social life and order of the Igbo tribe (Falola 
and Heaton 2008). However, in the Niger Delta area, there were well structured states where 
the people were autonomously ruled (Bercovitch 1997). The Niger Delta states sprung from 
the increasing trade in slaves and palm oil with the Europeans in the 19
th
 century. The 
emergence of city-states in the Niger Delta was predominantly as a result of migrants from 
the Hinterlands who came to the coastal lands to benefit from the trade with the Europeans 
(Onwubiko 1982; Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade 2002). They had city-states such as duke and 
creek towns presently known as Akwa-Ibom state (occupied by the Efiks), Bonny town in the 
present day Rivers state (occupied by the Ibeno), Buguma and Bakana towns in the current 




(occupied by the Kalabaris and Ikwerres) and Sapele and Warri towns in present day Delta 
state (occupied by the Itsekiris and Urhobos) (Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade 2002).  
4.3 Colonial Rule and the Creation of Nigeria 
In 1885, a conference was held in Berlin where the control over independent African states 
was shared among the European powers. Empowered by the Berlin conference treaty, the 
British invaded and conquered the independent states of the modern Nigeria. Subsequently, 
after the conquest, the British faced certain challenges which included limited administrative 
personnel coupled with insufficient financial resources, difficulties with the existing political 
institutions in the territories and obtaining legitimate recognition of their authority from the 
native people (Onwubiko 1982; Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade 2002). Due to all these 
challenges, the British colonial power decided to implement what was referred to as the 
„indirect rule system‟; a system, they believed, which would allow them to manage and 
overcome these challenges (Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade 2002; Falola and Heaton 2008; 
Sagay 2008). On the contrary, this system permitted the traditional authorities to rule under 
the control of the British officials (Sagay 2008). The indirect rule system was adopted 
initially in the Northern part of Nigeria during the early 1900‟s which was successful due to 
the existing centralised caliphate in this region. The Fulani emirs were used to administer the 
emirates and also to supervise the collection of taxes on behalf of the Europeans (Falola and 
Heaton 2008). However, the adoption of the system in the west was not as successful as in 
the north. Coalman (1958), for example, revealed that the indirect rule system could not 
succeed in the west due to the fact that the British imposed the supremacy of the Alaafin of 
Oyo, whose power over the Yoruba land at that time had waned. Hence, the autonomous 
Obas agitated and rejected such authority. The British mistakenly believed that the political 
structure was as autocratic as the Emirs of the North, whilst at the same time in the East, the 
indirect rule system failed woefully (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
As discussed in the previous section, the eastern part of Nigeria was characterised by highly 
fragmented autonomous family units that are egalitarian in nature. Regardless of this ethno-
political particularity, the British nonetheless created chiefs by warrant to preside over the 
Igbo society which eventually became unpopular and tyrannical (Mba 1982). The creation of 
these chiefs provoked what was called the famous Aba women‟s riots of 1929 against the 
collection of taxes by the chiefs (Mba 1982; Van Allen 1971). Theoretically, the indirect rule 




of the institutions were significantly distorted (Mba 1982;Sagay 2008), as the British primary 
motive was to promote their economic agenda by manipulating the local communities and 
their institutions to their advantage (Falola and Heaton 2008). As the result of indirect 
administrative system, a class of wage workers was created, a precursor to the present day 
civil servant, to administer their economic interest. Ultimately, new middle-class elites 
sprung up which were empowered by the British who at that time were frustrated by the 
political dominance of the local chiefs-colonialist alliance (Sagay 2008). 
Some scholars, including Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade (2002), Falola and Heaton (2008) and 
Sagay (2008), offered that the initial series of social and political changes started specifically 
in 1849 by John Beecroft who was appointed as a British consul in Nigeria. It draws from 
their views that Beecroft formulated policies that gradually subsumed the territory into what 
is now called Nigeria. Falola and Heaton (2008) and Sagay (2008), for instance, assert that in 
1813, Benue and Lokoja were both included in the Niger Coast protectorate. They went 
further saying that the Oil Rivers Protectorate was established in 1815, whilst Lagos colony 
was formed in 1861 with the southern part of the present Ilorin joining the colony in 1896. In 
1897, added Sagay (2008), Benin came under the Niger Coast Protectorate. This protectorate 
merged with the protectorate of Lagos in 1906 to eventually become the Colony and 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, he concluded. Finally, in 1914, the Colony and Protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria and the Northern Protectorate were amalgamated to form the Nigeria 
protectorate under the governorship of Lord Lugard (Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade 2002; 
Falola and Heaton 2008; Sagay 2008). 
4.4 Modern Nigeria 
Following a cursory socio-historical, even political, review of the process of Nigerian nation- 
and state-building, it is worth understanding the pre-colonial and colonial legacy to the 
current conflicts in the country. Bordered by four countries as elaborated in Chapter One, 
Nigeria is a vast country with a land mass covering an area of which arable land constitutes 
37.33% and forest and woodland 12%. Its resource potential in African and world affairs is 
internationally acknowledged, considering the vast resource endowment of both human and 
natural capital that lies within it. Nigeria is known as the most populous country in Africa 
with over 170 million people spread over the continent and the rest of the world; “one out of 
every two West Africans, one out of every four Africans and one out of every five persons of 




more than 250 ethnic groups, however just some tribes such as the Ibo, Yoruba and 
Hausa/Fulani emerge as the major ethnic groups in the country. As alluded to in Chapter One, 
the country is enormously rich in natural resources, mainly petroleum – reservoirs of which 
cover the Niger Delta underground, but also in other resources such as manganese, titanium, 
coal, fluorite, Iron ore, gold, diamond and tin. However, the country has only been able to 
fully harness oil and gas resources and has neglected the exploitation of other ores (Evoh 
2009). Lapin and Rossiasco‟s (2011) research suggests that Nigeria is currently ranked as the 
sixth largest oil producer in the world. The country earns over 90% of its export revenue and 
80% of its total revenue from crude oil, recording over USD 400 Billion as revenue from oil 
resource between 1956 and 2010 (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011). However, despite the country‟s 
natural resource wealth and human capital, the country has failed to utilise the resources to 
eradicate poverty, establish a strong economy or ensure stability in the state. Seemingly, 
Nigeria still struggles to achieve sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region of the country 
which has been embroiled in crises for a long period of time.  
4.5 Niger Delta Region 
As developed in the previous sections of this chapter, the ethnography and history of the 
aborigines in different parts of what is currently known as Nigeria is worth noting, as it 
would help to understand the existing links between resources, conflict, land and the people. 
In the context being explored, it must be underlined that conflict in the Niger Delta is caused 
by the exploitation of oil. However, even though this declaration is true, it would be more 
than accurate to also highlight that the bedrock of the conflict lies in the lack of respect for 
indigenes‟ resource rights. This justifies why this chapter continually refers to the different 
nations that constitute the current Nigeria.  
The Niger Delta region is located in the south-south zone of Nigeria, which centres on the 
natural delta of the Niger River and lies “within the Ibo plateau and the cross river valley” 
(Willinks Commission Report 1957:9). The geographic coordinates are; latitude 3°N and 
6°N, and longitude 5°E and 8°E which covers approximately 70,000 kilometres (Ndubuisi 
and Asia 2007:18). The Niger Delta comprises a waterlogged labyrinth of complex 
marshland, creeks, tributaries and lagoons that drain the Niger River into the Atlantic at the 
Bight of Biafra (Ibeanu 2000). It is the leading wetland in Africa and the second largest in the 
world (Nseabasi 2005:165). The region‟s ecology is greatly diverse in nature and serves as a 




environment, it is vulnerable to adverse environmental change. Politically, the Niger Delta is 
a panoply of geographically attached regions spanning across nine states in southern Nigeria, 
namely: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross rivers, Edo, Delta, Rivers, Imo, Abia and Ondo, but the 
core oil producing states are Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, in the south-south geopolitical zone of 
the country. It also includes 185 Local Government Areas (L.G.A.s) divided into more than 
2,000 communities (Tamuno 2000; Chinweze and Abiola-Oloke 2009). Furthermore, the 
Niger Delta has quite a number of distinct minority ethnic groups which includes the Ijaws, 
Urhobo, Itshekiri, Efik, Ibibio, Ogoni, Ilaje, Kalabari, Ikwere, Isokos and Ndokwas. The 
region has a population of over 40 million people; 62% of which are below 30 years of age, 
representing over one fifth of the national total (NPC 2006). This region has one of the 
highest population densities in the world, with 265 people per square kilometre (Nyananyo 
2007; Balouga 2009). Considering the terrain, it is difficult to navigate and establish large 
settlements. The local people of the region live in small, scattered hamlets of 50 to 500 
persons, some maintaining links with larger towns such as Port Harcourt and Warri 
(Nyananyo 2007; Balouga 2009; Lapin and Rossiasco 2011). They depend solely on the 
environment for their means of livelihood because farming and fishing is their predominant 
occupation. However, beside its ecological uniqueness and ethnic diversity, it is rich in 
natural resources. The Niger Delta is Nigeria‟s richest region; it yields the crude oil which 
makes Nigeria the largest petroleum producer in Africa and the sixth in the world. Besides oil 
and gas resources, the region has the potential to produce other mineral resources and cash 
crops, but only crude oil has been fully exploited. The region holds an estimated reserve of 30 
bbl of oil and 180 tcf of gas, generating 80% of revenue and supplies 95% of Nigeria‟s export 
earnings (Fidelis Allen 2014). Clearly, the oil and gas rents from the region are the main 
sources of revenue in Nigeria. 
4.4.1  History of Niger Delta Crises 
The struggle for relevance in the Niger Delta dates back to the pre-colonial period. This 
region has always been exploited of its resources with little or no compensation for it. History 
has a profound effect on the Niger Deltans perception of themselves and also their 
peculiarities. These peculiarities include a long term external exposure, originally derived 
from trade; active, fragmented and competitive authority and a hostile sense of independence 
towards any attempt at domination by outsiders (Nyananyo 2007; Balouga 2009; Lapin and 
Rossiasco 2011). The Niger Delta has been exposed to traders from the west long before the 




export and subsequently, after the abolishment of the slave trade, it went on during the period 
when palm oil became the next commodity for export. The people of the region have 
demonstrated a sense of hostility towards external domination. Among these cases could be 
listed the Jaja of Opobo‟s clash with the British; leading to his eventual exile in 1886, King 
Koko of Nembe‟s famous Akassa raid on the depot of the Royal Niger Company in 1895 and 
the crisis between Nana Olomu, the then Itsekiri Governor of Benin River, and the British in 
1895 (Balouga 2009). Alao (2005), for example, contends that the colonial ruler virtually 
controlled all the resources of the colonised people. As a reaction to that, the Niger Delta 
people contested the control of their resources by those they saw as imperialists, as they 
accused them for not taking into account their need for basic infrastructural amenities. The 
British elimination of the Niger Delta people as middlemen in commercial trades diminished 
their relevance in Nigeria‟s economy. Also, the cash crops emanating from other regions of 
the country, such as groundnuts in the north and cocoa from the west, further lessened the 
economic relevance of Niger Delta (Nyananyo 2007).  
The amalgamation of 1914 divided Niger Delta people into various provinces; then the 
southern protectorate, for convenience sake, was administered on the basis of provinces. The 
western Ijaws were in Delta while the eastern Ijaws were in Owerri and Calabar provinces 
(Ikalama 2006). This, consequently, created a discontent among the Ijaws who demanded a 
separate province for themselves. However, in 1947, their demands were met with the 
creation of Rivers Province. Furthermore, there was another struggle for a separate state 
which was taken to the constitutional conference in London. As stated by Alao (2005), the 
Niger Delta people requested a separate state within the federation, proposing the argument 
that there was:   
No other area in the whole of West Africa with a physical configuration like that of 
Rivers area. It was unfair that such an area should not have its own separate 
government to harness the energies of the Rivers and develop its unique resources in 
the interest of the people who live there. (Alao 2005: 57).  
There was a further argument that the administrative headquarters of various regions 
overseeing the Niger Delta region failed to appreciate their particular needs as these 
headquarters were too distant from them. However, their demands were declined. Arguably 
the colonial master could have feared losing control over such a resource-rich region which 
in long-term would increase the prospects for early independence due to their resources and 




Soon after Nigeria‟s independence in 1960, conflicts between local communities, oil 
companies, and the federal government started to emerge in the region. In February 1966, the 
first incident of violence occurred in the region. A militant group called Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force (NDVF) was formed and led by Isaac Boro, an Ijaw born in Oloibiri. Boro 
was a student of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. This group of students declared the 
independence of the republic of Niger Delta, which comprised the present day Rivers and 
Bayelsa state, and called on the oil companies to deal with their own government rather than 
the federal government (Ukiwo 2004; Obi 2009). However, although the rebel movement was 
crushed by the federal government, it however brought consciousness to the minds of the 
Niger Deltans. Additionally, the rebellion anticipated the Biafra civil war. Ukiwo‟s (2004) 
writings, for instance, ascertain that in May 1967, the eastern region declared itself the 
Republic of Biafra, setting the country into civil war. This was the period during which the 
federal government broke the eastern region into three states, of which Rivers state was home 
to many minority groups and the major oil bearing areas (Obi 2009). Moreover, the federal 
government passed new legislation; the 1969 Petroleum Decree and the 1978 Land Use 
Decree, which centralised the ownership and control of petroleum resources in the country, 
placing it under the custody of the federal government (Ukiwo 2004). As asserted by Obi 
(2009), any hope for greater control of the resource by the region was shattered. The 
centralisation of resources reduced tensions between the dominant ethnic groups of the 
federation, the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. At the same time, it exacerbated tensions between 
those large groups and the numerous minorities, especially those in the Niger Delta, who 
became increasingly marginalised from the political and economic systems (Ukiwo 2004; 
Obi 2009).  
It is worth underlining that although Nigeria is constitutionally a federation, the system as 
practiced falls short of true federalism principles, exhibiting an absence of fiscal and political 
autonomy at federating units (the states) as they depend on the centre for resources. By 
definition, federalism is a strongly decentralised administrative model whereby the central 
government, known as federal government, delegates much of its competences, except in 
finance, foreign affairs and security, to the local or regional entities, also known as federated 
states. With this principle of governance, the state‟s power and authority are shared between 
two units and each unit should observe the limits of its power spheres (Obi 2009). In the case 
of Nigeria, it is worth noting that power and authority that are supposed to be shared between 
the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta has been simply confiscated by the federal 




Similarly, considering the fact that oil is the mainstay of the country‟s economy, its 
exploitation by multinationals and the misuse of its revenue by the federal government 
created a sense of deprivation and exclusion in the Niger Delta region since the centre is 
mostly occupied by the major ethnic group. Works by Lapin and Rossiasco (2011) advise that 
the government further reduced the revenue allocation formula to the region from 50% in 
early 1966s to 1.5% in late 1980s. This growing sense of alienation and deprivation in the 
minds of the Niger Delta people was further worsened by two others concerns; the prolonged 
degradation of their environment triggered by oil exploitation and the neglect of the 
government in developing their region. As will be discussed further in the upcoming chapters, 
oil spillages in the Niger Delta region has wiped out an estimated 5 to 10% of Nigerian 
ecosystem. It is reported that the rainforest which was previously circumscribed in a 7,400 
km² area of land has disappeared and oil spillages in settled zones have contaminated the 
groundwater and soils and destroyed crops and aquacultures (Okonta 2006; Ngomba-Roth 
2007). People in the contaminated areas complain about health and livelihood issues, 
constantly holding the government accountable for condoning the careless nature of oil 
operations in the Niger Delta (Akinjide 2000).  
The reduction of the allocated formula referred to earlier by Lapin and Rossiasco (2011) 
instigated the agitation pioneered by the Kenule Saro-Wiwa Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the 1990s. Through non-violent protest, the group demanded 
resource benefits and compensation for environmental damages from the state and oil 
multinationals. However, the Federal Government responded with violence. In 1995, Saro-
Wiwa and eight other leading member of the organisation were judicially killed (Maier 
2000). The Saro-Wiwa movement saga also raised the awareness of the people that they were 
being alienated by the government. Although MOSOP opted for a non-violent approach, its 
actions however, led to the emergence of a violent dimension of the Niger Delta struggle, 
which was also coupled with the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999 (Okonta 
2006; Ngomba-Roth 2007). Conflict opened throughout the region along many axes: between 
ethnic groups, within ethnic groups, within communities, between generations, between the 
state and communities, and between oil companies and communities. All of these avenues of 
conflict became increasingly polarised and militarised, as stakes were raised and weapons 
became more accessible. Even after the 1999 return to democratic rule, the region was still 
heavily militarised with the state security operatives often resorting to force as a means of 
dealing with protests (HRW 2002:2). The government under the leadership of President 




communities such as Olugbobiri, Liama and Gbarantoru on November 20, 1999 (Human 
Rights Watch 2002). As of 2005, violence has spread over many communities in the Niger 
Delta region, most especially in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states. As reported by UNDP 
(2007:3), by 2005, the cases of violent conflicts were numbering over 120 per year and the 
existence of over 50 armed groups with an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 armed youths were 
operating in the Niger Delta region. Kidnapping of oil expatriates and attacks on oil facilities 
became a regular event, predominantly with the appearance of the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in December 2005. The emergence of MEND 
escalated the conflict to a crisis level. They repeated the calls of their predecessors for greater 
„resource control‟ and „self-determination‟ (Okonta 2006:9). By the middle of 2009, the crisis 
reached its peak. This period was marked by low intensity war between the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) and the militia groups. There were various occasions of attacks and counter-attacks 
between the two groups leading to loss of life and property (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011). 
However, after a major defeat of the armed groups in 2009, President Yar‟adua offered 
amnesty to all combatants who agreed to submit their weapons and surrender. The Amnesty 
programme has bought some level of stability in the region. This stability is occasionally 
interrupted by outbreaks of violence, so there is a need to find a more sustainable peace 
solution to the conflicts in the Niger Delta region. The following sub-sections will discuss 
ethnic, security, political and oil dimensions to the conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
4.4.1.1 Ethnic Dimension 
Several distinctive autonomous ethnic and cultural groups are currently living in Nigeria 
(Okonta 2006). However, to all intents and purpose, the British, Nigerian‟s colonial master, 
unified these autonomous ethnic groups in 1914 without proper consideration of the existing 
disparity in cultural value and preferences. As Akinjide (2000:13) puts it; “the British needed 
the railway from the North to the coast in the interest of British business. Amalgamation of 
the south (not of the people) became of crucial importance to British business interest.” 
Ejibunu (2007), on the same note, but put more clearly, advises that the British discovered 
that the south was viable and more resourceful than the northern protectorate, so therefore 
merging both regions will bridge the professed existing gap. However, the British in their 
pretence of uniting the distinctive ethnic groups in Nigeria had an imperialist motive; they 
deliberately and systematically divided the various groups, thus generating the suitable 




During the period of colonial rule, the administration system adopted by the British supported 
communal sentiments among different ethnic groups, creating a suitable environment for 
them to exploit the economic resources. The British divided the country into three regions, 
North, East and West, giving undue advantage to some ethnic groups over others, especially 
the three major ethnic groups, suppressing the identity of the minority groups.
8
 This created 
resentment and deepened divisions between the various ethnic groups. At the national level, a 
split was created, which still exists between the North and the South. Brunner (2002:132), for 
example, puts it the following way:  
The existing ethnic and religious differences between the north, dominated by the 
predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani people and the mainly Christian, ethnically 
heterogeneous south were exacerbated and politicised by the different forms of 
colonial rule.  
At the regional level, there exists a deep division between the major ethnic groups and 
minority groups. An instance would be “the Ogoni people‟s fear of Igbo dominance; an 
unease which dates back to the colonial rule” (Brunner 2002: 252). However, the other 
dimension which was central to the violence in the Niger Delta region is the deep divisions 
existing among the minority groups in the Niger Delta region, between the largest minority 
ethnic group, the Ijaw, and other minority ethnic groups, especially the Itsekiri, Urhobo and 
Adoni, of which the issues are mostly related to the ownership of land and local power 
(Ngomba-Roth 2007:145). With the heterogeneous nature of the country, the tendency of the 
various nationals‟ leans towards parochial consciousness at the expense of national 
consciousness. The attainment of independence and the return of democratic rule testify to 
these facts: these periods witnessed resurgence of various minority groups clamouring for the 
recognition of their identity and autonomy. Zinn (2005:107), for example, observed that at 
the local level, “these cleavages are one of the reasons for the absence of broader and 
harmonious actions against the Nigerian government and the oil companies”. However, the 
discovery of oil only intensified the ethnic lines giving rise to ethnic nationalism. Brunner 
(2002:132) is of this view, as his observation suggests that even before oil became the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, there was already an existing sharp internal division in the 
country.  
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The upsurge of ethnic-nationalism is responsible for the intense social identity and resource 
control agitations in the Niger Delta region. This has damaged the sense of nationalism and 
patriotism in Nigeria. Indeed, the Niger Delta people have resorted to ethnic patriotism rather 
than national patriotism by advocating for self-determination. Ikporuko (1998) concurred and 
stated that the causes of the Ogoni-Andoni and Okirika-Ogoni inter-communal conflicts are 
all related to the role played by resource control agitations against oil exploitation activities 
in the area based on ethnic identities from colonial times. 
4.4.1.2  Security Dimension 
Early in the 1990s, most local communities in the Niger Delta region started forming 
vigilante groups to secure their communities from external attacks and crime. Brunner‟s 
(2002) opinion, for instance, reveals that the Okrika community formed the Bush Boys 
vigilante groups; the Nembe Ogbolomairi community formed the Isongofaro, etc. These 
informal and somehow non-allowed security movement structures became a model of a 
longstanding protection and defence institution in many parts of the region. They consisted of 
their communities of origin arming the youths who made up these vigilante groups. However, 
observed Zinn (2005), these groups were used by the local elites beyond the aim of protecting 
the community to engage in conflict with their neighbours, especially over oil-related border 
disputes. Zinn (ibid.) further explained that in 1999, the Okrika community employed their 
vigilante boys to conflict with Eleme (its neighbouring town) over claims to land which 
yields compensations from oil companies. Drawing on Zinn‟s observations, one could argue 
that the „Warri Wars’ incidents in 1997, 1999 and 2003 were the products of such acts. The 
Warri incident involved the constant clash between the Ijaws and the Itsekiri in the south-
west LGA of Delta state over land claims. These incidents led to the availability of more arms 
to the youths. Consequently, these vigilante groups became a law unto themselves and 
practiced extra-judicial killings, seizure of personal property, and other serious human rights 
violations (Brunner 2002; Zinn 2005). This led to wide-scale intra-community conflict; 
struggles developed over claims to customary authority within communities; new power-
brokers emerged to challenge traditional leaders. This was the case when Nembe youths 
questioned the authority of the traditional ruler in dealing with compensation payments. 
However, in time, these vigilante groups evolved into militia groups bunkering oil and 





4.4.1.3             Political Dimension 
Since the attainment of independence in 1960, the state Constitution states that the political 
structure should always be characterised by over-centralisation of power and resources 
(Suberu 1996:67), a political structure which is called federalism. However, on the ground, 
and this in the light of what is happening, there seems to be a negligence of the application of 
federalist institutions and values. The structure has undergone changes since the country 
gained independence. In 1960, the country started off with three regions, each controlled by 
one of the major ethnic groups: Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba. By 1966, twelve states had been 
created, of which Rivers and Bendel states were considered to be home to Deltan ethnic 
groups and were offered additional autonomy (Brunner 2002). As at 1976, the number of 
states created stood at nineteen and by 1996 the number of states created rose to 36 plus the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Abuja. Equally, the Local Government Area (LGA) was 
formed in 1979, starting off with 300 governing units, but presently Nigeria has 774 LGAs, 
of which 185 are located in the nine oil-producing states (Zinn 2005). 
However, regardless of the fragmentation of the regions into states and LGAs, the autonomy 
granted was limited especially during military rule. With the return of power to civil rule, the 
federal government allowed additional autonomy to the 36 states, but still they are very much 
limited in their autonomy. As has been defined in the previous section, in principle, the 
federalist system allows the central government to be decentralised in order to delegate some 
spheres of its competences and powers to regional units, with the exceptions of defence, 
external relations and finance (Ukiwo 2004; Obi 2009); yet, in Nigeria, federated states 
remained utterly economically dependent on the federal government. Quoting the Wilson 
Centre report on the conflict in the Niger Delta, Obi (2009) advises that the 1999 Constitution 
deters the states from having their own constitutions or enacting legislation that opposes 
national legislation. This legislation places regional revenues to the centre, revenues which 
are mainly derived from oil, and creates a new legal layer of dependent states relying in large 
measure on the decisions and resources of the federal government. Consequently, the federal 
government supremacy over the decentralised and autonomous entities has intensified the 
ethno-regional struggle across the country, whilst in the multi-ethnic Niger Delta, this 
legislation has contributed to a sense of dependency and marginalisation (Collier and 
Sambanis 2005). This „extreme centralisation‟ brought back by this new law has resulted in 
intense struggles for the control of the central government machinery in Nigeria. As a result, 




and well-established networks of patronage and political alliance. This neo-patrimonial 
system of patronage which underpins Nigeria‟s political structure only delivers rewards, 
rendering the public sector ineffective in delivering it services. The defective public service 
delivery in the Niger Delta could thus be explained by the establishment of this political 
character largely responsible for the underdevelopment, environment degradation and 
insecurity that inflicts the region. 
4.4.1.4           Oil Dimension 
There has been total disregard for the Niger Delta‟s environment due to the substandard 
practices adopted by the oil companies operating in the region including Shell, Chevron, 
Agip, Total, Elf and Mobil. The environmental damages went unnoticed for several years. As 
documented by Soremekun and Obadare (1998), the havoc inflicted on the environment by 
oil multinationals was not recognised until thirty years after 1958, when commercial oil 
production commenced. There have been cases of pipeline leakages, oil-well blow-outs and 
spillages, having destructive impacts on the eco-system of the region. Owing to the Nigerian 
government complacency and, most importantly, connivance with the MNOCs, this 
destruction went on for many years. Between 1976 and 1990, the Niger Delta region recorded 
2,676 cases of oil spills (CLO 1996; Uyigue and Agho 2007:15) and in 2010 the total figure 
recorded was 3,203 cases (Daily Independent 2010:7). These oil spills have destroyed 
farmlands, polluted surface and ground waters (Inoni et al 2006); subsequently displacing the 
basic means of the Niger Delta people‟s livelihood, since they are predominantly farmers and 
fishermen.         
In addition, the gas flared by the oil companies has added to the Global warming process and 
the contamination of air, land and shallow ground water resources in the region. As 
documented in The Comet (2001:12), quoted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
report, 8 million cubic feet of natural gas is flared on a daily basis in the Niger Delta region. 
These elements of environmental degradation have subjected the Niger Delta people to 
untold inhumanities and injustices. It is important to note that although the Nigerian economy 
relies on oil export which is mostly extracted from the Niger Delta region, the revenue from 
oil production and sale does not benefit the indigenes. The region is deprived of basic 
infrastructure and its inhabitants do not have decent facilities. Furthermore, local 
communities‟ rights over their resources and lands which have often turned to protests have 
been violently repressed by authorities and the oil companies. All these put together: 




and the oil companies, played a role in instigating fresh oil-related agitations in the region in 
an effort to oblige the state and MNOCs to address their suffering. Due to the negative effects 
of the operations of oil companies in the Niger Delta, the aforementioned crises in the region 
took up a new dimension.  
According to Oloruntimilehin and Ayoade (2002:16):   
Most of the conflicts have arisen from complex environmental problems, and a 
long history of neglect and social development of peoples who have seemed 
helpless watching their land and water resources continually devastated by the 
intense exploitation for petroleum and gases without deriving any appreciable 
benefits by way of investment in their own development. 
As will be substantiated further in Chapters Six and Seven, during the period of the 1970s 
and mid-1980s, the oil companies ignored court rulings that went against them. More so, 
even when they decided to pay compensation, little amounts were paid and it took very many 
years for those payments to be made. The oil multinationals supported repressive regimes in 
Nigeria by collaborating with the government to suppress the local communities in the Niger 
Delta (Ogbogbo 2004; Akinola 2008). The case of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his 
other Ogoni comrades was linked with Shell being instrumental in, or at least supportive of, 
the military government of the late General Abacha in the executions, as is discussed in more 
detail in Chapters Seven and Eight (Adefemi 1998). The oil companies buy off individuals 
seen as a threat or have major influence in the Niger Delta communities. Edafejirhaye and 
Edafejirhaye (2008) cite an investigation which revealed that oil companies connive with 
some individuals in the oil industry and security outfits to promote illegal bunkering 
activities. There were also instances where oil companies funded armed groups to protect 
their business and also to fight against other militia groups. For example, in Bukuma 
community, where Shell was alleged to have supported the group called „Port Harcourt Boys‟ 
to fight against another group called „Occasion Boys‟ whose activities appeared to be a threat 
to Shell‟s business in the area.  
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter browsed through the history of the conflicts in Nigeria, particularly in the Niger 
Delta region. It especially focused on the evolution of the current conflicts in the region, 




between oil-bearing communities and oil exploiters. It mainly argued that conflict in the 
Niger Delta could have been managed and resolved in a cooperative way, if the modern legal 
system governing the federal state and federated states had worked for the indigenes‟ customs 
and rights. The chapter then identified the existing links between ethnic groups, land and 
resources, and conflicts: concerns which would need to be taken into account if a sustainable 
peace solution is to be realised in this region.  
Overall, the chapter summarises that the experiences of violence in the Niger Delta region 
showed that the historical and political atmosphere, from the pre-colonial, colonial, to post-
colonial periods did not give the opportunity for a more cooperative approach between the 
indigenes and colonial authorities firstly, then the independent‟s and lastly the multinationals. 
There has not been equity, justice nor fair play in managing or resolving the conflicts in the 
Niger Delta. The history of Nigeria, from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial era tells that 
the inhabitants of the Niger Delta went from requesting a fair share of the resource revenue to 
asking for their rights to have control over oil resources in their region which is the major 
reservoir and producer. The request for oil control could be subsumed in what local people 
call a cohabitation of custom rights with a true federalism; a challenge that these people are 
facing. In order words, their demand reads that the political economy of oil in the Niger Delta 
points to more deep national challenges which the federal government has to deal with, most 
particularly, issues of economic federalism, minority rights, resources apportionment and 
poverty mitigation. A modest start in recognising the rights of the oil-bearing communities 
over their lands and resources would be for the government and oil companies to give a 
favourable response to their desire, which is to have a more bearable life. However, as this 
desire could necessitate a huge flow of funds, which would prove expensive, the governments 
and the oil companies have decided to ignore these challenges or simply offer minimum 
effort. Shying away the indigenes‟ concerns or addressing them with tokenism has helped to 
develop a sense of contention and led to protests which have turned to open conflict, as will 





Chapter Five: Niger Delta Conflict Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Conflict in the Niger Delta has been blamed on a number of forces, ranging from political 
fissures to environmental challenges. One way to appreciate the performance of the current 
amnesty programme and other previous solutions to the conflict is to scrutinize pre-conflict 
conditions that paved the way for violence in the region, as well as those that ensure the 
conflict remains protracted. This chapter analyses and differentiates the structural factors that 
are embedded in the very fabric of the Niger Delta region from those factors that simply fuel 
violence in the region. The chapter posits that violence is not an isolated fact, rather, it is a 
result of payments for the resources in the oil bearing communities and/or countries that 
contribute to the safeguarding of the future of resources in the resource-rich communities – or 
countries – and should be considered as a developmental vector. Nevertheless, when these 
payments are made for purposes other than the betterment of the people, they become illicit 
and unlawful, and they can trigger violent contentions and conflicts in the communities. As in 
Chapter Four, this chapter also responds to the first research sub- question: What are the 
background and other causes of the conflict? It is divided into two main sections; the 
structural factors causing the conflicts in the Niger Delta and the factors driving violence in 
the region.  
5.2 Structural Factors Causing Conflict in the Niger Delta 
The factors responsible for the crises in the Niger Delta are multiple and operate at different 
levels, and together they generate violence in the region. As shown below in figure 5.1, it is 
the structural factors, at the most primary level, that constitute the mechanisms and 
fundamental conditions in which the political-economy, government and society engages in, 
which create the source of instability in Niger Delta. Basically, there are deep-rooted 
contradictions in the socio-political structures and cultural fabric that make the region 
vulnerable to conflict. Whereas, at the tertiary level, driving factors include those forces that 
manipulate the latent tensions in society by generating violence and crime, mostly for making 




complexity of their interactions poses a great challenge to the creation of sustainable 
solutions. Figure 5.1 below summarises the complex web of conflict in the Niger Delta 
region. It draws on Galtung‟s (Bishnu Pathak 2016) conflict transformation theory for 
peaceful World. 





















As shown in the different green rectangles of the chart above and as will be elaborated further 
in this chapter, the structural factors causing conflict in the Niger Delta region could be 
grouped under four titles, namely political culture, government system, political economy of 
oil and diverse ethnic groups. 
5.2.1 Political Culture 
The political culture and character of Nigeria state is deeply enmeshed or affected by the 
dynamism resulting from its colonial experience. This colonial legacy trickles down from the 
Political 


















Profit-seeking Violence e.g. Oil 






Top Political & military leaders, 
Businessmen and IOC’s staff 







top level of governance to the grassroots and requires a better understanding of the colonial 
rule in order to appreciate the culture embedded in Nigeria‟s political structure as well as its 
link to the Niger Delta conflict. During colonial administration, the British imposed colonial 
rule to protect their capital and to use the colonial state as the servant of imperialism. The 
colonial state, herein, refers to the colonial administrators who ruled the territory from 1900, 
when the Royal Niger Company surrendered its charter over the region, to 1960 when the 
Nigeria state gained flag Independence. The colonial state was more or less formed to serve 
as a tool for economic exploitation. As described by Ekekwe (1986) and Akinterinwa (2007), 
the formation of the society was restructured in a way to enable commodity production and 
surplus accumulation. The typical structure of African society adopts a communal mode of 
production, which is welfaristic. However, colonialists introduced a capitalist mode of 
production that emphasised the idea of private ownership of the means of production and 
profit maximisation. The colonial masters created a network of „bourgeoisie‟ to facilitate the 
repression and exploitation of the people and their common wealth (resources) (Onimode 
1983). The Bourgeoisie includes the native rulers (Obis, Chiefs, Emirs and Obas); those who 
served as intercessors between the indigenes and the imperialists, the merchants; those who 
acted between the local people and imperialist firms and professionals who later led the 
national struggle for independence (Hyden 2005). The imperialists manipulated existing 
social institutions or established new institutions in order to safeguard their economic 
exploits. Due to the affluence bestowed on them by the colonial masters, the native rulers 
chose to pursue personal interests rather than the interests of their people. They ensured that 
their people remained submissive to exploitation in return for the benefits promised by the 
colonialists (Ogomudia 2002). These circumstances gave rise to serious suffering and despair 
as well as cultural disorientation. 
The nation‟s political leaders inherited a culture of established complex, powerful, and 
deeply entrenched networks of patronage and political alliance which continue to characterise 
the political structures of the country. This political culture shapes the pursuit for assets 
especially the control of rents from oil and gas. At the local level, in the Niger Delta region 
the traditional accountability of political systems has waned, as local chiefs have abused their 
positions for material gain. In addition, at the national level the same attitude is prevalent. 
Chabal and Daloz (1999), for example, point out that after fighting for independence, the 
political leaders, instead of focusing on nation-building, chose to concern themselves with 




wealth. This argument has already been expressed by Nnoli (1980:145) when he affirmed 
that: 
The class character and interests of the nationalist parties were glaringly 
reflected in their activities when Nigerians assumed political positions of 
authority. They immediately embarked on the use of political machinery 
to pursue their class interests of amassing wealth and privileges against the 
interest of the majority of the country, the workers and peasantry. 
Nnoli‟s (1980:145) view is supported by the historical analysis of the development of 
political parties in Nigeria as previously discussed in Chapter Four. It is important to bear in 
mind that the Nigerian political landscape is ethnic-based with political leaders working first 
for their tribes‟ interests rather than the nations; an attitude which has led many of them to 
use their public offices and positions to benefit their own ethnic groups.  
After independence, another factor that characterised the political culture in Nigerian society 
was the tendency to form political parties along ethnic lines. For example, the political party 
called National Congress of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), created in 1944, was considered 
as an Ibo Political Party. The Action Group (AG) formed in 1948 was regarded as a Yoruba 
political party. Likewise, the Northern People‟s Congress (NPC), formed in 1950, was a 
political association for the people of the North (Chabal and Daloz 1999). The political 
leaders promoted the politics of ethnicity to sustain their political powers and advantages. 
Ethnicity, in this context, is referred to as the exploitation of ethnic sentiments in political and 
economic competitive struggles involving different ethnic groups (Nnoli 1980:147). Under 
such conditions is created mutual distrust and suspicion which hinders national development 
at every stratum of the society. More worrisome is the fact that destructive elements like 
thuggery, assassination, arson, rigging and bribery are products of such a political culture. At 
the national level, the politics of ethnicity creates tension between the Niger Delta people and 
the federal government, occupied mainly by the major ethnic groups, while at local level, it 
also creates tension among the various micro-ethnicities, and often when manipulated by 
other factors this has led to violence.  
Narrowing the focus on the Niger Delta, prior to imperialism, collective identity in the region 
was formed around clan structures or extended family having native authorities who were 
custodians of communal assets such as land and fishing grounds. However, with the advent 




authority, and reshaped the community relations both internally and externally (Hyden 2005). 
Even after independence, the oil companies adopted similar tactics to ensure an uninterrupted 
flow of business. Francis et al (2011), for example, states that the oil companies adopted 
practices related to those used by the colonialists in their dealings with the local people. They 
utilised the established traditional authorities, placing more power and resources in the hand 
of a selected few, who can be termed „interlocutors‟, to ensure that pressures from the local 
populace were minimised. Nowadays, such prevailing culture continues to have a strong hold 
on the socio-economic life of the Niger Delta communities. The mind-set of using public 
positions as a means of acquiring wealth further intensifies the struggle for political office; 
this most often ends up in violence. This culture has led to a defective public service delivery 
system, a system where public resources are used to advance group or personal interests 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999). In order to sustain their affluence, the ruling elites distribute the 
common wealth, rewarding their cohorts for their loyalty and support, and as a result, says 
Hyden (2005), the resource-sharing follows the lines dictated by patronage rather than a 
policy that serves the populace. The direct consequence of Nigerian political culture is poor 
infrastructure and service delivery which gives rise to other anomalies in the Niger Delta 
region. According to reports by the World Bank (2003) and UNDP (2006), the infrastructure 
and social services in the region of the Niger Delta are generally appalling. This includes a 
lack of basic services such as security, education, healthcare, water and jobs. As shown in 
figure 5.2 below, the most appalling effect of the lack of schools in the region is the low level 
of youth education. 
Figure 5.2: Education distribution of a selected sample of the Niger Delta 
Source: Okonofua 2011 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 




The infrastructural deficit is either attributed to the obstinacy of local communities or the 
challenges of the difficult terrain. However, in any case, it unlawfully denies the Niger Delta 
people access to fundamental social services. Edeho, a town in Rivers State, was surveyed by 
the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2007, which reported that it had no police post, a 
primary school without tables and chairs, a hospital that lacks medicine and equipment and is 
twenty kilometres distant (ICG 2007). Figure 5.3 illustrates the deficiency of infrastructure in 
the Niger Delta. 
















The lack of policy plan on the Niger Delta security provision gave rise to the formation of 
various vigilante groups by the local communities. As put by a senior military officer 
(Ogomudia (2002), the capability of security agencies needed substantial upgrading; police 
stations were absent in most of the oil-producing communities. Most local communities 
engaged their youths to organise vigilante groups to secure their community: these 
communities armed the youths to protect the community. However, beyond the provision of 
security, community and political leaders most often use the vigilante groups to assault 
perceived enemies over land issues or compensation claims from the oil companies. These 
„enemies‟ could be neighbouring communities or political opponents. As a result, such local 
clashes have led to the death of many and the destruction of homes. These incidents were 
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responsible for the Warri wars in 1997, 1999 and 2003 and also for some conflicts that 
occurred in other areas mentioned above (Ukeje 2001). This situation further led to the 
increased availability of arms to the youths, which, over time, encouraged criminal activities 
among vigilante groups that later developed into the militia groups bunkering of oil and 
kidnapping of foreign workers. 
5.2.2 Government System: Flawed Federalism  
The idea of federalism in Nigeria can be traced back to 1914 when the southern and northern 
protectorates were amalgamated. Subsequently, the federal system was moulded by various 
constitutions pre- and post-independence. Sir Bernard Bourdillion‟s 1939 Constitution divided the 
southern protectorate while the Richards and Macpherson Constitutions of 1946 and 1951 only 
created a decentralised unity system of government. The constitution created under Lyttleton 
introduced true federalism, after the upheavals generated by the idea of self-government, which 
indicated that a true federal structure is the only way to keep the diverse nations together (Ukeje 
2001).  












However, the Post-independence period has witnessed various alterations made to the 
structure of the country. Since 1960, the federal structure has wavered between the excessive 
regionalism of the first republic (1960-1966) to the over-centralisation of the military. In 
1960, the three regional components of Nigeria‟s federation were transformed to a four-











and 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). Although these changes were driven by the 
intention of granting self-actualisation and fulfilment to various ethnic groups in the country, 
however, as is discussed further in the following section, it succeeded in creating more 
imbalances and amplifying the concentration of power at the centre. Similarly, Barkan et al. 
(2001) observed that there was a tendency to grant administrative rights to various minority 
ethnic groups to satisfy their quest for self-determination while, on the other hand, the 
tendency to consolidate the power of the central government and weaken the federating units 
by increasing the number of states and LGAs. Gofwen (1994 and Mohammed (2008) point 
out that the present structure tilts favourably towards the north. Despite the creation of new 
states, the structure gives the northern region a domineering position over the south, coupled 
with the fact that the terms of resource allocation and federal appointments are based on the 
size of the geopolitical zone. For example, the seats in the National House of Assembly are 
allocated according to the population size of the various ethnic groups, which ultimately 
makes the enactment of legislation favourable to the ethnic majority. Consequently, the 
resulting structure has been a source of heightened tensions and established a dichotomy 
between the north and the south at the highest level.  
Beyond the north-south competition, as posited by Collier and Sambanis (2005), the usurping 
of so much power by the federal unit over the federating states has intensified widespread 
ethno-regional competition across Nigeria, and among the minority groups, particularly in the 
Niger Delta region where it has generated a sense of marginalisation and dependency. These 
tensions are inevitable since the hybrid centralised/federal political structure is designed in 
such a way that the resource distribution and revenue allocation is controlled and directed by 
the federal government. Since the access to power at the federal level is obviously the key to 
control over revenue allocations, any group that controls the power at the centre controls the 
wealth of the country. Thus, considering the political culture of the country, any group that 
has the advantage can divert larger shares of the rents to the disadvantage of the wealth 
producers. This is evident by the constant and systemic relegation of the principle of revenue 
allocation since 1951. Furthermore, such advantage was demonstrated when these two pieces 
of federal statute; the Petroleum Decree of 1969 and the Land Use Decree of 1978, were 
passed into law. These legislations were specifically designed to undermine local control over 
their resources, monopolising the resource ownership and control into the hands of the 
federal government. Prior to the advent of those legislations, Ebeku (2001) reported that the 
local communities in the Niger Delta negotiated directly with the oil companies over access 




Considering the dominance of oil rents in the country‟s national income, contention over its 
distribution has generated much political debate inside and outside of the Niger Delta. Watts 
(2004) puts it in this way: this has been a source of agitation for the Niger Delta people 
whose region produces the resources that enriches the country. By any standard, the 
federalism in Nigeria is flawed. Among scholars, there is general consensus that the federal 
system has been unable to manage countless religious, ethnic, sub-ethnic and regional 
differences (Osaghae 1998; Suberu 2001; David-West 2002; Akiba 2004; Sagay 2008). 
Additionally, there is also an agreement that the federal structure has been exploited or 
distorted by the three major ethnic groups; Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo, to their advantage. The 
federal structure is short of equity, justice and fairness. As documented by David-West in his 
work, Nigerian federalism bears the appearance of federalism, but its content and purpose 
reflect unitarism. Consequently, it has created a fertile ground for cultivating political 
instability, conflict and violence. The Ogoni bill of Rights in 1990 and the Kaiama 
declaration by the Niger Delta people both demanded true federalism where local regions are 
granted full autonomy (Sagay 2008), however it was met with government repression whose 
intents was to ensure that they (the major ethnic groups) retain full control of the resources 
(Akiba 2004). Such structure, if not revised, will always remain a source of contention in the 
Niger Delta region.  
In an interview with a political analyst, it has been claimed that the disproportionate amount 
allocated to the federal government has intensified mistrust and tensions among ethnic 
groups. This analyst further added that the federal structure with an allocative rather than 
derivative revenue-sharing formula is partly responsible for the lack of economic and 
infrastructural development in the Niger Delta region and the political marginalisation of its 
people.
9
 In other interviews with a Niger Delta indigene and an official of the Niger Delta 
Ministry, it was acknowledged that the sense of marginalisation and political under-
representation is a product of Nigeria‟s federal system that is highly centralised in practice 
giving little autonomy to the states. This has left the region‟s natives with a common feeling 
of relative inequality.
10
 These opinions were supported by a NGO worker who I interviewed: 
he pointed out that the feelings of exclusion among the Niger Delta people are usually 
manipulated by different actors to justify the use of violence in order to reinstate the 
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 Interview conducted with a political analyst, Abuja, 05 December 2015. 
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equilibrium between the centre and the oil-producing regions which were politically 
marginalised. However, he added, the then president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, of Ijaw 
extraction from Bayelsa, a core Niger Delta state, has restored some sense of political 
representation to the Niger Delta people.
11
 
Broadly, these various views show that there is a lot of expectation from the people that the 
situation for the region will improve for the better. These expectations can easily turn to 
disappointment or violence if the promise of development for the region is not delivered, if 
future elections intensify ethnic tensions through manipulation by political interests, or if 
general perceptions of marginalisation remain the same. 
5.2.3 Political Economy of Oil 
The advent of the oil business in Nigeria has transformed the country‟s political economy 
into a resource-reliant economy and also generated much wealth for the country. Yet, the oil 
business has worsened the economic and social-political plight of the Niger Delta people. In 
fact, the region typifies a land blessed with enormous riches but yet is immersed in poverty. 
Many observers and scholars (Offiong 1980; Olorode 1998; Iyayi 2000; Ukeje 2001; Watts 
2009) have pointed out that the disparity which exists between the wealth derived from the 
region and the economic ostracism of the Niger Delta people has been a source of instability. 












                                                 
11

















However, putting into perspective the nature of the oil business, Watts (2009) argues that 
there is little employment opportunity for local indigenes who are mostly unskilled. The oil 
and gas business is highly capital intensive which creates little demand for the unskilled 
labour which is mostly prevalent in the region. Despite the huge investment in oil and gas, 
there are little investments in manufacturing and agriculture to compensate for the capital 
intensive nature of the oil business. Furthermore, the environmental effect of oil production 
damages the source of livelihood or employment for the people in the region. This is evident 
in the level of unemployment in the region which is worse off when compared with any other 
region in the country. As presented in Table 5.1, in 2006, official statistics revealed that 
youth (aged 15 to 24 years) unemployment in the region stood at 24%. Similarly, Brown 
(2006) reported that in the first oil producing town, Oloibiri in Bayelsa state, the 
unemployment rate stood at 50% in the region while a more recent report by the World Bank 

















Table 5.1 Unemployment and Underemployment Rates 2006 (Youth unemployment) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2006) 
Observing the statistics presented by the table above, unemployment and underemployment
12
 
in the oil-bearing states in the Niger Delta surpasses the rates obtainable in any other region 
in Nigeria, and they are more evident in metropolitan areas. Unavailability of jobs restricts 
the aspirations for the youths to move out of poverty. It is also makes them vulnerable to 
violent forms of struggle and criminal activities (Oyefusi 2007). In an interview with an 
employee of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), it was claimed that the 
high rate of unemployment in the region, particularly among the youths, has helped to drive 
and sustain high levels of violence and criminality throughout the delta region.
13
 This is 
further evidence of the damage from oil exploitation which particularly differentiates the 
Niger Delta from other poor regions in the country. The issue of environmental deterioration 
has always been in the centre of the agitations of the local communities against the slick 
alliance of the state-oil companies (Ukeje 2001). The degrading of the Niger Delta‟s 
environment is as a result of continuous erosion, shoreline flooding, gas flaring and oil spills. 
In the wake of the 1990s, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
based its campaign on the environmental situation in the region, using it as a rallying point 
for their grievances against oil exploitations in the area. Ever since then, the environmental 
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Unemployment is a case where a skilled working-age individual who would like to work as full-time 
employee is unable to find a job. Underemployment is a way of determining employment and labour utilisation 
in the economy that examines the best way the skills of the labour force are being used. 
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issue has intricately connected to the broader fight for social and political change. It gets 
worse considering these people are mostly farmers and fishermen, so the destruction of their 
environment has also taken away their livelihood which has not been replaced by the creation 
of new jobs in the oil industry. 
Conflict in the Niger Delta is largely a product of petro-capitalism or patterns of economic 
exploitation (Offiong 1980; Okonta 2000; Ukeje 2001; Watts 2009). Saro-Wiwa (1992) 
refers to the situation as „a slick alliance‟ with the Nigerian state to produce an oil-enclave 
economy that shuts out the local populace. The petrol-capitalism, over the 50 years of oil 
production, has advanced a precise economic logic fixed predominantly on the capture and 
control of state and cultural influence that in return serves their antagonistic economic 
motives. Inherently, the petrol-capitalism logic adopted by the agents of the state-oil 
company‟s alliance wages an internal war against any form of resistance from the local 
people in the region. For the logic to be sustained, several degrees of repression are instituted 
to protect the unjust system of oil exploitation and profit-sharing (Ukeje 2001). Such 
strategies facilitate repressive legislation that legitimises unjust oil exploitation, aggressive 
repression of legitimate opposition, severe environmental damages, ineffective environmental 
laws and discriminatory revenue allocation. Moreover, it also accounts for the „divide and 
rule‟ tactics employed by the oil companies to stimulate inter- and intra-community conflict. 
Such conflicts are encouraged with an ultimate motive of ensuring undisrupted oil production 
through forestalling any possible united actions against it (Ukeje 2001; Watts 2009). 
5.2.4 Diverse Ethnic Groups  
The issue of ethnicity has been a bane to the unity and development of the country. Basically, 
there are two divisions that exist between ethnic and religious groups. The apparent ethnic 
and religious differences between the North, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, and 
the South‟s ethnically-diverse Christians were exacerbated, exploited, magnified and 
politicised by various arrangements of imperial rule (Brunner 2002). These divides still exist 
in present day Nigeria. Even before oil became the main source of national income, sharp 
internal division had always existed between the North and South and also, among the 
diverse ethnicities in the South. The division is further exacerbated by the perceived political 
domination of the Northern elite and their power over the central government. However, at 
the local level in the Niger Delta, tension also exists among the ethnic groups in the region. 
Groups that once cooperated are having their relationship strained while strong bonds are 




instability in the region that can be manipulated by local chiefs, politicians and the oil 
companies to their advantage. A familiar instance was the intensified inter-ethnic conflict in 
the Warri area between 1997 and 2003, which the federal government orchestrated. Similarly, 
there were several cases when oil companies manipulated inter-ethnic conflict, a 
contemporary attempt at divide and rule tactics (Okonta 2000; Ukeje 2001). In the case of 
Nigeria, it is evident that Nigerians pledge more of their allegiance to their ethnic origins 
rather than the entity called Nigeria. Both at a national and local level, deep splits exist which 
are further exacerbated by the ruling elites. However, it is assumed that the sentiments that 
ethnicity creates in the country is one of the reasons for the lack of united action against the 
government and the oil companies, which thereby strengthens the power of their alliance to 
exploit the wealth of the country.  
5.3 Factors Driving Violence in the Niger Delta Region 
Following the analysis how the structure of various factors that are at the centre of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta region operates, it is crucial to understand who these factors are 
effectively. 
5.3.1 Manipulation of Tensions by Political Actors 
After long years of military rule, there were expectations, as democratic rule returned in 
1999, of a rise of a new era of liberal politics where justice, impartial administration and 
tolerance would exist, including a level playing field for all. Paradoxically, the political 
culture that bequeathed previous democratic dispensations was still in play; this was a culture 
in which politics was militarised through the commodification of violence.  
Many spates of violence in the region occurred just after the transition to civilian rule. 
Politicians engaged youths, made idle as a consequence of the region‟s high rate of 
unemployment, arming them with weapons to orchestrate their victory at elections. More 
youths enlisted in armed groups prior and during poll years. Before polls were conducted in 
1999 and 2003, most of the political parties, especially the ruling People‟s Democratic Party 
(PDP), hired armed gangs to intimidate political opponents.  During the 2003 polls, across the 
country people were killed in hundreds as a result of the electoral violence orchestrated 
mainly by PDP Members. In Rivers state, electoral-observing NGOs reported widespread 




intensity armed struggle‟ according to a leading European Union election observer 
(Okonofua 2011). 
A Human Rights Watch (HRW) survey in 2003 reported that indigenes in the region, close to 
the leaders of Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), revealed that top government officials and prominent politicians supported both 
Asari and Ateke, the leaders of NDV and NDPVF, through funding of what was called 
„logistics‟ (HRW 2003). Even at the local level, political thugs were used to intimidate 
contending opponents over traditional chieftaincy. The battle for the traditional seat of the 
Amanyanibo of Okrika between Chief Dr. Abam and Chief Dagogo, which was perceived as 
a tussle between the PDP and the All Nigeria People‟s Party (ANPP), typifies such political 
manipulations. The erstwhile Minister for Transport, Dr Abiye Sekibo, engaged the services 
of Ateke and his group to assault perceived PDP enemies, prominent Okrika sons, including 
even Chief Rufus Ada George (an ex-state governor and an ANPP stalwart), driving them out 
of Ogu/Bolo and Okrika areas prior to the elections (Okonta 2000; Ukeje 2001). However, in 
exchange for the group‟s violent services, they were granted full access to steal oil. In an 
interview with Human Rights Watch, a local opposition party candidate claimed that Abiye 
Sekibo, and other senior members of the local PDP, made use of the „Ateke Boys‟ - 
supporters of Ateke‟s NDV, to force those supporting the opposition candidate from the 
Ogu/Bolo and Okrika administrative zones before the elections were held (HRW 
2003).Similarly, in a study carried out by Watt (2004), a local resident narrated a case in 
which some armed members of NDV assaulted opposition party members who were putting 
up election posters in Amadi Ama. Watt‟s research revealed that there were also allegations 
that the former governor, Peter Odili, used Asari to infiltrate the ranks of the Ijaw Youth 
Council in order to destabilise their growing influence. The IYC is a non-violent group 
formed in 1998 to articulate the aspirations of the Ijaw youth in the Niger Delta region, and 
was seen as a threat to Odili‟s election prospects. Peter Odili wanted Asari to curb the 
increasing popularity of the Ijaw Youth Council prior to elections. 
5.3.2 Manipulation of Tensions by Oil Companies 
In Nigeria, before a company carries out oil, gas or mineral exploration, certain payments are 
made to the federal government as well as the host communities. In the mining sector in 
general and particularly in oil, it is common and lawful for multinationals to pay the 
resource-bearing communities and country for resources they intend to exploit. These 




bonuses, signature bonuses or taxes. It behoves each mineral-bearing country to determine 
the amount of money to be paid based on the mining and hydrocarbon code applicable in the 
country. The payments of these various taxes are meant to compensate for the depletion of 
resources, the environmental impact of oil exploitation and many other problems that it may 
bring to the resource-bearing communities (Vanguard 2007). Legally speaking, these 
payments are lawful, however, due to the high level of corruption in the public institutions in 
most resource-rich countries, particularly in Nigeria, and owing to the ease with which 
multinationals can buy the conscience of many of the officials in the oil-bearing countries, 
many of these payments are made without any transparency, therefore becoming illegal as 
they are directed to individuals rather than to the public interest, or for the benefit of the 
people.  
Local communities in the region are designated as „host communities‟ when their lands or 
fishing grounds are exploited for oil and they also stand to gain some benefits in the form of 
security contracts, promises of employment and community development funds from the oil 
company. However, the tactics being deployed in dispensing these benefits, in many cases, 
have triggered violence in the region: violence between communities and oil companies, 
between local communities and within communities. The strategies for distributing benefits 
to the communities reinforce or intensify existing tensions. The issue of who receives what 
benefits and how they are distributed remains a driver of violence in the region. Moreover, 
considering the scarcity of resources for the local indigenes in the region, individuals and 
groups struggle to position themselves to access the various benefits available from the oil 
companies. 
The oil companies negotiate such agreements and contracts with some selected persons in the 
communities who they identify as the community representative, most especially the ruling 
elites. According to Imobighe (2004), such practices have been argued to have played a very 
major role in the breakdown of values and systems in the Niger Delta through a hostile 
remaking of the local political landscape and the introduction of corrupt and divisive 
community relation policies suggestive of the divide and rule tactics of the imperialist. 
Struggle for the local political space has led to violent clashes such that occurred in several 
villages about twenty to forty kilometres from Port Harcourt, including Buguma, Tombia, 
and Okrika. Also, the manner in which most oil companies operate, including their staff 
behaviour, creates, feeds into, or exacerbates the violence. World Alumni Celebration (WAC) 




assuming the individual ownership of land and therefore acquires lands from individuals 
without going through traditional structures, giving rise to distrust and jealousy within a 
given community against those individuals who receive compensation. The policies of oil 
compensation also breed violence surrounding the issues about who gets the payment for 
compensation and who gets the contract for the clean-up.  
At the level of inter-community conflict, due to monetary benefits derived from being 
designated as a host community, communities engage in violent conflicts over lands and 
territorial issues that grant them such a designation. Indeed, the conflict between the Bille and 
Kalabiri was as a result of the dispute over the right to ownership of land where two Shell 
flow stations are sited (HRW 2002). However, there were cases when oil companies, due to 
their strong desire to pump out oil at the earliest possible time or to maintain a continuous oil 
flow, would adopt divide and rule tactics to ensure that their short-term production targets 
were met (Okonta 2000). Such actions exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions which then drive 
violence. This is the case happening in the conflict between Soku and Oluasiri communities, 
where Shell is being accused of favouring the Soku community by naming the gas plant 
situated in that area after Soku, whilst the gas was located in Oluasiri land. This conflict 
intensified age-old issues between the Soku and Oluasiri, leading to the death of 18 people in 
early September 2003 (Niger Delta News 2003).  
Furthermore, the large quantities of money directed to the community‟s representatives, 
many of whom at times failed to share the benefits with their community, has intensified the 
struggle for political space in the region. These local ruling elites, who are usually the 
community rulers and elders, have amassed much wealth through their positions, enabling 
them to control the political behaviour of a large populace. They reward their supporters, 
mostly youths, who in return sustain their dominance in the community. The oil companies 
prefer to deal with a selected few who can guarantee an undisrupted flow of business. The 
spoils derived have made the local leaders tolerant of the inconveniences of oil company 
activities, i.e. environmental pollution, as long as the oil companies continue to reward them. 
However, as the political space has become more lucrative and the youth group grows 
powerful, the youths have risen to challenge the local elites and the oil companies. With this 
rise of youth militancy, the oil companies in turn, have been forced to make dealings with the 
youth in order to maintain undisrupted oil operations. 
The ultimate consequence for the tactics adopted by the oil companies in distributing 




creation of rentier space which had led to violent struggle among contending parties. Such 
practices if not abated will remain a key driver of violence in the region. I conducted two 
different interviews: one with a Niger Delta indigene and another with an official of the Niger 
Delta Ministry. When I asked each about the role of the oil companies in the conflict, 
amazingly their responses were the same. They argued that the oil companies use the award 
of contracts or development projects to deliberately divide communities and thus can 
dominate them without serious challenge to their business operation.
14
 A similar tactic was 
reported in a newspaper article, with the title: „Shell‟s Odidi gas project tears Ijaw 
community apart‟ (Vanguard 2007). This emanated from a protest letter, dated 17
th
 July 
2007, by the Ogbe-Ijoh community to the General Manager, Shell, Warri, alleging that there 
was a covert and provocative plan, promoted by some Ogbe-Ijoh indigenes, in collaboration 
with some Shell staff, to deny the community of its benefits from the project. 
5.3.3 Manipulation of Youth by Business Conglomerates 
The manipulation of youth business conglomerates is another conflict-triggering factor in the 
region of the Niger Delta. The business of oil theft in the Niger Delta has a long and complex 
history. Commonly referred as to „Oil Bunkering‟ in the region and as discussed further on, 
oil bunkering occurs when crude oil pipelines are attacked by certain individuals who create a 
hole in the pipeline in order to divert the oil into illegal bunkers These attacks, are a well-
organised and very lucrative business (Asuni 2009), consist of sabotaging oil installation with 
the purpose of stealing the fuel and sell it on the black market. It is estimated that between 
70,000 and 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) (up to 12 per cent or more of average daily oil 
production) are lost to the illegal oil trade (UNDP 2006). Allegedly, it is a business syndicate 
of oil bunkers, a network that comprises of local and foreign business men, the military, top 
politicians, and even personnel of oil companies who provides the operational logistics, 
although since the year 2000, their assistance have become less important (HRW 2003).  
Initially, this syndicate recruited armed youths to help protect their illicit operations. The 
armed gangs provided patrol services to escort the stolen oil through the creeks to the point of 
illegal transfer to ships at the open sea. Further, the armed groups provided labour to tap 
directly into the pipelines and redirect the oil through another pipeline to large barges hidden 
in the creeks. However, over time, by 2003, the armed gangs recruited by the oil bunkering 
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cartel had acquired the necessary business skills and infrastructure to transform them from 
security providers into oil bunkers themselves. The bunkering business provided the leaders 
of these groups with a lucrative revenue to acquire sophisticated weapons to further sustain 
their illicit trade. However, due to the huge profits derived from this business, the armed 
gangs‟ struggle to dominate the illicit oil bunkering trade became a constant escalator of 
violence in the region. A report by HRW (2005) supports that: 
Some of the most intensive fighting between October 2003 and 2004 centred around 
villages located on tributaries about twenty to forty kilometres south west of Port 
Harcourt, including Buguma, Bukuma, Tombia, and Ogbakiri. This is Asari‟s home 
area and the site of several oil wells, flow stations and gas gathering projects operated 
by Shell Petroleum Development Company in the Cawthorne channel…Asari and 
Tom were most likely interested in manipulating a local dispute to gain control of 
Tombia and Bukuma because of their proximity to lucrative bunkering routes in the 
Cawthorne channel. Both Asari and Tom armed their new recruits from this area with 
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Even today, this illicit trade still continues in the region, though with less violence, and still 
remains a serious problem throughout the Niger Delta. Oil bunkering is a complicated issue, 
considering the political connection to the trade and also the heavy involvement of security 
forces. 
5.3.4 Violent Repression of Legitimate Agitations 
Violent repression of legitimate agitations is another conflict-triggering factor in the region of 
the Niger Delta. The initial protests against the government and its ally, the oil companies, 
had been peaceful. Such agitations were fostered by a deep sense of inequality (HRW 2003). 
Then, the familiar cycle starts with a demand or protest against injustice which was most 
likely rebuffed or ignored by the government and the oil companies. Subsequently, with their 
issues left unresolved, the Niger Delta people‟s agitations developed into a collective and 
conscious action. It was at this point the MOSOP was formed and led by Saro-Wiwa who 
demanded justice and fairness for the Niger Delta people (Asuni 2009). Unfortunately, the 
peaceful uprising from the group was met with violence from the state: Saro-Wiwa and other 
leaders of the group were executed. Beyond the Saro-Wiwa case, the state adopted more 




legitimacy of the state; so they adopted strategies such as armed intervention, arrests and 
physical assault to deter agitations (HRW 2003). The Umuechem town case serves as an 
illustration. It was reported that the long-standing need for development assistance led to a 
mass protest at a Shell facility near Umuechem town, which accidentally led to the death of a 
policemen. Sadly, before dawn, a large mobile police force retaliated destroying over 400 
homes and killing 80 people. In an effort to lessen further reaction, the authorities usually 
employ a strategy of „carrot and stick‟ by assuaging the use of force with placation (Asuni 
2009). Such placation includes promises of contracts, jobs, money, development projects, or 
even the creation of new states or LGAs. All such promises are intended to reach a „soft 
stalemate‟ in order to resume oil production. The rise of the insurgent group MEND in 
December 2005, which frequently demanded for „self-determination‟ and greater „resource 
control‟, is in many ways a result of long-term neglect and violent repression by the state 
(Okonta 2006). 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the conflict in the Niger Delta region. Contrary to Chapter Four which 
focused on the development of the current conflicts in the region, this chapter scrutinises the 
role of various actors in contributing to the protracted conflict in the Niger Delta region. The 
chapter argued that payments for resources in the oil-bearing communities and/or countries 
are a common practice which aims to safeguard the future of resources in the said 
communities or countries. However, when these payments are made for other purposes than 
those expected, they become illicit, thus paving the way for contentions and conflicts in the 
communities. As applied to the case of the Niger Delta, it seems that oil payments that should 
have been used for the betterment of the whole country, particularly the oil bearing regions, 
have been used for the benefit of the state‟s officials and a cluster of individuals. This 
practice has resulted in the discontentment of the people in the resource-bearing communities 
who resorted to individual justice based on sabotaging and disrupting oil installations in the 
region.  
Overall, the chapter has identified two layers in the analysis of the conflicts in the Niger 
Delta. The first layer constitutes the structural factors composed of political culture, 
government system, political economy of oil and diverse ethnic groups. The second layer 
involves factors themselves, namely manipulation of tensions by political actors and oil 




legitimate protests. It draws from both layers of analysis that rather than constituting a factor 
of development and cohesion, oil resources and revenues have been used as an instrument of 
enrichment for some and repression for others. Oil revenue has been used as a weapon of 
massive repression instead of responding positively to the aspirations of oil-bearing 
communities. Oil taxes or payments need to be re-thought, in terms of how they could 
contribute to the compensation for the depletion of resources and to the repair of damages 
that host communities have incurred as result of exploitation, if a sustainable conflict 
management and resolution is to be achieved in this region. However, for this to be effective 
there will be the need for the federal government to take responsibility in the management of 
the oil-conflict in this region. This leads the discussion to the next chapter on the state-





Chapter Six: State-Sponsored Conflict Management Initiatives 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Assessing the effect that various government initiatives have on conflict management can be 
a challenging task. If such initiatives were specifically intended to help resolve the conflict, 
many initiators and implementers of conflict management projects may assume that their 
efforts will contribute at least to something, such as the goal of reducing violence. However, 
one could wonder whether this is always the case, particularly in the Niger Delta region. 
Many government-sponsored conflict management initiatives in post-conflict settings may 
have no discernible impact on the conflict, may exacerbate the conflict, or may even create 
new conflicts. So, bearing this in mind, this chapter investigates the state-sponsored conflict 
management initiatives as applied to the conflicts in the Niger Delta region. The Nigerian 
state has responded to the Niger Delta crises with all sorts of measures which they consider 
in their best interests, including the establishment of several development intervention 
agencies, the upward review of the revenue allocation to the region, the use of brutal force 
and, more recently, the amnesty programme.  
This chapter attempts to appraise past and present initiatives taken by the Nigerian state in 
resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta region, to examine their strengths and weaknesses. As 
in Chapters Seven and Eight, data collected from the field research undertaken between 2014 
and 2016 in Nigeria – in Abuja, Lagos and Ibadan, as well as other villages located in the 
Niger Delta region – are presented and analysed in four main sections. Overall, it might be 
said that whilst the state-sponsored conflict management initiatives in the Niger Delta region 
are believed to have done little to bring peace to the region, this approach has also been 
blamed for not tackling the real problems which sustain the conflict in the region: the deep-
seated issues considered to be the root-cause of various conflicts in the region are still 
unsolved. While this chapter responds to the main objective of this thesis, as do the 
upcoming Chapters Seven and Eight, it is however worth remembering that it also answers 
the second specific research question of this study, namely: In what ways has the state 
responded to the conflict in Niger Delta and how successful have its initiatives been? 




intervention agencies, revenue allocation, the 13% derivation principle, the use of military 
force and the amnesty programme.  
6.2 Establishment of Developmental Intervention Agencies 
Several federally instituted developmental agencies have been established for the sole 
purpose of readdressing the challenges in the region. Essentially, the idea of a development 
intervention agency was based on the report of the Willink commission of 1958 (Ogan 
1994). This commission was formed by the colonial administration in response to the 
agitations of the Niger Delta minorities; believed to be the result of the high level of 
ecological deterioration, destitution and underdevelopment. After the commission‟s enquiry, 
colonial administration recommended a special treatment for the region, with the minorities‟ 
interest being secured by the Constitution, working alongside a special agency, which had to 
be created, confronting their developmental challenges. However, despite these decisions, 
conflicts resulting from oil exploitation in the Niger Delta are still not at an end. This section 
examines four development intervention agencies established by successive governments 
since independence.  
6.2.1Niger Delta Development Board 
The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) was instituted in 1961 by the Federal 
legislature in accordance to section 14 of the 1960 Constitution to transform the Niger Delta 
into a developed region (Constitution 1960; Ogan 1994). This appeared to be the first 
response to various agitations that had occurred in the region. The principal aim of the Board 
was to carry out an extensive survey and prepare schemes designed to promote the 
stabilisation of the local economy and the physical development of the region which would 
serve as a guide to the federal government on developing the region (Etekpe 2007). By 
implication, the NDDB operated merely in an advisory capacity. Nevertheless, they 
identified the local means of livelihood (mainly agriculture) in the region, experimented with 
a variety of agricultural produce and techniques so as to enhance the region‟s productivity 
and developed a scheme for the physical development in terms of road networks and 
settlement (Enemugwem 2009). However, the Board‟s activities had little impact as it never 
moved beyond the planning stage. In spite of the extensive surveys and other activities of the 
NDDB, the government failed to implement its recommendations on solving the Niger Delta 
problems (Enemugwem 1998; Ikporukpo 2001). It is thought that the federal government 




1967 Biafra civil war also harmed the activities of the Board. Note at this point that after the 
Biafra civil war, the government diverted the money meant for the Board‟s activities into a 
fund for restoration and reconstruction programmes across the country (NDDC 2006); 
something that led some people to believe that the military government had no interest in 
developing the region, eventually discarding the NDDB‟s recommendations on resolving the 
Niger Delta issue. Without ceasing to function officially, the use of the NDDB‟s money for 
purposes other than was originally intended rendered the NDDB obsolete and figurative, 
unable to implement the objectives it was created for.  
6.2.2 Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) 
General Babangida‟s administration (1985-1993) established the OMPADEC under Decree 
no. 23 of 1992. This commission was a response to the rising discontent and restiveness in 
the region as it spread beyond the Ijaw youths to include the Ogoni youths in the region. The 
commission was mandated to address the years of neglect of the Niger Delta 
region. OMPADEC was funded by 3% of oil revenue which had to be utilised for the 
restoration and development of the region on the basis of the ratio of oil produced in 
particular areas (Adebayo 2006). This was a more generous funding when compared to its 
predecessor. However, as a result of mismanagement, OMPADEC failed to achieve its goal. 
The commission increasingly gained a reputation for entrenched corruption, white elephant 
projects, poor planning and a lack of consultation with local people. As documented by 
Sanya (2006), most of its funds were embezzled while the little that remained could only 
provide electricity and piped water to some villages in the region. In its first three years of 
operation, OMPADEC started projects valued at USD 500 million but funds were paid to 
contractors with no contact address, leaving the institution with a huge amount of debt and 
abandoned projects five years prior to their intended completion (Sanya 2006; Edigin and 
Okonmah 2010). A staff member of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
concurred that the agency was bequeathed with numerous abandoned or uncompleted 
projects and vast debts.
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 The absence of a grass-rooted developmental programme coupled 
with corruption resulted in the execution of projects with little or no impact in alleviating the 
sufferings of the Niger Delta people. In fact, the Niger Delta people saw the agency as a ploy 
used to enrich associates of the military government with the pretence of developing the 
region (Adefaye 2008; Ibeanu 2008). The level of corruption was so evident that the first 
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two sole administrators, Albert K. Horsfall and Professor Eric Opia, were sacked in quick 
succession. Opia was said to have failed to account for funds running to hundreds of millions 
of dollars (Frynas 2001; Okonta 2006; Sanya 2006). In addition to the bane of corruption, 
the federal government manipulated and withheld its monthly allocations as alleged by 
Horsfall, an ex-chairman of the commission (The Guardian 2000). OMPADEC was replaced 
by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. 
6.2.3 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
As a response to the rising violence in the region, the new civilian government led by 
President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) submitted a bill that eventually led to the 
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace OMPADEC 
in 2000. The commission was to address the ecological crisis and developmental challenges 
through conceiving, planning and implementing projects and a programme to bring 
sustainable development to the Niger Delta region in the areas of transportation, including 
waterways, telecommunications, water supply, industrialisation, employment, education and 
health (NDDC Act, section 7(1); (b)). In fulfilling its mandate, NDDC was directed to create 
and implement an extensive plan for the region which was eventually called the Niger Delta 
Regional Development Master Plan (NDRDMP).
16
 The NDRDMP is a fifteen-year plan with 
an implementation budget of USD 50 billion (Ereibi 2011; Lapin and Rossiasco 2011). In 
regard to funding, the commission was to be financed through the following contributions; 15 
% of the monthly allocation from the federation account, 50 % of the Ecological Funds 
allocated to the oil-bearing states, 3 % of the total budgets of the oil and gas producing 
companies and any other contribution from foreign or private bodies (NDDC Act). However, 
as shown in Table 6.1, the actual funds released to the commission are far less than the 
contributions agreed by law. Until 2015, the unremitted funds to NDDC stand at NGN 800 
billion (about USD 2,216,000,000) (Ibileke 2015).  
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Table 6.1: Federal Government Nigeria (FGN) Releases to NDDC, 2001-2009 
Source: NDDC (2012) 
Within the first five years of operations, NDDC started 2,035 physical development projects 
across the Niger Delta region (Ereibi 2011). As shown in tables 6.2 and 6.3, the projects 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version 




included human capacity development, erosion control, building, shore protection, 
electrification, water supply, jetties, roads, bridges and canalization in the states of Abia, 
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. 
Table 6.2: NDDC Projects –Summary of Completed and On-going Projects 2002-2005 
Source: NDDC (2012) 
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Table 6.3 NDDC Projects –Summary of Completed and On-going Projects 2002-2005 
Source: NDDC (2012) 
The Commission shows a bias for costly, prestigious projects such as regional roads and 
jetties which have not bequeathed significant improvement in the welfare of the Niger Delta 
people (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011). The Commission focuses on lofty projects that will 
satisfy contractors rather than the ordinary Niger Delta people. This contradicts the 
participatory approach that underpins the Popular Version of Niger Delta Regional 
Development Master Plan (NDRDMP) where the local indigenes were involved in the 
planning process. During my fieldwork in Nigeria, a conflict analyst and a staff member of 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version 




the Macro-Economic Model of the Nigerian Economy (MONC) based in Abuja both had 
convergent views supporting the opinion above. The conflict analyst indicated that the 
commission adopted a top-down approach in deciding on the projects to execute. This 
approach alienates the local people from the selection and ownership of the project
17
 and is 
also seen as the source of a hostile relationship between the contractors and the community 
which does not have any sense of ownership or interest in the projects (Okolo 2014). The 
staff member of MONC was of the view that the non-involvement of local communities had 
limited the impact of the projects that NDDC embarked upon.
18
 In the same vein of thinking, 
a staff member of NDDC indicated that the rate of completed projects is adversely affected 
by the slow and poor implementation process. In this analyst‟s view, a lot of projects were 
awarded with little funds available to execute them.
19
 A staff member of NDDC added that 
this situation is further complicated by successive administrators of the commission who 
execute new projects rather complete the older ones.
20
 In May 2009, the NDDC had initiated 
2,416 infrastructure projects, of which only 841 had been completed (Lapin and Rossiasco 
2011). It is important to mention that by the end of 2014, NDDC had 4,000 uncompleted 
projects (Vanguard 2014). 
The commission also had human capacity development programmes, which focus on job 
creation, as one of its stated priorities. Onwuke (2010) advises that in fulfilling this aspect of 
their portfolio, they executed projects such as the Empowerment Scheme (NDDC/GLO 
Empowerment Scheme), the NDDC Mass Transit Scheme (providing vehicles on Hire 
Purchase to the public) and issued NDDC-NTAC (Technical Aid Corps) contracts (computer 
training programme). However, evidence from my fieldwork indicates that these projects 
failed to improve the woes of the people as a result of gross mismanagement, insincerity, 
insider dealings and nepotism on the part of the NDDC management.
21
 An indigene from the 
Niger Delta that I interviewed told me that there have been instances of the diversion of 
empowerment aids by the management of NDDC for the gain of themselves and their allies.
22
 
His view concurs with Okolo‟s (2014) research which showed examples of purchased 
vehicles meant to be given on hire purchase to the common people were hijacked; the multi-
                                                 
17
 Interview conducted with a University researcher, Abuja, 8 December 2014. 
18
 Interview conducted with a staff member of Shell, Abuja, 11 January 2016. 
19
 Interview conducted with a staff member of ExxonMobil, Abuja, 11 January 2016. 
20
 Interview conducted with a staff member of NDDC, Abuja, 16 December 2015. 
21
Interview conducted with a University researcher, Ibadan, 20 January 2016. 
22




billion NGN partnership with GLO (telecom company) Nigeria limited to provide start-up 
equipment was also ruined by insider deals, nepotism and corruption as most relatives of 
NDDC staff benefitted from it. This left a Nigerian NGO staff member to suggest that some 
of these programmes lacked real substance and were not fit to empower the Niger Delta 
people.
23
 The NDDC‟s performance has been riddled with a number of factors namely: 
corruption, insufficient planning, gross mismanagement, due process violation, lack of 
accountability and clarity, and lack of consultation with local stakeholders. Ige‟s (2009) 
research, for example, underlines that, like its predecessors, successive heads of the 
commission were accused of corruption. The same research added that in August 2008, a 
former NDDC chairman, Mr. Sam Edem, was charged with embezzlement of funds 
amounting to NGN 800 million (about USD 2,216,000). In support to Ige‟s research, the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission‟s (ICPC) (2011) 
report, released in 2011, revealed that in that year, the acting MD of the NDDC was arrested 
and prosecuted by the ICPC, an anti-graft agency, amounting to USD 20 million, whilst in 
2010, the execution of 500 project contracts was stopped as they did not follow due process 
(Aborisade 2010).  
6.2.4 Ministry of Niger Delta 
The Yar‟Adua administration (2007-2010) formed the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
(MNDA) with the responsibility of formulating and coordinating the Federal Government‟s 
development initiatives and programmes in the region as it concerns youth empowerment, 
infrastructural and environmental projects. According to the government, the ministry will 
serve as a mechanism that will enhance better focus and speedy implementation of Federal 
government developmental projects in the region (Taiwo 2008). The initial announcement of 
the Niger Delta Ministry drew reactions. Some in the region saw it as a renewed strategic 
commitment towards developing the region, while for most it seemed to be another avenue 
for political settlement and enrichment rather than to serve the interests of the Niger Delta 
people. According to the ICG (2009), the social movement called Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) advised the region to receive the ministry with 
apprehension as it might end up being another means for corruption and political patronage. 
Unfortunately, several years after its establishment, the ministry has achieved little. 
According to (Francis et al, 2011), in 2009, the MNDA‟s entire NGN 50 billion budget was 
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tied to already existing federal government projects. The Budget of NGN 50 billion 
comprised of NGN 3 billion for recurrent expenditure and NGN 47 billion for capital 
expenditure, out of which NGN 30 billion were reserved specially for the East-West road 
project (The Nation 2009). However, one NGO staff member I interviewed during my 
fieldwork claimed that most of the projects executed by the ministry were politically inspired 
with little or no regard to its impact on the wellbeing of the local people.
24
 This is partly 
responsible for the uncompleted projects by the ministry. Moreover, the lack of coherent 
development planning strategy and lack of concerted framework for action has resulted in 
unfinished projects. According to a Niger Deltan indigene living in Abuja, this hinders the 
ministry‟s capability to properly select projects that add the most value and to pursue it to 
completion. There is the issue of lack of clarity between the roles of the MNDA and Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC) as they seem to create an unclear image of 
overlapping, duplication and competition in their plans for projects, he added.
25
 The MDNA 
proposed to construct new jetties in Ekeremor and Brass meanwhile, in 2010 and 2011; the 
NDDC had already budgeted for these same projects in the very same locations (NDBMG 
2012). 
Based on the evidence gathered from my fieldwork, it might be argued that successive 
governments have not been sincere in their intention towards fixing the developmental 
challenges of the region. The little effort taken towards ameliorating the plight of the people 
by the government has failed to measure up, considering the amount of funds said to have 
been spent by its development intervention agencies, particularly OMPADEC.
26
 From 
documentary review and interviews I carried out, this failure can be attributed to the lack of 
commitment, mismanagement of funds, extravagant spending, excessive politicisation of 
policies and appointments and the lack of clear focus on the part of the government and its 
agencies. This could also justify why the government failed to properly fund or implement 
the report of the intervention agencies, most especially the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) master plan. My opinion is close to that of a few individuals with 
whom I held focus group discussions, particularly Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch members. To these people, a number of crucial elements seem to be missing in the 
operations of the successive development intervention agencies. These elements include: 
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clarity of direction, the appointment of qualified and tested technocrats (not politicians), 
proper funding, effective supervisory mechanisms, and strong-willed government that can 
guarantee more effective and efficient development interventions in the region.
27
 It emerged 
from this discussion that the agencies have been poorly managed by inefficient 
administrators whose primary interest was to divert funds for their personal enrichment. 
Repeatedly, the various intervention agencies have had to conceptualise and implement 
development projects without the participation of the intended beneficiaries of the 
development. On the other side, the top-down approach adopted by the agencies accounts for 
the high cost of projects that have been executed, projects that have had little bearing on 
people‟s livelihoods. Furthermore, lessons learned from the discussion tell that the prolonged 
underdevelopment of the region remains a source of frustration and agitation to Niger Delta 
people. Finally, the overall trend arising from these views suggested that the failures of the 
successive agencies have contributed to the escalation of the conflict: the local communities 




6.3 Revenue Allocation: the 13% Derivation Principle 
Following the review of the various development intervention agencies, this section looks at 
the revenue allocation as it has applied to the Niger Delta region. The revenue allocated to the 
Niger Delta has been at the centre of the agitations of the indigenes. In an interview I 
conducted with an academic, it was indicated that the Federal Government and the region 
have been in continual dispute over the revenue allocation formula.
29
 According one MNOC 
staff member I interviewed, some stakeholders are of the opinion that the oil benefits 
allocated to the region are fair,
30
 while another MNOC staff member is of a different view as 
he claimed that the Niger Delta people deserve a greater share as they alone bear the negative 
impact of oil exploitation.
31
 Whether and how to reconcile these views remains an open 
question, however, as indicated in table 6.4, the revenue allocation to the region had been 
declining from 1966 until 1999 when it was revised upwards.  
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Table 6.4: Revenue Derivation: Niger Delta State Shares of Petroleum Proceeds 1953-
Present 
Source: Lapin and Rossiasco (2011) 
Initially, the revenue allocation was based on the principles of Derivation
32
 and Even 
Progress.
33
 The three federating units (Northern, Western and Eastern regions) retained 50% 
of the revenue derived from their respective region; 30 % to be retained by the central 
government and 20% went to a pool account to be shared by each of the federating units on 
the basis of population and need (Udeh 2002). One Niger Deltan indigene claimed that the 
previous formula was discarded as oil became more valuable, creating a sense of unfairness 
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 The Derivation principle would grant a certain percentage of the revenue generated by the constituting unit.  
33
 The Progress principle was designed to allow for adjustments in grants depending on each state‟s relative 
need, population and level of poverty. 
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to the Niger Delta people.
34
 However, a few indigenes raised their concern by arguing that 
when the other regions were producing cash crops (Southwest: cocoa, North: groundnut, 
East: palm oil), they all pushed for the derivation principle, so why change the rule because 
of their own resources, crude oil? To these individuals, successive military governments 
(1966-1979; 1983-1998) gradually reduced the percentage of derivation in the revenue 
allocation formula; something which instilled a sense of mistrust, deprivation and bitterness 
in the hearts of the Niger Delta people over the years.
35
 
As part of the response to a growing crisis, the 1999 Constitution reversed the trend and 
entrenched the derivation principle, pegging it to a minimum of 13%. While the increase 
might have created an impression of fairness in the revenue allocation, the increase of 
derivation principle remains at the heart of the Niger Delta struggle.
36
 It has been at the 
forefront of various national conference and reports by committees set up by the federal 
government, stated an academic acquainted with the revenue allocation project.
37
 This issue 
of revenue allocation alone brought the national political reform conference of 2005 to an 
abrupt end, added another analyst who closely followed the project 
developments.
38
Nevertheless, the 13% derivation principle granted to the region has 
produced little in terms of real human and physical development, opined another academic 
analyst.
39
 Another similar view from a NGO staff member was that various stakeholders 
inside and outside of the region have wondered how the level of development can be 
commensurate with the amount of funds allocated to the region even with the strong oil 
prices during late 2000s.
40
 For example, for the half-year 2007, the revenue apportioned in 
the statutory allocation to the four major oil-producing states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta 
and Rivers, amounted to NGN 58.11 billion, NGN 35.95 billion, NGN 41.46 billion and 
NGN 85.58 billion, respectively (Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2007).The clamour most 
especially by the ruling Nigerian and the Niger Deltan elite for an increase in the derivation 
percentage diverts focus from the real issue of how well they have utilised the funds already 
allocated to these oil-bearing states. This statement led to an academic claiming that the 13% 
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derivation principle granted to the region brings to light the fundamental issue that hinders 
tremendous progress in the region, including failed governance, lack of accountability and 
transparency regarding public funds rather than the lack of sufficient funds.
41
 As noted by 
HRW (2007) and Ewerenmadu (2008), the magnitude of corruption and governance failure in 
the Niger Delta is shocking. It is prevalent across the entire nation. Nevertheless, the revenue 
allocation formula will always remain a ticking bomb (Mefor 2009), as the funds were 
corruptly mismanaged and local people did not benefit. It will keep showing up on every 
national dialogue in the country and the federal government cannot delay acting on it 
indefinitely. 
6.4 Use of Military Force 
The use of military force has been a common conflict-resolution strategy deployed by the 
Federal Government in the Niger Delta region. This often involves conscripting security 
operatives from the entire spectrum of the country‟s armed forces (Army, Navy and Air 
Force) with the order to clamp down on any uprising in the region. As the anti-oil protests 
aggravated in the early 1990s, the Federal Government started deploying armed forces in the 
region as the police force failed to quell the uprisings (Okumagba 2012). Constitutionally, the 
Nigerian police force is charged with the responsibility of preserving law and order, claimed 
a civil society member.
42
 However, according to a Niger Deltan indigene, the militants 
overwhelmed the Nigerian police force, hence the deployment of armed forces to the region. 
The aggressiveness of the military operations resulted in significant destruction to properties, 
loss of life and displacement of residents, he added.
43
 Instances of state coercion include: the 
1990 Umnechem Massacre, the 1992 Bonny Tragedy, the 1994 Egi-Obaji Mayhem, the 1994 
Tai-Baira(Ogoni) Massacre, the 1995 Ubima Tragedy and the 1999 Odi Massacre(Raji 1998; 
Ovwasa 1999; Eteng 1996).  
 
As shown in table 6.5, even after the return to democratic rule in 1999, the Federal 
Government still relied on the use of the military to subdue any agitation in the region. The 
civilian government militarised the region with the establishment of a Joint Task Force. The 
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JTF comprises of the State Security Service, Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Air Force, 
Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Army which were mandated to forestall the criminal activities of 
militants, preserve and to restore law and order in the region (Omonobi 2004). The JTF has 
about 4,000 military personnel deployed in Niger Delta. The JTF‟s mandate requires a 
strategic use of force to guard the populace while eliminating the militants (Akin-Ojo 2010). 
Table 6.5 Militarisation of the Niger Delta 1999-2010 
Date Place Operating Force Action 
1999  Odi Army and Mobile 
Police 
Razed the entire community and properties 
worth millions of NGN were destroyed 
January 
2004 
Uwheru Operation Restore 
Hope 
Killed 20 persons 
Razed 11 houses 
July 
2004 
Egbema Operation Restore 
Hope and Joint 
Security Task 
Force (JSTF) 
Used gun-boats, military helicopters and 
bombs to destroy 13 communities 
200 persons, mostly women and children 







Killed 16 youths for agitating for a better 
deal from multinational oil 
October 
2005 
Odioma JTSF Killed 77 people, including youths 
2006 Okerenkoko JTSF Killed several people and destroyed 
properties 








Ayakoromo JTSF Killed several people and destroyed 
properties 





While they succeeded in restoring order in most cases of violent conflicts, their involvement 
usually leads to a disastrous situation with massive waste of human life and property, as 
shown in table 6.5. In the same way of thinking, a Niger Delta indigene claimed that the JTF 
operations in eliminating the militants alienated the local citizenry and further increased the 
locals‟ sympathy for the militants.
44
 An analyst concurred and added that it seems that the 
primary motive of the security forces is to protect the oil and gas industry with little regard 
for protecting the civilians in the regions.
45
 Asuni (2009) confirms the widespread abuse of 
human rights, coercion, intimidation and alliances with criminals by the military. In the light 
of the fieldwork results, it might be argued that the consistent use of force after 1999 led to 
the emergence of groups such as the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
46
 and 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
47
 Fieldwork evidence 
shows that even with the massive deployment of JTF in the region, this strategy could not put 
the militants under control; rather, it worsened the situation, as the surge of these militant 
groups created more problems for the government.
48
 The government spent about NGN 700 
billion on security operations between 2008 and 2009 alone (Asuni 2009). By mid-2009, over 
1 million barrels of oil production were lost as a result of the deepening militancy 
(Okumagba 2012). The Nigeria state claimed to have lost over USD 6.8 billion between 2005 
and 2009 (Abosede 2012). The use of force to quell protests by the government has been 
grossly ineffective. The military lacked the capability to manage preventable violence 
without the loss of innocent lives and destruction of properties. It led to human rights 
violations and led to the emergence of militia groups. Also, the strategy could not suppress 
the militancy activities, rather it further aggravated the conflict. The militancy activities 
significantly affected oil production and revenue. Furthermore, there was the high cost of 
maintaining the military operations in the region. The militarisation of the region as a strategy 
only heightened the conflict in the region. 
                                                 
44
 Interview conducted with a Niger Delta community member, Lagos, 14 January 2016.                                                           
45
 Interview conducted with a University researcher, Ibadan, 28 January 2016. 
46
Considered as a terrorist group, NDPVF is one of the largest armed groups in the Niger Delta region, created 
in 2004 and largely composed of the Ijaw ethnic group. Their objective of fighting is to gain more control over 
oil resources in the Niger Delta region. 
47
 MEND is a free network of armed movements the Niger Delta region that are strongly involved in 
kidnapping oil workers, attacking oil fields, blowing up pipelines and defying Nigeria's army. They make 
billions of dollars by stealing crude oil from pipelines. 
48




6.5 Amnesty Programme 
By 2008, armed insurgency in the region had reached its peak. At that time, it was quite 
obvious that the use of military action was not sufficient to conquer the militants in the 
region. Consequently, ex-President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua was compelled to change tactics 
by withdrawing the stick and offering a carrot in the form of amnesty on 25
th
 June, 2009 – a 
delayed implementation of the 2008 Technical Committee report.
49
 The amnesty was part of 
that committee‟s recommendations. This new programme was entirely financed by the 
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and came under presidency projects and budgets 
(Abazie-Humphrey 2014). The Federal Government‟s initial budget for the Amnesty 
programme was NGN 50 billion (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) 
2014). Structurally, the Presidential Amnesty was based on a Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR) approach. The DDR strategy is a transformational process that 
offers social, political and economic reintegration for ex-combatants so as to return them to 
civilian life (Gleichman et al. 2004). The amnesty was offered on the understanding that the 
militants were willing and ready to surrender all illegal arms in their custody and to 
unequivocally renounce militancy in all its forms within 60 days commencing from 6
th
 
August and ending on 4
th
 October 2009. At the expiration of the ultimatum, 20,192 ex-
militants laid down their weapons, surrendering 2,760 arms of different categories, 763 
explosives, 3,155 magazines, 287,445 rounds of ammunition and 18 gunboats to the 
Presidential Amnesty Programme and accepting the amnesty deal (Abiodun 2009). 
Moreover, 6,166 ex-militants were later enlisted into the programme by the end of November 
2009 (Charles 2010). As summarised in Table 6.6, by the end of the disarmament stage, key 
militants including Henry Okah, Tompolo and Ateke Tom had accepted the Amnesty deal. 
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Date of Acceptance 
 
Estimated arms and ammunition 
surrendered 
1  Solomon Ndigbara 
alias Osama bin 
Laden  
26 June 2009  Gave up 11 firearms and 1,000 rounds of 
ammunition  
2  Henry Okah  13 July 2009  The supposed leader of MEND, Okah, 
did not surrender any arms because he 
had been arrested in Angola and 
extradited to Nigeria where he had been 
detained since February 2008 and was 
facing closed trial on 62 charges.  
3  Victor Ben 
Ebikabowei alias 
General Boyloaf 




and Ezizi Ogunboss  
7 August 2009  Surrendered an assortment of 520 
firearms, 95,970 rounds of ammunition 
and 16 gunboats.  
4  Soboma George of 
Outlaws cult group.  
13 August 2009  Surrendered 36 assorted weapons  
5  Kile Silkey 
Torughedi (Young 
Shall Grow).  
5 September 2009  Gave up an assortment of arms totalling 
100 weapons, 100,00 rounds of 




6  Ateke Tom of NDV  3 October 2009  Exact number is unknown but it included: 
anti-aircraft weapon launchers, General 
Purpose Machine Guns, AK-47 rifles, 
Mark IV rifles, pistols and much 
ammunition.  
7  Manfimisebi 
Othello and the 
Gwama Boys of 
Ilaje  
3 October 2009  Surrendered different weapons, such as: 
sub-machine guns, AK-47 rifles, 
hundreds of rounds of ammunition and 
arrows  
Source: Lysias (2011) 
 
After the disarmament stage, the ex-militants were moved to designated centres (two each in 
Aluu, Rivers state and Agbarho, Delta state) for demobilisation. These centres can 
accommodate 3,000 people and as a result the ex-militants were grouped into batches. They 
received NGN 65,000 as a stipend during the demobilisation period (Ekumaoko 2013). 
Currently, the reintegration phase is still on-going as the amnesty office reintegrated them 
into the economy, primarily by deploying them to vocational and higher education courses in 
Nigeria and abroad.
50
Here they acquire training in technical and entrepreneurial skills and 
received formal education. As summarised in table 6.7, by 2013, the programme has trained 
over 9,000 ex-militants in various professions such as fabrication, welding, plumbing and 
electrical installation to mention a few. 
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Table 6.7: Ex-militants trained in Obruba Camp in Rivers state 
Source: (Ikelegbe & Umukoro 2014) 
 
Evidence from a government official indicates that as of March 2015 about 11,000 ex-
militants were waiting for placement in academic or vocational training facilities. The 
Federal government through the Presidential Amnesty Office (PAO) liaised with both the 
private and public sector to engage the ex-militants.
51
 Obia (2014) records a small number of 
institutions such as the Nigerian Army, Nigerian customs service and SAP Drilling Oil and 
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Gas Limited that engaged some of the ex-militants. Fifty jobs are said to have been identified 
in road safety, the Navy, Air Force and Customs as „senior officers‟ (NSRP 2011). Similarly, 
Vanguard (2012) reported a total number of 113 ex-militants had been employed both locally 
and across many countries: for example, about 40 of them were engaged in Ghana, South 
Africa and Dubai. However, it is important to remember that the developmental projects were 
not finished, partly because of security conditions.  
 
On the basis of the evidence provided by a staff member of NDDC who I interviewed in 
Abuja, just a cursory look at the Amnesty programme could signify success
52
 for two 
reasons. Firstly, the prominent militia leaders accepted the amnesty deal, according to a Shell 
staff member.
53
 Secondly, the acceptance of the amnesty deal has secured some level of 
peace and stability in the region, believed a Niger Delta indigene.
54
 As a direct result, attacks 
on oil companies‟ facilities and the kidnapping of their expatriate employees fell. This 
positive détente also resulted in a subsequent increase in crude oil production from a level of 
700,000 bpd in mid-2009 to between 2.2 and 2.4 million bpd since 2011, hence allowing the 
government to demonstrate a positive impact on the nation‟s revenue profile (Igwe 2010). 
Through the stability brought by the programme, Kingsley Kuku, the Chair of the Amnesty 
Programme Implementation Committee, approximates the extra oil earnings by Nigeria and 
its joint venture partners at NGN 6.3 trillion in 2012 (Sayne 2013). It has saved an estimated 
NGN 3.74 billion daily which was utilised in tackling the militancy (Vanguard 2009). This 
progress allowed a staff member of NDDC to be optimistic by claiming that the stability 
brought by the Amnesty fostered development projects in the region as it was safe for 
contractors to execute their projects.
55
 
On the contrary, however, a deeper analysis reveals that there are challenges imbedded in the 
programme itself. Drawing from ex-militants‟ DDR programme, Onuoha (2011), for 
instance, advises that the success of DDR is very much dependent on the first and second 
stages which are the disarmament and demobilization. Disarmament success is very much 
dependent on the number of weapons surrendered compared to the stock of weapons 
estimated to be possessed. There is a common belief that only a small fraction of the (ex) 
militant‟s arms were handed over as most of them had doubts about the government‟s 
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sincerity with regard to the amnesty deal. Looking at the amnesty programme, an inland 
researcher and analyst suggested that the number of arms surrendered by the ex-militants is 
not commensurate with their actual number and the projected number of arms anticipated to 
be surrendered.
56
 This raises the question of how is it that only about 2,760 arms were 
recovered from 20,192 ex-militants. Furthermore, the subsequent 6,166 ex-militants enlisted 
into the programme have no available record on the arms they laid down. There is also the 
question of the authenticity of some of the people that registered as ex-militants, since there 
are some indications that most of the people presenting as ex-militants did not actually take 
part in the armed struggle (Okonofua 2011). In a response to Okonofua‟s (ibid: 243-244) 
concern regarding this issue, a member of the Niger Delta Community claimed that: 
No genuine militant is participating in the Amnesty program. None! The people you 
see, these are area boys of some big shot politicians. They put their boys and 
girlfriends in there just to make money. If you think I am lying, ask about the 
weapons returned. And you will see that where they say they have 26,000 reformed 
militants, they will only show you a few hundred guns and thousands of bullets. What 
is a bullet without guns? Bullets are like groundnuts in the Niger Delta. 
 
Another Niger Delta indigene claimed that the people who were part of the amnesty 
programme were either just unemployed individuals looking for a means of livelihood, or the 
cronies of politicians.
57
 This created a bloated figure, thus crowding out the real militants 
from participating in the programme. Conversely, there is the issue of non-inclusion of some 
ex-militants from the second and third phases of the programme. According to Ameh (2013), 
the failure to properly reintegrate ex-militants would create more problems in the future as 
they might be forced to return to the life of crime. To illustrate this better, by 2009, the 
incidence of oil pipeline vandalism was about 1,453, by 2010 it fell drastically as a result of 
the introduction of the amnesty programme via the DDR programme. However, by 2011, it 
rose to 2,768 during the reintegration phase and has become a major issue in the region, as 
the result of keeping the true ex-militants from participating in the programme. Table 6.8 
below summarises different incidents occurred from 2009 to 2012 as a result of the 
inappropriate application of the Amnesty programme. 
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Table 6.8 Pipeline Incidents in Nigeria 2009-2012 
Source: NNPC (2012) 
 
Another challenge engrained in the amnesty programme is the means of paying the ex-
militants. An arrangement whereby payments are initially made to ex-militant commanders 
who in turn pay their “boys” in the camps reinforces the bond between the ex-militants and 
their commanders, giving the latter the ability to rally them to any new cause. Also, it is 
important to add that there are also cases where these “boys” are being short-changed by their 
ex-commanders (Eno-Abasi 2011). 
Indications from my research fieldwork show that the indirect money for weapons approach 
might undermine the success of the amnesty programme as many of the ex-militants may 
only be interested in the financial gains rather than the reform packages.
58
 This poses a 
danger as the ex-militants might likely return to violence when the stipend stops flowing or 
when they are unable to find employment opportunities that will pay them as much as the 
Amnesty programme.
59
 Evidence from an interviewee indicates that the NGN 65,000 stipend 
paid to the ex-militants is significantly higher than the average public servant pay, deterring 
most of the ex-militants from searching for, or accepting, a job. This might create new 
regional security issues in future when the programme comes to an end.
60
 Also, the kind of 
training offered to the ex-militants does not align with the labour market. The training is very 
much centred on aviation, oil and gas businesses with a consequential raising of expectations 
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of the ex-militants who look forward to working in such industries.
61
 Meanwhile, the industry 
sources contend that there is little or no space available to absorb these trained ex-militants.
62
 
By the end of the first quarter of 2015, a meagre 151 ex-militants out of the 15,451 graduate 
trainees were able to get jobs with reputable organisations (ICG 2015). Another major issue 
arising from the implementation of Amnesty is its narrow focus on the militancy. The 
Amnesty programme was just part of Technical Committee‟s recommendations, what 
happened to the other recommendations, asked a community member.
63
 Other concerns that 
the amnesty programme did not factor in are to do with the empowerment of women and 
youths, environmental remediation and sustainability, establishment of credible institutions, 
etc. A community member has been of the view that the fact that the vulnerable groups in the 
communities are excluded from the amnesty programme is problematic. Vulnerable groups, 
according to this indigene, include women, children, unemployed youths and elderly persons. 
They are excluded from the benefits and assistance packages associated with amnesty.
64
 This 
sends a wrong signal: that the use of violence pays; those that did not take up arms are 
excluded from the programme. 
The amount of money expended on the ex-militants reveals the government‟s disposition to 
buying peace. On the programme, the government have expended NGN 72 billion and NGN 
88 billion in 2012 and 2013 respectively (Punch 2012). This surpasses the yearly budget for 
basic education. In fact, this is perfectly reflected on the huge oil pipeline contracts awarded 
to ex-warlords by the government, ranging from NGN 560 million to NGN 3.6 billion (This 
Day 2012). This supports the evidence from a NGO that the ex-militant general Tompolo, 
alone was given a contract worth NGN 3.6 billion which excludes other contract such as the 
Vessel supply contract worth over NGN 15 billion.
65
 In addition to the ex-militants 
commanders, most of the funds designated for the programme has been utilised in paying its 
administrators and the rising number of consultants and contractors. During an interview with 
a community member, it was claimed that a review carried on the programme in 2010 
revealed that 80% of the budget had gone on payments of consultants and contractors, 
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leaving 20% for the rehabilitation of the ex-militants.
66
 This supports Ameh‟s (2013) view 
that the programme itself has now become a very lucrative business for the political class.  
Overall, it emerged from the above that there has been much focus on the amnesty 
programme with little emphasis on the root causes of the crises in the region. There is no 
practical development besides the few developments initiated by the development 
intervention agencies. There remains environmental degradation, underdevelopment, poverty, 
unemployment, corruption and marginalization. Furthermore, there are vast constituencies of 
the Niger Delta people that are excluded in the post-amnesty deal, specifically Ogoni youths, 
who had no involvement in the armed struggle. These marginalised youths can pose a future 
threat to peace in the region as they have observed that violence seems to be the only tool that 
will get the government to address their needs. Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, 
the amnesty programme has been the most successful intervention programme to bring 
relative peace in the region. However, if the root causes are not effectively tackled another 
vicious cycle of violence will eclipse the post-amnesty peace. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta 
have been largely defective and ineffective. Though, it has fairly resolved some of the issues 
fundamental to the oil conflict in Niger Delta, yet there is still much to be done. Successive 
administrations have approached the crisis from three major platforms: developmental 
interventions, increases in revenue allocation and the use of brutal force. The government (s) 
have established several development intervention agencies to execute infrastructural and 
human development projects in the region. Unfortunately, they have failed to effectively 
execute their mandate. The appointment of politicians as the agencies‟ administrators, the 
lack of consultation with the beneficiaries and unbridled corruption remain factors that have 
hampered the effectiveness of the agencies. Also, the government increased the revenue 
allocated to region through the increase of the derivation formula. However, the increased 
allocation does not trickle down to the poor masses but rather it ends up in the hands of the 
predatory network of the Nigerian state. The lack of transparency and accountability of the 
utilisation of oil revenue by political leaders in the region facilitates the abuse of public 
funds. One of the most commonly adopted strategies by the government is the use of force 
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which is aimed at violently repressing any form of uprising or threat to the oil business. The 
violence only complicated the crisis in the region as it inspired the Niger Delta people to 
develop a correspondingly violent response through the emergence of militia groups to tackle 
the state security agents. It led to the loss of human lives and properties as civilians were 
caught in the crossfire. Furthermore, the state security agents lacked the training to quell the 
insurgency without harming the civilian populace. Finally, the master stroke that brought 
relative peace in the region is the amnesty offer to the militia groups. The willingness of the 
militia groups to surrender their arms shows that the youths would prefer a legitimate means 
of livelihood to a life of crime. Although it has brought peace to a degree, the programme is a 
diversion from the real issues sustaining the conflict in the region. The deep-seated issues are 
yet to be largely resolved. Environmental degradation, underdevelopment and unemployment 
still pervade the region. Meanwhile, the absence of strong political will, the non-
implementation of the NDDC‟s master plan, non-consultation with the grassroots, poor 
funding, appointing mediocre staff and having a strong reliance on brutal force all symbolise 
the insincerity of the Nigerian state towards resolving the root causes of the crisis. 
 
Overall, this chapter has analysed the state-sponsored conflict management initiatives as 
applied to the conflicts in the Niger Delta region. Its main argument was that several 
government-sponsored conflict-management initiatives in post-conflict environments could 
fail to have an impact on the conflict, could exacerbate the crisis, or may even pave the way 
for other tensions. The chapter endeavoured to assess a few initiatives taken by the Nigerian 
state in managing and resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta region. The presentation of data 
throughout this chapter has broadly brought up two perspectives. The first is that the Nigerian 
state has attempted to address the Niger Delta crises using various approaches including the 
establishment of several development intervention agencies, the upward review of the 
revenue allocation to the region, the use of brutal force and, more recently, the amnesty 
programme, which at first sight has given the best results. The second, however, considers 
that the state-sponsored conflict management initiatives in the Niger Delta region have 
scarcely settled conflict in the region and have neglected the deep-seated issues considered to 
be the root-cause of various conflicts in the region which are still unresolved. Conflict in the 
Niger Delta is an oil mineral issue whereby the conflicting role of oil companies is 
undeniable. The next chapter will try to examine how oil companies approach conflict in the 





Chapter Seven: Conflict Management Initiatives by Oil Companies 
7.1 Introduction 
It is commonly agreed that multinational companies working in the oil and gas sector have to 
be aware that the impact of their operations can lead to conflict. Failure to appreciate and 
address local dynamics in regions of potential conflict, or regions known as such, might be 
costly to their effective existence in terms of impact on employee safety, normal business 
operations, social licence to operate, reputation and future opportunities. Worldwide, in oil 
producing countries like Nigeria, oil and gas companies are believed to have accrued 
significant experience of working in areas of conflict. Nonetheless, rudimentary knowledge 
of, and training in, conflict risk and conflict management seems to be a common concern in 
oil-producing developing countries. In the oil and gas sectors, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that conflict, in all its forms, is a business risk that these industries should not overlook. 
In fact, the MNOCs operating in regions that are at risk of, or experiencing, conflict need to 
be prompt in taking decisive steps to proactively and conscientiously address socio-economic 
grievances resulting from their involvement in resources exploitation, if they are to manage 
and reduce the risks that conflict poses to their existing or potential operations.  
This chapter evaluates conflict management initiatives by the oil companies in the Niger 
Delta. It contends that the problem of conflict management between the oil companies and oil 
communities in this region is not new. As made clear in the preceding chapters, political and 
social volatility has long been a real concern in the Niger Delta region where large oil and gas 
resources exist. Recently the conflict between the MNOCs and oil communities has been 
getting worse as, in the search for more oil, the companies operating in the Niger Delta 
extend their operations into the more conflict-prone parts of the region. At a minimum, 
conflict and social unrest could be a source of costly delays to new projects and operations. 
Similarly, it could also result in damage to a company‟s reputation, depending on that 
company‟s responses to conflict and on the consequences, or perceived consequences, of its 
behaviour and actions. In the worst cases, conflict could lead to the loss of lives and 
livelihoods among local populations, employees or contractors and deep developmental set-
backs. Greater success is believed to stem from working proactively to avoid conflict and to 
build sustainable relations with communities and governments instead of trying to defuse 




be aware of the potential impacts of their actions both on their own business and on the local 
communities in which they are working. Also, they would need to pursue actions and policies 
that avoid the stimulation of new conflicts or the aggravation of old ones. In this chapter, the 
analysis of findings is presented in one main section: Conflict Management Initiatives 
adopted by the MNOCs. It explores the different means used by the MNOCs to settle 
conflicts in the Niger Delta region. It also responds to the third specific research sub-
question: in what ways have the companies engaged with the state and communities in their 
oil operations and what are the relevant factors that influence the conflict management 
initiatives of oil companies in the Niger Delta.  
7.2 Conflict Management Initiatives adopted by the MNOCs 
Several multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) operate in the Niger Delta region as shown 
in table 7.1, including Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd (EPNL), Total, Chevron Nigeria Limited 
(CNL), ExxonMobil, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and Nigerian Agip Oil 
Company (NAOC). These MNOCs epitomise the major players in the oil industry in Nigeria 
and make use of Joint Ventures (JVs) to fund most of the oil and gas projects while other 
projects, particularly the recent ones situated offshore, have been funded through Production 
Sharing Contracts (PSCs). The combination of these two different arrangements is what is 
called in the oil or mining sector, a „fiscal and contract regime‟ and is recorded in the 
hydrocarbon or mining code. It involves a signing of agreements between the MNOCs and 
the host community, often represented by the state‟s government depending on the political 
system applied in the host state (Gordon et al, 2011). The understanding of fiscal and contract 
regime in the oil sector is very important because it is a source of conflict in case one 
contractual party is less respective of engagements than the other. It has been proved that 
much of the conflict in the mining or oil sector is the result of a lack of understanding of 
fiscal and contractual regimes or the lack of respect for signed engagements (Picton-
Turbervill 2014). Joint Venture (JV) is a contractual structure formed between two or more 
parties to create a new entity by both or all parties contributing equity, and they then share 
the revenues, expenses and control of the enterprise. A Production Sharing Contract or 
Agreement (PSC or PSA), however, is an agreement with a host country regarding the 
percentage of production each party will receive after the participating parties have recovered 
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ExxonMobil and Agip Oil Company, much of the focus, however, will be given to Shell, not 
only because it is the longest established MNOC, but also because it has the largest onshore 
footprint in Nigeria‟s oil industry. Broadly, it is important to bear in mind that the MNOCs 
operating in the Niger Delta have developed their own view regarding conflicts in the region. 
This particular comprehension of conflict, which is not necessarily shared by the oil 
communities, has also resulted in a certain approach to conflict resolution by the MNOCs: 
conflict suppression and crackdown on those that dare to protest. The following strategies 
adopted by the MNOCs in handling conflict in the region illustrate this approach. 
The upcoming lines review a variety of community development approaches including; the 
deployment of state security agents, the use of vigilante groups, giving cash gifts, awarding 
contracts to powerful elements in the community and the provision of community 
development projects used as conflict resolution in the Niger Delta region.  
7.2.1 The Deployment of State Security Agents  
One of the strategies emerging from my research findings gleaned from different interviews 
is the use of state security agents by the MNOCs to manage community protests.
67
 It bears 
emphasising that before the 1990s the oil companies in the region of Niger Delta were 
keeping a low security profile using un-armed security forces and limited perimeter fencing 
around their properties. At that time MNOCs had been deploying supernumerary police, 
known as a security unit that does not carry arms, as their security operatives (Okonta and 
Douglas 2001).  
However, at the start of the 1990s, as the awareness of the ecological disaster caused by the 
oil business intensified, and while the issue of prolonged underdevelopment was still 
unsolved, a more organised structure of anti-oil protest in the region thrived in an 
unprecedented manner. As Ikelegbe (2001) posited, the anti-oil struggle started to rally 
around civil society and youth groups. As the consciousness of the locals in the region rose, 
the MNOCs adopted new approaches to their security arrangements. The uprising during this 
period ushered in a grand collaboration between oil companies and the Nigerian state for the 
securitisation of the oil operations. The oil companies fortified their security arrangements 
with the state security services such as the mobile police, navy and army. They imported 
arms and financed the state security forces. For instance, Shell was indicted in the 
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importation of arms ranging from smoke grenades, through bullets, to sub-machine guns in 
order to reinforce its security arrangements (Frynas 2001:51). Moreover, the MNOCs took 
full responsibility for the up-keep of the state forces which were protecting their facilities. 
From an assessment carried out by Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue 
Organisation (ND-HERO), it has been revealed that Nigeria Agrip Oil Company (NAOC) 
had a 100 per cent responsibility for the troops posted to its facilities (ND-HERO 2000). 
From a series of interviews I conducted with individuals from different communities in the 
Niger Delta region, Abuja and Lagos, my research results showed that the oil companies have 
been using force as a key strategy for resolving the surging conflict in the region.
68
 These 
results concurred with the views of some conflict analysts in the region that state security 
forces have been used by the oil companies to settle their conflicts with local communities in 
the Niger Delta region. For example, evidence from a youth leader from Omuku village in the 
Niger Delta,
69
 supported by two different sources: a lecturer of the University of Abuja
70
 and 
a Niger Delta indigene based in Abuja,
71
 indicated that Shell had relied heavily on 
intimidation and the use of state security forces in quelling oil-related agitations. However, 
there have been some occasions where Shell was inviting the armed forces, which included 
the Army, Navy and Police directly, to suppress any form of organised protests even without 
any approval from the government (Ibeanu 2000). In 1987, the natives of Iko in the Niger 
Delta carried out a peaceful demonstration against Shell on its obnoxious practice of flaring 
gas. In response, Shell brought in the mobile police force; a forceful and military operation 
which destroyed homes and left about 350 people homeless, inflicted injuries and raped 
women (ERA 1995; Okonta and Douglas 2001). Three years later, an unarmed community in 
Umuechem protested against the adverse effects of Shell‟s drilling operations on their 
farmlands which were covered with oil spillage. In response, Shell invited in the mobile 
police force. The police intervention killed 80 people and destroyed 495 homes (Douglas and 
Ola 1990). Following this event, the anti-oil protest grew across other communities Ijaw, 
Uzure, Irri, Izon, Ogbia and Uzure (Bello 1992; Bello 1992; Rowell 1994; HRW 1995).  
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As referred to further in Chapter Eight, there is the well-known case of Kenule Saro-Wiwa, 
where Shell was implicated for their complicity in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight 
other indigenes. Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of MOSOP and an environmental rights activist, 
started massive protests against the environmental catastrophe resulting from Shell‟s work in 
Ogoniland. The group issued a series of demands: that Shell should pay ten billion dollars in 
royalties and damages, stop its pollution, make good the exposed pipelines and start fresh 
negotiations for any future oil extraction projects. The ruling government took advantage of 
the controversial death of four Ogoni chiefs by a violent mob to arrest and sentence Ken and 
his colleagues to death in an unfair trial (Osaghae 1995; Adefemi 1998; Holzer 2007). In 
1998, Chevron called in a joint force of Navy and mobile police forces to attack a group of 
protesters that occupied one of their oil facilities. The attack resulted in the killing of two 
Niger Delta activists (Goodman and Scahill 1998). The same way, in 2000, the naval 
personnel posted at NOAC‟s brass terminal shot dead five youths who were protesting 
against the non-execution of an agreement reached with the company in 1994 (HRW 2000). 
Furthermore, in 2005, Chevron invited a joint force of soldiers and mobile police to disperse 
a protest carried out by a group of Ugborodo women in the Niger Delta. As illustrated above, 
the involvement of state security led to the loss of a life and scores of injured protesters (Irene 
2005), with many of them having claimed they were tortured and abused.  
What is even worse, the continuous reliance on state security force by the MNOCs instead of 
using appropriate and acceptable conflict-handling mechanisms inspired the youths to engage 
with the oil companies in more violent measures. Moreover, it is of note that despite the huge 
funds spent on security, the assaults on the MNOCs installations continued unabated. 
Research from Amunwa (2012), for example, depicted that Shell spends more than USD 1 
billion on the security of its production infrastructure. However, the incidence of continued 
and coordinated assaults on its oil installations and employees stood at about 40 incidents in 
2006. This figure rose to 80 and 90 incidents in 2007 and 2008 respectively, while at the 
same time the abduction of oil company employees reached 62 in 2006 and 172 in 2007 
(Nnimmo 2015). In the same way of thinking, it is important to underline that the oil 
companies experienced frequent production shut-ins as a result of the sustained militant 
assaults. For example, in June 2009, Shell production went down significantly to 140,000 
bpd, losing 85.9% of its production (Adeyemo 2009). Hence, it may be argued that the 
reliance on the use of state security by the MNOCs in handling conflict further worsened the 




operations. On a personal note, I can contend that MNOC use of state security agents for 
conflict management has been ineffective and illegitimate: not only has it backfired in terms 
of loss of production, but also it has bred further conflict and dissension in the region rather 
than reducing it. This tactic seems to be a demonstrably disingenuous approach to conflict 
resolution by the oil companies, in many ways similar to divide and rule tactics, as further 
developed in the upcoming sections. 
7.2.2 The Use of Vigilante Groups  
Realising the worsening security situation arising from the use of state security forces, the 
MNOCs instead reached an agreement with the youths in the villages of Niger Delta oil 
communities to protect their oil production facilities. 
The use of these „vigilante‟ groups is a particularly invidious tactic of divide and rule. It 
consists of getting one section of youth to do a dirty job for the MNOCs. It is an attempt to 
co-opt part of the youth. From an interview I conducted with a staff member of Shell in 
Abuja, it was clear that local communities‟ youths were engaged by the MNOCs to invigilate 
and protect pipelines against illegal oil bunkering and vandals.
72
 This view supports Day‟s 
(2008),who asserted that Shell developed a „Community and Shell Together‟ (CAST)policy 
designed to recruit youths to protect oil pipelines from vandalism. A source from 
ExxonMobil agreed with the two views above and indicated that the hiring of youths by the 




However, the hiring of these youths by the MNOCs apparently complicated the security issue 
of both the oil companies and communities in that some of the youths engaged were also 
members of the militants who carried out attacks against the oil companies. A report from 
Agence France-Presse (2003), for instance, indicated that in 2003 the case of 14 kidnapped 
Chevron staff was linked to some members of a security outfit employed from the 
communities to guard their facilities. This confirms the evidence from research and an 
analyst who claimed that the security arrangements as provided by the MNOCs have always 
fuelled violent struggle for employment among community youth as well as groups within 
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 In the same vein, a lecturer of peace and conflict studies at the University of 
Lagos added that the groups left out from the companies‟ security „arrangements‟ often attack 
the oil companies‟ facilities or use other forms of violence.
75
 It seems to be that the oil 
companies give out huge sums of money to the vigilante groups so they can acquire arms to 
not only strengthen their capacity to protect their oil installations, but to fight rival gangs. 
This situation illustrates how the MNOCs have been playing into the intensification of the 
local conflict dynamics in the region (WAC 2003). As result, this strategy changed the socio-
economic situation, thereby increasing the grievance situation and the culture of greed, 
particularly for those groups left out of the security arrangements. In the long-term, as is 
further discussed in the following section, the oil companies will employ the „use of vigilante 
groups‟ as a tactic aiming to divide and rule local communities. 
7.2.3 Giving Cash Gifts and Contracts to Powerful Elements in the Community 
Offering cash gifts and contracts to powerful elements in the community is a way of buying 
off potential opposition. As in the use of vigilante groups, this is again a very dubious and 
morally reprehensible tactic due to its partial and unfair approach to addressing conflict. This 
attitude has been condemned by many individuals which I had discussions with during my 
fieldwork. Looking at this invidious tactic, results from my fieldwork also indicated that the 
MNOCs adopted the strategy of giving gifts and contracts to the most vocal and violent 
groups in the oil communities as a means of handling potential conflict that could emerge as 
the result of their oil activities within oil communities.
76
 Evidence from a lecturer at the 
University of Lagos, for example, suggests that the oil companies have been lobbying the 
groups in a community which are most influential on those capable of disrupting oil 
production.
77
 A researcher from the University of Abuja similarly stated that the giving of 
gifts and contracts to a category of individuals known for their violent activities against 
MNOCs facilities has become a vital licence to operate peacefully in the region.
78
 
However, reflecting on the agreements between the MNOCs and certain groups of youth 
leaders within oil communities, it is important to point out that the initial arrangement was 
between the oil companies and the community ruling elite. That is to say that the oil 
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companies focus on local elites, traditional chiefs, before cutting off security agreements, as 
they are seen as influential within communities. The MNOCs reached agreements with the 
leaders of the community to whom they gave cash and contracts for them to carry out. This 
was the beginning of the patronage relationship in the region: a relationship between a few 
members of the communities and the MNOCs (Nnimmo 2015). These development contracts 
were awarded to these individuals without any evaluation plan, as the oil companies were not 
concerned at all about the way the funds were to have been allocated towards the 
development of the community. In most cases, these projects were either not executed at all 
or were poorly implemented, said an indigene from the Niger Delta.
79
 The oil companies 
were seen to be buying peace from the community leaders through the contracts awarded 
(Norimitsu 2002; HRW 2005; Watts 2007), a situation which led an analyst to claim that the 
MNOCs fostered a strong tie with the local elites as they provide the oil companies with low 
access cost and a peaceful operating environment.
80
 The view concurs with Kemedi‟ (2003) 
who asserted that the ruling elites in most of the communities became corrupt, having 
diverted project funds for personal enrichment at the expense of their people. As a researcher 
put it:   
By taking advantage of low cost access to security through these arrangements, the oil 
companies have built a material relationship with the traditional leaders of the 
communities. On the contrary, these leaders started losing their authority or control 
over their subjects, especially the youth. Hence fragmentation and weakening of social 




The youth accused their elders of leadership failure as they were seen to stand by in silence as 
the oil companies destroyed their homeland for a paltry compensation.
82
 Osaghae et al.‟s 
(2007) research on the militancy activities within oil communities in the Niger Delta 
provided that the youths lost faith in their ruling elites and so they decided to confront the 
patronage alliance that emerged between the oil companies and their traditional rulers, hence 
they resorted to disrupting the operations of oil companies in the region. This is what Ukeje 
et al (2002) alluded to as youth guerrilla warfare aimed at damaging the oil companies‟ 
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installations also heightened the insecurity in the oil communities. In doing so, they have thus 
severed themselves from their elders and no longer receive any instructions from the ruling 
elite. As a consequence, according to Ile and Akukwe (2001) and Kemedi (2003), the oil 
companies in turn started dealing with the youths as they were seen as the ones with more 
disruptive powers. The youths became the object of patronage and power brokers; becoming 





It is arguable at this point that the oil companies were identifying and influencing those 
powerful stakeholders in communities that had the capability to ensure a peaceful business 
operation for them. Ikelege (2006) elaborated on this point, ascertaining that the MNOCs 
supported selected individuals who were considered to be influential in their communities. 
He concluded that although the MNOCs‟ support was shown to be evident to certain factions, 
these factions, however, still retained the ability to disturb the MNOCs operations.  Ikelege‟s 
stand (2006) seems to corroborate some realities on the ground, as the contestation over 
patronage and rent-seeking resulted in violent struggles among youth groups within 
communities, giving rise to individuals fighting one another for supremacy. 
Programmatically, however, this was part of the „divide and rule‟ tactics of the oil companies. 
An analyst claimed that when the youths succeeded in getting their demands met by the 
MNOCs by using violence, they realised their power and so resorted to yet more violence to 
get their subsequent demands met.
84
 Another conflict expert is of the view that the sabotage 
of the Oil Companies‟ installations by the youths partly promoted the culture of violence by 
youths against the oil business. Once a group is identified as the master-mind of violence, 
they become available for conflict settlement, he added.
85
 Overall, it could be argued that the 
selective financial and material offering strategy adopted by the MNOCs weakened the 
community‟s relationship and divided community‟s members. It also created a struggle for 
power and position to access the oil benefits that come with such a position. This further 
reinforced a culture of violence in the oil communities.  
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7.2.4 Provision of Community Development Projects 
In an effort to placate the host communities, the oil companies have also been providing 
community development projects. Originally, the MNOCs adopted a corporate assistance 
approach that placed emphasis on corporate philanthropy in the provision of assistance 
programmes to their host communities. However, the oil companies‟ development 
undertakings in the oil communities were limited to philanthropic indulgencies (Francis et al. 
2011). Ite (2004), in this context, indicates that the MNOCs implemented community projects 
that were directly related to their operations, including rolling out agricultural support 
programmes, providing basic amenities to the neighbouring communities which serve their 
remote oil facilities; scholarship awards on petroleum courses etc. Most of the community 
assistance programmes that were implemented were designed to enhance the MNOCs social 
image rather than to address urgent social and economic problems and had little or no impact 
on the socio-economic wellbeing of the oil communities.  
Conversely, at start of the 1990s, the anti-oil protests had intensified as the Nigerian state 
failed to provide social goods and the environmental degradation caused by oil production 
continued unabated. Research from Okoko (1996) showed that the host communities 
channelled their demands to the oil companies who were seen as the conduit through which 
their resources went to the federal government. They perceived the development of their 
communities as a legitimate duty of the MNOCs. One could argue that with the increasing 
pressure from the local communities, the MNOCs were forced to re-examine their approach 
towards community development, stepping up their support for infrastructure as well as 
agriculture, health and education. Taken from this particular view, Francis et al. (2011) put 
forward that the oil companies evolved their approach from corporate philanthropy to a „Top-
Down‟ community development approach and finally to a „Bottom-Up‟ approach that places 
emphasis on sustainable development and community participation.  
Researching on the oil companies‟ provision for the oil communities, however, Nwokolo 
(2012) pointed out some problems associated with the initial approach of providing the 
community development projects that further exacerbated the crisis. Initially, the provision of 
development projects and other social services, according to an operational manager of Total, 
were predicated on the communities being designated as „Host Communities‟.
86
 Herein lies 
the important issue to underline: that the MNOCs draw a clear line between communities that 
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directly host their oil facilities and those outside of their area of operations. This difference in 
the understanding of „host community‟ is the basis of the policy which determines access to 
oil benefits for communities located within the operational zones of the oil companies, added 
a staff member of Chevron.
87
 It follows from this that the adoption of such policies can breed 
violent conflict between communities in the region, fuelling intense struggles between 
communities for the access to oil benefits. Additionally, these policies have also polarised the 
existing, but volatile, peace among these communities. Besides, they have proved that the oil 
companies have failed to understand that the damaging effect of their operations is also borne 
by the communities surrounding the host communities, namely: oil pollution, high cost of 
living and loss of livelihood (Nwokolo 2012). A significant example is that the violent clash 
between the Ijaw communities Ogulagha and Odimodi in Delta state was as a result of the 
non-host community being adversely affected by the oil production with no compensation 
while the designated host communities enjoyed the oil benefits (Vanguard 2008). This inter-
community conflict illustrates another consequence of divide and rule tactics by the MNOCs.  
In regard to a top-down approach adopted by the oil companies, communities were provided 
with assistance on the basis of what the oil companies believed were the needs of the 
communities (Francis et al. 2011). However, as observed by some critics (WAC 2003; 
Idemudia and Ite 2006), it is arguable that the application of the top-down approach by oil 
companies was the result of their lack of a systematic approach in the provision of 
development projects for the communities. Over time, such projects were often implemented 
haphazardly with little positive impact on the socio-economic wellbeing of the oil 
communities. This was exemplified by a notable from Obrikom who said that there were 
cases of unfinished projects, particularly a health centre in Obrikom in Port-Harcourt that was 
constructed by Agip with no equipment and drugs in it.
88
 From another source, but 
supporting the same view, it was said that coupled with the policy of issuing contracts to 
prominent individuals in the oil communities, the oil companies further fragmented social ties 
and exacerbated the conflict within communities, as their projects were either never 
completed or ended up in the pockets of a few individuals.
89
 This situation fuelled conflict 
among groups within oil communities which in most cases escalated to violence. 
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Over time, the MNOCs became increasingly frustrated by the chaos, violence and destruction 
(IRIN 2006). Part of the increasing violence was related to competition for compensation for 
land ownership, allocation of employment opportunities and community-development 
projects. The increased funding towards community development by the MNOCs did not 
seem to make much difference as the violence continued unabated with little to show for the 
funds disbursed for community development. Research by Bustany and Wysham (2000), for 
example, depicted that the sum of USD 28 million disbursed for community development by 
Chevron during 1990-1997 was largely misused as most projects were either missing or non-
functional. Similarly, the assessment carried out on Shell‟s community development projects 
revealed that less than a third of the projects established were successful (Legborsi 2004). 
With regard to Chevron, its operations were disrupted over 70 times between 1997 and 2001 
following violent community clashes (Reider and Haastrup 2013). Summarily, it could be 
said that the conflicts that were associated with previous community development 
programmes were driven by the exclusion of the oil communities‟ own initiatives and the 
arguments among factions/ethnic groups over oil benefits.  
Recognising the divisive consequence of the „host community‟ designation, Chevron decided 
to initiate a development policy that targeted clusters of communities in its operational area 
(IRIN 2006). Therefore, in 2004 Chevron took the initiative of changing the traditional 
development strategies and to reduce conflict and strengthen civil society through a new 
model called „Global Memoranda of Understanding‟ (GMOUs). This model is primarily 
based on „bottom-up‟ community-driven development initiatives in the region (Ristau and 
Knight 2008). A GMOU is a written agreement between an oil company and a group of 
several communities. The groupings are based on local government or ethnic lines as advised 
by the relevant state government. Under the terms of the GMOUs, the communities select the 
developments they desire while the oil companies provide the funding. Chevron‟s GMOU 
created coalitions of communities that concentrated efforts on managing projects to meet 
long term goals. The company (with the support of New Nigeria foundation) created eight 
federations on an ethnic basis managed by „Regional Development Councils‟ (RDCs) – a 
governance structure in each cluster made up of representatives from the community, NGO, 
government and oil company, covering 850,000 people in 425 communities in five states 
(Reider and Haastrup 2013). Other oil multinationals followed suit in adopting the GMOUs 
model (Okechukwu 2014). In 2006, Shell Nigeria declared plans for 67 similar structures, 
clustering 1,200 communities under Community Development Boards. By the end of 2012, 




clusters, covering 349 communities, about 35% of the local communities around their 
business operations in the region (SCIN 2013).    
As for the desire of the Niger Delta communities, an independent assessment undertaken in 
2009 suggested that they want to partake in the management of their development through 
community-driven arrangements that guarantee community-based planning and greater local 
empowerment (RTI/SFCG/CBI 2008; Francis et al. 2011). The results of this assessment 
corroborate the view of a researcher from the University of Ibadan who stated that an 
appraisal of the GMOU revealed the intent of many community stakeholders. This researcher 
claims that the community-driven arrangements approach stimulates more sustainable 
development, ownership and transparency, and has enriched company relationships with the 
communities.
90
Moreover, the GMOU model has been widely accepted by the oil 
communities,
91
as claimed by an engineer of EPNL, who is familiar with the local 
development projects. This is because one of the great innovations of this approach is that all 
decisions on local projects would be made in a participatory process by the community at 
large, starting with community focus groups that included women and youth as confirmed by 
a consultant of Nigeria Agip Oil Company.
92
 
Moreover, an indigene close to the projects advised that through this approach, the 
communities do get assistance from partnering donor agencies or NGOs in the planning and 
designing of their projects.
93
 Therefore, unlike previous development programmes, the 
GMOUs contain a series of checks and balances to ensure transparency and guarantee strong 
financial oversight (LaPin 2000). Project funds are released by the approval of a community 
management board chaired by the oil company with the release being triggered by satisfying 
criteria, such as: the identification of project as a high priority, identification of certified local 
contractors and project budgets. Chevrons GMOUs implemented approximately 258 projects 
in more than 400 communities and benefitted some 600,000 lives. Projects worth more than 
USD 83 million have been completed (Chevron 2015). In 2012, through Shell‟s GMOUs, a 
total of 723 projects were completed. By 2012, over USD 117 million had been spent on the 
GMOUs programme (SCIN 2013). The projects completed involved electrification, 
education, health, transportation, housing and economic empowerment. The economic 
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empowerment projects included investment in SMEs, skill acquisition and micro-credit 
schemes which all brought the prospect of alleviating poverty in the communities (Idemudia 
2009). Micro-credit is particularly important for women‟s groups. Further, the community 
development councils or boards are expected to maintain a record of their development 
history, in order to attract funds from other sources. Nine of the 33 Cluster Development 
Boards (CDB) under Shell GMOUs are now registered foundations receiving third- party 
funding (SCIN 2013). 
The implementation of GMOUs has reduced violence around the areas of the oil companies‟ 
operation. Chevron, for example, recorded a reduction in community-induced disruptions to 
their operations from 81 in 1998 to zero in 2012(Reider and Haastrup 2013). Experience from 
my fieldwork shares the view that largely, GMOUs are a successful model owing to some 
MNOCs adopting them for empowering the oil communities. It is thought important to 
maintain a sustainable partnership between the oil companies and the oil communities. For 
this to be achieved, in addition to the community development projects, there needs to be a 
credible change in the setting of the MNOCs corporate priorities and the way in which they 
execute their core activities in order to reduce the environmental ills associated with their 
business. Furthermore, over the long term the choice strategy for industry is to attract greater 
commitment from government, donors, NGOs and other private entities to support 
community development in the region.
94
 
7.2.5 Reparation and Conservation of the Environmental Damage 
The environmental degradation caused by oil exploration has been at the centre of the oil 
communities‟ agitations. In an interview I conducted with an engineer of Shell in Abuja, 
environmental concerns and their remediation were one of the contents of Shell‟s plan 
towards conflict-management initiatives, the engineer claimed that the remediation of 
environmental damage caused by oil extraction is one of initiatives adopted by the MNOCs 
towards managing the conflict in the region.
95
 Following the mid-1990s incident, Shell took 
measures towards replacing its old flow-lines and pipelines that are more than fifteen years 
old (Aghalino 2009), a situation which entails the installation of modern equipment to 
enhance the safety and environmental standards of their operations.
96
 Quite recently, most of 
                                                 
94
 Fieldwork conducted in Nigeria, 2014-2016. 
95
 Interview conducted with a staff member of Shell, Abuja, 16 January 2016. 
96




the MNOCs are undertaking remediation programmes on past impacted oil production sites.
97
 
Shell has been involved in remediating over 700 impacted sites across the Niger Delta 
covering over 1,500 hectares including legacy sites such as Bomu-11, Bomu-31, Bomu-
manifold, Sime, Nokpor, K-Dere, B-dere and Bomu Well 41/50 (Shell 2012). Concomitantly, 
other MNOCs, in collaboration with the federal government, have started several ambitious 
natural gas utilisation projects which, among others, include the Nigerian Liquefied Natural 
Gas Project at Bonny in Port Harcourt and Gas-to-liquid project at Escravos in Delta state 
(NLNG 2015).
98
 According to two different engineers from Shell and Chevron I interviewed 
respectively in Abuja and Lagos, it may be considered that the projects above were aimed at 
eliminating gas flaring.  
There has also been some effort by the oil companies to incorporate a waste management 
system for their facilities, including a system aimed at reducing the impact of their operation 
on the environment by treating and disposing waste products in compliance with relevant 
regulatory requirements.
99
 Shell, for instance, has two recyclable waste depots where waste 
from its installations are reprocessed, while the organic waste is transformed into manure 
utilised for remediating polluted land (Odisu 2015). However, despite the efforts taken, a 
staff member of ExxonMobil that I interviewed in Abuja is not aware of the fact. To him: 
The MNOCs have not done much to prevent environment degradation and that the oil 
companies still have lot to do in remediating the environment, as the production sites 
claimed to have been remediated were still polluted.
100
 
Based on the assessment carried out by UNDP (2011), oil pollution at several sites was 
claimed to have been cleaned up by Shell. However, following the inspection, it has been 
found on the ground that the company‟s Remediation by Enhanced Natural Attenuation 
(RENA) technique for environmental remediation was ineffective. Similarly, a Union for the 
Conservation of Nature-Niger Delta Panel study (2013) noted that the methodologies 
presently utilised for the remediation and rehabilitation of oil spill-impacted sites in the Niger 
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Delta do not fully address the need for the rehabilitation of biodiversity. Amnesty 
International (2015) concurs and adds that little has changed since the UNDP assessment. 
There are still recent cases of oil spillage and on-going gas flaring. In 2014, Shell and ENI 
have admitted to more than 550 oil spills in the Niger Delta in the previous year, according to 
an Amnesty International study of the companies‟ latest figures. This represents a huge 
disparity when compared with Europe where only 10 spills have occurred between 1971 and 
2011(Amnesty International 2015). However, continuous delay on cleaning up polluted land 
in the region will keep encouraging confrontation between the oil companies and the oil 
communities. More so, such delays further complicate the remediation process, as it becomes 
more difficult to clean-up over time. There is a need for a more concerted effort by the oil 
companies towards adopting effective remediation techniques and accelerating the 
remediation of past impacted oil production sites. Furthermore, the issue of continuous gas 
flaring and oil spills needs to be effectively addressed. Such an effort would go a long way to 
reduce the frustration of the oil communities. 
Broadly, in regard to the in-depth analysis of above-substantiated conflict-management 
initiatives adopted by the MNOCs, namely: the deployment of state security agents, the use 
of vigilante groups, cash gifts and contracts offered to particular indigenes and the provision 
of community development projects, I might argue that the conflict management system of 
the MNOCs is not effective owing to the security situation of companies varying widely. In 
reference with the deployment of security agents, for instance, it has been established that the 
management arrangements surrounding the conflicts in the Niger Delta is opaque (Avant 
2005: 184), as quite often oil companies rely on public security forces for both protecting 
their operations and for settling their disputes with local communities. For example, oil 
companies have been asking for the supernumerary police to be deployed for the protection 
of their facilities. This police, also known as „spy police‟, are officially one of the specialised 
units of the Nigerian Police Force, but have been de facto employed by the oil companies, 
since they are paid by them. Oil companies also depend on different public security forces: 
police, army and navy to protect their assets. These forces are thus repeatedly allocated to oil 
companies‟ facilities, hence getting paid by companies including top-up allowances, housing 
and meals (ICG 2006b: 7-9; Omeje 2006: 80).  
As to cash gifts and contracts offered to particular indigenes, one could ascertain that another 
common practice, used by the MNOCs to handle conflicts in the Niger Delta is to have 




arrangements whereby an oil company hires different members and groups from host 
communities, such as youths and some influential individuals, “to provide security services 
for the company‟s oil facilities and services within their local domain on a contract basis.” 
Shell‟s security problems, for instance, involves attacks on personnel, facilities and pipelines 
as well as kidnappings which have caused the temporary shutdown of operations (Shell 
Nigeria 2007f: 7; Omeje 2006: 75-77). Shell is believed to be the company most heavily 
criticized for its partnership with public security forces and connivance in human rights 
violations. Following the mid-1990s Ogoni crisis, Shell‟s conflict-management approach to 
security changed from a reactive to a more preventive one. Several analysts seem to concur 
with the view that Shell is now aware of the potential human rights implications for its 
security provisions and also perceives its community commitment as a tool to prevent 
conflicts (Freeman et al. 2001). 
Overall, the scope of this chapter is to discuss the conflict management initiatives by the oil 
companies, using the views of different opinions above and those of my fieldwork. However, 
suffice it to say that Nigeria in general and the Niger Delta region in particular, has developed 
into a typical resource-conflict state (Omeje 2006; 2008) where the state is no longer reliant 
on traditional conflict-resolution and -management, but on a conflict-oriented or -tailored 
management and a solution which involves all protagonists (oil-communities, federal 
government and oil companies). It is, however, of note that following the partial 
nationalisation of upstream oil production in 1971, oil production was re-organised in the 
form of joint ventures. This re-organisation de facto set a close partnership between the state 
and oil multinationals (Frynas 2001: 30), but ignored indigenes‟ rights: a situation which 
impeded the consecutive governments to provide a sound conflict-management regulatory 
framework for oil production. Consequently, Nigerian people have been blaming their 
government for backing oil companies‟ operations at any cost, since it is believed to be 
willing to repress community protest against oil production (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 57). 
Here it is important to also underline that initially, the 1990s protest movements against oil 
production in the Niger Delta had the aim to protest peacefully against the central 
government and the oil companies. Communities have always required compensation, health 
services, educational opportunities, infrastructure and socioeconomic development directly 
from companies as “surrogates for an absent or neglectful government” (Ibid: 72). As a 
response, the oil companies resorted to either using violence against protesters, or bribing the 




spread in the Niger Delta makes them vulnerable to protest and violence. Conflict 
management initiatives by oil companies differ from the local people‟s expectations and 
make security a precarious issue. The dearth of palpable and sustainable conflict-
management initiatives that factor in the local communities‟ rights and views has resulted in 
protracted conflict in the Niger Delta. Oil companies and the federal government have always 
been colluding and applying invidious and dubious conflict-resolution and -management 
tactics to buy any opposition off.  
7.3 Conclusion  
This chapter was related to the conflict management initiatives by the oil companies in the 
Niger Delta and aimed to offer and examine the fieldwork‟s findings on the causes, impacts 
and resolution strategies pertaining to the on-going conflicts in the Niger Delta. It mainly 
argued that the issue of conflict management between the oil companies and oil communities 
in the region of the Niger Delta is not new and that political and social instability has long 
been a real concern in the region of the Niger Delta where large oil and gas resources exist. 
Overall, the analysis of fieldwork data suggested that at least two major conflict management 
initiatives by the oil companies could be identified to have led to increasing protest and oil-
related violence in the Niger Delta; firstly, the selection of certain local leaders on the basis 
of the divide and rule principle, especially through the distribution of revenues, and secondly 
the vague agreement regarding a sustainable project addressing the ecological and social 
consequences of oil production. The first point has argued that the distribution of revenues on 
the basis of invidious and dubious tactics based on the divide and rule principle is perceived 
as unjust by the communities who bear all the negative consequences of oil production. 
Herein lies the importance to underline that the question of revenue-sharing in oil 
communities is further convoluted by rent-seeking behaviour, lack of transparency and 
corruption of elites at the federal but also state and local levels. As a result, demands for local 
ownership over resources also mirror the fear of domination and overlap with conflicts over 
the political influence of different ethnic groups (Anugwom 2005: 104). The second point, 
however, contended that an unclear management framework for the ecological consequences 
of oil production and its resulting social deprivation have given rise to different groups 
demanding greater control over resources, but also using violence to extract money by taking 
hostages or by engaging in illegal oil bunkering. Consequently, militias‟ activities are 




or vigilante groups to secure their own power base or to enforce government control. By 
reflecting and analysing relevant factors that influence conflict management initiatives of oil 
companies in the Niger Delta, the research analysis on this point departed from the political 
and societal environment in Nigeria and in oil companies‟ home states, to explain the system 
of their conflict management initiatives. To this point, suffice it to say that companies prefer 
not to engage in a proper conflict management system, as they perceive it to be at the core of 
the state‟s responsibilities (Feil et al. 2008).  
As opposed to what is expected to be an appropriate mechanism for conflict management 
initiatives by the oil companies in the region, however, the MNOCs have chosen violence 
against indigenes and the corruption of influential local elites as a conflict management 
framework. The disproportionate use of force by the MNOCs, supported by the government, 
as a means toward managing resources contentions, has exacerbated the existing animosity 
between the MNOCs and the indigenes. Summarily, the conflict management initiatives by 
the oil companies are simply attempts at conflict suppression, at times resulting instead in 
conflict escalation. 
Discussions in this chapter have shown that the form of the conflict management initiatives 
executed by the oil companies in the Niger Delta region are in reality an attempt to settle the 
problems using violence and using the divide and rule principle which privileges a small 
social group to the detriment of the other community members. It also noted the 
implementation of the MNOCs‟ policies or top-down policies as a means toward ending the 
conflict has instead exacerbated the situation. In sum, the analysis has shown that managing 
the oil-led conflict in the Niger Delta region would need the MNOCs, and their ally the 
government, to adhere to the local communities‟ blueprints in regard to their socio-economic 
development. Embracing community participation and initiatives have already proved to be 
among the best ways to proceed in the post-conflict recovery process. This process could be 
an emulated powerful coalition between all protagonists involved in the conflict. In doing so, 
it could also create and communicate a vision for change that could tackle obstacles that have 
prevented the oil companies and oil communities from agreeing on the development of the 
region.  
Summarily, a variety of community development approaches as reviewed in this chapter 
demonstrates that the deployment of state security agents, the use of vigilante groups, giving 
cash gifts, awarding contracts to powerful elements in the community and the provision of 




conflict-resolution initiatives. The inability of the oil companies to realise to the indigenes 
aspirations exacerbated the existing violent environment of the politics; a situation which 
eroded the security of their operations. These tactics applied by the oil companies have also 
revealed their attitude and behaviour toward the development of the conflict management 
framework in the region. These companies have been reluctant in engaging in a proper 
conflict management system in the Niger Delta region. However, how do local communities 
respond to the conflict management initiatives by the government and the MNOCs? The 





Chapter Eight:  Local Community Opposition to the Oil Companies and 
Adverse Effects on their Lives 
 
8.1 Introduction 
From a contemporary and global perspective, the dramatic upsurge in violent confrontation 
and protest against the Oil Multinationals in the 1990s in the Niger Delta coincided with the 
end of the Cold War. The developments of violence in this region raise the question 
regarding how local communities could contribute to the solution of the problem which has 
seemingly spiralled out of control. The spate of instability and criminality has given rise to 
the question around local communities‟ perspectives on how social movement‟s peaceful 
protest against the negative impact of oil development has become one of violent conflict, 
and how this conflict has been handled in the Niger Delta. This chapter appraises local 
community opposition to the oil companies and the adverse effects on their own lives. It 
argues that non-violent and violent actions by local communities are a direct response to the 
government and the oil companies‟ apathy to the issues that local communities are facing as 
the result of oil exploitation. As in Chapters Six and Seven, it also presents and analyses data 
collected from the field research undertaken between 2014 and 2016. However, contrary to 
the two previous chapters that looked at the conflict-management efforts by the government 
and oil companies, this chapter focuses on the indigenes‟ attitude towards the government 
and oil companies‟ approaches to conflict resolution and management in their oil-bearing 
communities. In doing so, the chapter attempts to address the fourth sub-question: in what 
ways have the communities been affected by, and responded to, the issues of governance in 
the Niger Delta. This part is structured around four sections: the adverse effects of oil in the 
Niger Delta, local community opposition, violent actions and responses, and the MNOCs and 
state‟s responses to the community actions. Overall, it develops an analytical discourse on Oil 
Communities‟ responses to the MNOCs‟ conflict-management initiatives and suggests the 
integrated conflict-management model as a problem-solving or management approach to 
conflicts in the Niger Delta. Therefore, the main focus of this chapter is an account of the 






8.2 Succinct Overview of the Adverse Effects of Oil on the People of the Niger Delta 
As this discussed in the previous chapters, particularly in the literature review, this section 
briefly highlights some of the issues that the oil communities have been suffering in the Niger 
Delta as a result of oil exploitation. It is worth noting that the duplication of this information 
at this particular point is solely to serve the purpose of analysing how indigenes came to 
respond to different issues resulting from the oil operation within their settings, as will be 
discussed further in this chapter.  
Several oil multinationals have been offered the licence to operate in the fields of oil and gas 
in the Niger Delta. These operations have been lucrative for the oil companies and a few 
government officials, indigenous communities, however, continue to suffer from the negative 
effects of oil exploitation and the lack of the needed compensation related to this exploitation 
and the export of their resources. The issues that the oil-rich communities in the Niger Delta 
face include energy poverty and access to energy, poor democratic institutions and practices, 
oil spillages and gas flaring, poor governance and service delivery, land clearances and 
displacements, and the subjugation of women, to name but a few. However, for the purpose 
of this research, only oil spillages and gas flaring are being examined, due to their serious 
impact, namely pollution, on the livelihood of the people in this region.  
As substantiated on the „environment burden‟ in Chapter Three, it has been clearly 
established that poor operational practices, the lack of implementation of regulations and a 
continuing unlawful oil economy have given rise to a series of oil spillages and gas flaring in 
the Niger Delta region (Ndubuisi and Asia 2007; Kadafa 2012) that have been disastrous for 
the environment. This catastrophic environmental pollution has destroyed existing 
livelihoods and triggered mistrust and antipathy between indigenes and the oil companies; 
thus damaging the functioning security of the MNOCs and federal government (Ukoli 2005). 
The daily flaring of gas in the Niger Delta region is comparable to the Brazilian quotidian gas 
consumption (Kadafa 2012). In other words, it is not only a loss of multi-billions of dollars, 
but also prevents communities from effective energy solutions (Anifowose 2008). However, 
most importantly is the fact that gas flaring is the single largest contributor to CO2 releases in 
the Niger Delta (Anifowose 2008; Kadafa 2012). The environmental disaster caused by oil 
spills and gas flaring in the Niger Delta has many serious negative effects on the farming, 




discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the federal government and the oil companies have 
taken a few initiatives towards managing and solving these issues. However, in the view of 
local people, these initiatives did not live up to their expectation, nor did they address the 
fundamental problem related to resource ownership and compensation. Rather, they 
contributed to the creation of a rift between the federal government and the oil companies on 
the one side, and the members of local communities on the other. The local communities 
decided to express their concerns to the oil companies and government in order to gain full 
rights over their resources. The following section looks at the different means used by local 
communities. 
8.3 Adverse Effects of Oil and Local Community Opposition in the Niger Delta 
The Niger Delta communities are effective in forming organised and well-coordinated civil 
society groups with various degrees of demands and different approaches to getting them 
answered (Olowu 2011). These civil society groups mostly work on the basis of a non-violent 
ideology (Inokoba and Imbua 2010). As stated earlier in the literature, following a long 
period of neglect over their concerns, the oil communities decided to organise themselves 
into the MOSOP group to further their cause (Mitee 1997). Recently again, the silence of 
authorities on the problems caused by oil operations is still prevalent. Oyibode‟s (2016) 
research on the oil activities in the region, for example, points to the issue of the continuous 
gas-flaring going on in Dokwa communities. He notes that regardless of numerous 
complaints by the representatives of Dokwa communities addressed to the Presidency, the 
Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the Delta State Ministry of Oil and Gas, they 
are yet to get any response. Overall, it may be deduced from the above that the oil 
communities‟ petitions toward the solution of environmental pollution was a peaceful 
approach toward managing an ongoing social issue. However, the continuous avoidance of 
complaints by the MNOCs obliged them to use more aggressive actions to get their demands 
met. The insensitivity and nonchalant attitude of both the Nigerian state and oil companies 
only added to the exasperation of the petition writers.  
Drawing from the literature, it can be indicated that following the shortcomings of using 
petitions, the Niger Delta people resorted to legal suits against the oil companies (Owugah 
1999; Ibaba and Okolo 2009) in order to voice their concerns. Through legal actions, the 
aggrieved communities thought they were assured in using the judiciary system as a legal 




University of Lagos, their grievances were largely ignored by the oil companies that 
purposely were flouting court verdicts and, to some extent, took advantage of the judiciary 
system‟s loopholes to postpone decisions.
101
 This MNOCs‟ behaviour is still persistent and 
prevalent nowadays; the cases of the Ejama-Ebubu community against SPDC in 2001 
(Sheldon 2011), Ijaw community against SPDC in 2006 (Vanguard 2010) and Iwherekan 
community (Gbemre) against SPDC (This Day 2005), to name a few, are very telling. In all 
these cases, the oil companies flouted the High Court judgements against them. Two 
employees of Shell and Chevron that I interviewed in Lagos were of the consensus that the 
inefficiencies observed in the Nigerian judicial system has allowed the oil companies to act 
and behave in an anarchic and unruly manner. For these individuals, although there are 
compensation agreements between the MNOCs and local communities, environmental 
damages caused by their operations are still not repaired.
102
 
By early 2000 confrontations between indigenes and the oil companies over oil extraction in 
the Niger Delta metamorphosed from peaceful protest to violent confrontations. The 
abhorrence of the Niger Delta people at the adverse effects of oil exploitation was expressed 
vocally to the MNOCs by local community members. The people‟s grievances thereafter 
grew into more organised mass protestations whose demands, approaches and tactics 
substantially changed with social and sociological dynamics. In order to voice their concerns 
to the oil companies, local communities adopted various strategies which included: written 
petitions to oil companies and the government, media interviews and newspaper publication, 
legal suits, sending of delegations to oil companies and government, vocal threats, 
communiqués, mass rallies and demonstrations, blockades and disruption of company 
operations, temporary occupation of installations and oil premises, and the kidnapping of 
MNOCs‟ employees (Okoh 2005:100).The different oil communities‟ strategies are grouped 
into two phases. The first phase uses non-violent protests and includes writing petitions, legal 
suits, organised protest, mass rallies and temporary occupation of oil facilities. The second 
phase employs violence against the oil companies and state. 
8.3.1 Writing Petitions  
The earliest community peaceful protests against the oil companies started with writing 
petitions in the 1960s. These petitions were initiated, written and signed by the local 
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communities‟ notables, youth movement leaders, members of civil society organisations, 
members of local and international human rights, environment and development NGOs. They 
were addressed to the federal government and oil companies operating in the Niger Delta 
region (Oyibode 2016). They were expressing frustrations and concerns of local communities 
on the issue of environment pollution, loss of livelihood and health, as well as lack of access 
to oil revenue (Mitee 1997). From a series of interviews I conducted in Nigeria in line with 
the case being studied, a few people in the Niger Delta, among which indigenes, oil company 
employees and academics, have been of the view that the oil communities have been using 
the writing of petitions as a strategy to express their grievances regarding their non-access to 
oil revenue.
103
 During a focus group discussion conducted with academics and researchers 
working on the Niger Delta‟s environmental remediation at the University of Ibadan, the 
same view above was supported by three individuals, who claimed that the earliest 
community protest involved sending petitions or community delegations to register their 
complaints to the oil companies and the Nigerian State.
104
 Communication between the oil 
communities and the MNOCs was relayed by local community leaders, as mentioned above, 
through written petitions. However, in most cases, the oil companies had been reluctant to 
respond or when they did respond they failed to fulfil the promises they made. For example, 
the Ogoni crisis was initially marked by indigenes‟ petitions and complaints to Shell, the 
Federal Ministry of Mines and Powers (as it was then known) in Lagos as well as to the state 
ministries in Rivers State, on the environmental degradation caused by oil spillage (Mitee 
1997). This issue was not resolved until it turned into a full-blown crisis. Oil communities 
were thought to have tired of writing petitions, and so decided to organise themselves into the 
MOSOP group to further their cause (Mitee 1997). The „no-response‟ attitude by the 
government is still prevalent in recent times. In 1966 for example, despite several petitions 
written to the Presidency, the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the Delta State 
Ministry of Oil and Gas by representatives of Dokwa communities on the continuous gas-
flaring happening in their communities, they are yet to get any response (Oyibode 2016). To 
a large extent, this shows that initial response or action of the oil communities towards the 
effects of oil exploitation has always been of a peaceful nature. However, the continual 
disregard of the oil communities‟ complaints appears to have been forcing them to adopt 
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more forceful actions in order to get their demands met. The submission of petitions by 
indigenes has shown to be ineffective: this strategy having been frustrated by the insensitivity 
and nonchalant attitude of both the Nigerian state and oil companies towards a possible early 
resolution to an issue. Hence, local community‟s members have resorted to other actions 
more compelling than writing petitions. 
8.3.2 Legal Suits 
The Niger Delta people perceived that their petitions regarding environmental damage and 
the unfair sharing of revenue did not receive any positive response from either the 
government or MNOCs. From the late 1970s, the Niger Delta people have utilised the 
strategy of taking legal actions against the oil companies (Owugah 1999; Ibaba and Okolo 
2009). The aggrieved communities were assured that the judiciary system would consider 
their appeal then take action on their behalf against the government and MNOCs. 
Nevertheless, the grievances went largely unresolved as the oil companies deliberately 
flouted court verdicts and in some instances exploited loopholes in the legal system to delay 
judgement. These attitudes to the legal system are still prevalent in more recent times. There 
are several instances where the MNOCs attempted to frustrate the justice system or totally 
ignore the court order. For example, in the Ejama-Ebubu community v. SPDC case, where 
the plaintiff brought a suit against Shell for an oil spill incident in 2001, is very telling. It is 
important to mention at this point that before the verdict, Shell tried to file interlocutory 
(interim) appeals no fewer than 27 times, thus delaying the merits of this case to be held until 
the July 2010 judgement (Sheldon 2011). Shell interfered by attempting to suspend the 
proceedings each time the court decided a preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiffs. The 
court verdict on the oil spill case in Ejama-Ebubu community, after so many years of delayed 
justice, was for Shell to pay NGN 15.4 billion (USD 100 million) as compensation. However, 
following the court‟s verdict, Shell applied for a stay of execution and appealed against the 
order which will delay justice for the communities whose lands and livelihoods were 
destroyed by Shell‟s careless actions (Vanguard 2010:56). Similarly, in the 2006 case of Ijaw 
community v. SPDC, the court ordered Shell to pay NGN 210 billion (USD 1.5 billion) to the 
plaintiff in compensation for harmful environmental effects caused by the defendant‟s 
operations (Opinion Juris 2006). Like the previous case, Shell filed for stay of execution and 
appealed to the Supreme Court following the court‟s verdict. However, the High Court judge 
instructed Shell to pay NGN 210 billion to the coffers of CBN pending the date for the appeal 




community (Gbemre) v. SPDC and others, where the plaintiff sued Shell, ExxonMobil, 
Chevron, Total and Agip to stop flaring gas in their community (This Day 2005). Shell 
behaved in the same way as in other cases illustrated above, it kept filing a stay of execution 
in response to the court‟s verdict and they are yet to stop the gas flaring (Sheldon 2011).  
The cases illustrated above denote not only the inefficiencies in the judicial system, but also 
the oil companies‟ attitude towards addressing the environmental damages caused by their 
operations. The Niger Delta people believe that ecological destruction in their region is the 
result of oil production in their local communities. The MNOCs‟ view on this issue, however, 
is totally different from that of the local communities. They blame the local communities for 
environmental issues, as their conviction has always been that the environmental degradation 
results from youth militancy against oil installations in the region (Sheldon 2011). In 
response to my question regarding the impact of conflict on environmental deterioration in 
the Niger Delta region, Shell and Total employees that I interviewed have been of the view 
that most of the oil spill cases which cause environmental degradation in the region have 
been as a result of the vandalism of their oil facilities by local communities.
105
 This view was 
dismissed by two researchers who closely follow the developments of this conflict in the 
region, they upheld the view that poor operational and maintenance standards resulted in 
corroded and leaky pipelines that stretch across Niger Delta.
106
 This stance corroborates that 
of Kaufman‟s (2010), who thought it absurd that the oil companies claimed that the local 
communities were largely responsible for the environmental damage. Kaufman further 
emphasised their disturbing attitude in which they initially try to blame others, then avoid 
international scrutiny and finally overwhelm the local courts which have limited resources. A 
researcher believed that the oil communities‟ strategy to take legal action against the oil 
companies has been hampered by the poor legal and institutional framework, court delays, 
non-compliance by the oil companies to court orders and the relatively large sums paid to 
lawyers, sums which are difficult to find for the communities of limited funds.
107
 Many 
applicants are poor and cannot sustain a long legal proceeding that could take many years for 
a court to decide on. The strategy has not been effective in getting compensation for the oil 
communities. The local communities are forced to look elsewhere for solutions. As noted by 
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some scholars, there is a strong correlation between the environmental degradation and social 
unrest in the region as the oil communities are not adequately compensated for the damage 
done to their environment (Ukeje 2001 and Jike 2004).  
 
As stated earlier in the literature, following a long period of indifference over their concerns, 
the oil communities decided to organise themselves into the MOSOP group to champion their 
cause (Mitee 1997). Recently again, the silence of the authorities on the problems caused by 
oil operations continues. Oyibode‟s (2016) research on the oil activities in the region, for 
example, points out the issue of the continuous gas-flaring going on in Dokwa communities. 
He notes that regardless of numerous expressions of complaint by the representatives of the 
Dokwa communities addressed to the Presidency, the Federal Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources and the Delta State Ministry of Oil and Gas, they are yet to get any response. 
Overall, it may be deduced from the above that the oil communities‟ petitions toward the 
solution of environmental pollution was a peaceful approach toward managing an ongoing 
social issue. However, the continuous avoidance of complaints by the MNOCs obliged the 
communities to use more aggressive action to get their demands met. The unresponsive and 
indifferent attitude of both the state and MNOCs made the petition writing futile. 
The failure of the use of legal suits exacerbated the already contentious relationship between 
the MNOCs and local communities, and progressively led the latter from peaceful 
confrontation to more violent protests such as those set out further in the following sections.  
8.3.3   Organised Protest, Mass Rallies and Temporary Occupation of Oil Facilities  
From the mid-1980s, the Niger Delta communities adopted a more action-oriented strategy to 
voice their grievances. This strategy was based on the members of the oil communities 
forming several organised and well-coordinated civil society groups to make demands at 
many levels and using different approaches (Olowu 2011). Prominent among them was the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) (1990), the Ijaw National 
Congress (INC) (1991), the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality of the 
Niger Delta (MOSIEND) (1992) and the Ijaw Youth council (IYC) (1998) (Inokoba and 
Imbua 2010). For example, the MOSOP group, which until then was known for their non-
violent ideology, initially embarked on massive protestations against the environmental 
disaster that Shell had caused in Ogoniland (Holzer 2007: 287). The group issued a series of 




cease all environmental pollution, repair all exposed pipelines and start new negotiations for 
future oil extraction and exploration (Osaghae 1995). They took active measures to drive 
home their demands, a situation which involved actions that disrupted oil production through 
peaceful protestations and occupation of oil facilities. Between January and August 1990, for 
example, Shell installations were blocked at least 22 times, sometimes several days at a time, 
by communities protesting against the environmental degradation caused by the company 
(Newswatch 1990:32).  
 
By the mid-1990s things became worse as the Niger Delta communities had totally lost faith 
in the oil companies and the government. The oil communities turned to forceful but still 
non-violent action, as will be explained further. Groups in the Niger Delta communities 
forcefully occupied oil facilities and at times caused some destruction (Mabro 1997). It was 
in that particular period when women and youths occupied and closed down oil facilities and 
captured the helicopters and vessels of oil companies (Nnimmo 2015). As a result, production 
and other oil-related activities slowed down. Research from Osaghae (1995), for instance, 
stated that on 17
th
 August 1997 more than 10,000 youths from across the region assembled in 
Aleibiri town of Bayelsa state to protest against the ecological disaster caused by SPDC. 
Later, in 1998, ascertained Nnimmo‟s (2015:87) research, some Ilaje youths occupied 
Chevron‟s offshore platform, while the Ijaw youths were also occupying some oil-flow 
stations and shutting down the gas flares the same year. The Ijaw youths through the IYC 
platform issued their aspirations, known as „historic Kaiama Declaration‟, calling for 
resource control and autonomy. The oil multinationals were given an ultimatum to leave the 
Niger Delta by the end of 1998 until the issue of resource ownership and control is resolved 
(Nnimmo 2015). At this point, their requests had evolved from simple demands for social 
amenities delivery and sufficient compensation, to a political demand for resource control 
and self-autonomy. However, the oil companies, assisted by the state, continued to use state 
security agents to quell any form of protest with the attendant abuse of human rights. The 
leader of the MOSOP group, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight other MOSOP activists were 
executed in what is believed to be a „Judicial Murder‟, on the orders of a special military 
tribunal, for their involvement in an unsubstantiated and controversial death of some local 
chiefs. One could argue that the IYC‟s Kaiama declaration was an invitation for a dialogue 
with the Nigeria state on their discontent. As accounted in Ibiba (2006), a prominent leader of 
IYC, Tuodolo Felix, clarified the intention of the group‟s declaration as being a revelation of 




opportunity for negotiations on issues that have been at the forefront for a very long time, 
including the destruction of livelihood, deprivation, marginalisation and environmental 
pollution. On the contrary, the state responded with horrific military actions causing the loss 
of several lives. It was a case of carnage in Kaiama town in Bayelsa State (Ibibia 2006). In 
many instances, the invitation of security forces to quell the protests resulted in killings, 
raping, burning down of houses etc. 
 The use of protest, rallies and occupation of oil facilities to get the attention of the oil 
companies and government proved ineffective as their attitudes remained unchanged. 
However, the oil communities did achieve some gains. KenSaro-Wiwa‟s MOSOP non-
violent movement against the oil establishment, for example, drew the world‟s attention to 
the plight of the Ogoni people. All participants were quite outstanding in its role in 
internationalising the struggle of the oil communities. They also drew sympathy from several 
international institutions including Amnesty International, the UN committee for Indigenous 
People, the World Conference on Indigenous People, the London Rainforest Action Group, 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (HRW 1999; Obi 2010; Okonta 2002). Although the 
movement led to the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, it started an irreversible momentum of popular 
mobilisation in the region. As Shell was implicated in the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa (Watts 
2005:394), the mounting domestic and international pressure forced the company to pull out 
of Ogoni land and reconsider its relationship with the oil communities. With a damaged 
public image coupled with the intensification of the anti-oil protests at that time, Shell had to 
review its projects and policies in the region. It was in this context that a new era was 
launched in the oil industry. Shell and other MNOCs started moving from their previous 
attitude of relying on state force and intimidation towards a more „socially responsible 
character‟ whereby the company engages the oil communities in the development of 
infrastructures and social services. 
8.4 Violent Actions and Response: Use of Violence against the Oil Operations and 
State 
The Niger Delta communities are adept at forming organised and well-coordinated civil 
society groups using various approaches to make their demands known (Olowu 2011). These 
civil society groups mostly work on the basis of a non-violent ideology (Inokoba and Imbua 
2010). The escalation of militancy in the Niger Delta is a direct consequence of the use of 




left in the collective memory of local communities a sense of being under the oppression of a 
government which works for the interest of the oil companies rather than that of its people. 
The oil companies slowly started to change their response to indigenes concerns from one of 
violence to one more positive. However, the 1999 Odi incident was not only a reaction to the 
killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa, but also served as an example of the terrible outcome of the 
communities‟ action against the MNOCs and the state, who helped to maintain the conflict in 
the Niger Delta. This violence happened in the context of a continuing conflict in the Niger 
Delta over indigenous rights to oil resources and environmental protection. The Odi massacre 
was carried out by the Nigerian military in the predominantly Ijaw town of Odi in Bayelsa 
State in retaliation for the murder of twelve members of the Nigerian police by a gang near 
Odi (Environmental Rights Action 2000; Olowu 2011; Egbemeile 2015; Nnimmo 2015). 
According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, a wide range of civilians, 
estimated at more than 2,500 individuals, had been killed (Environmental Rights Action 
2000; Egbemeile 2015). A Nigeria-wide national opinion still holds that the massacre was 
ordered by Olusegun Obasanjo, the then Head of State. However, the security system, 
particularly the military, has repeatedly defended its action saying it was ambushed on its 
way to Odi; so raising tensions before entering the village (Nnimmo 2015). 
 
The 1999 Odi massacre brought significant concern for the young democracy of Nigeria: the 
1999 democratic elections in Nigeria had opened an era of expectation of peace in the nation. 
Many people in the country, particularly those from oil communities in the Niger Delta State, 
were expecting the return of peace to the region. However, this was not the case as the 
attitude of government remained repressive, according to a staff member of Amnesty 
International.
108
 The Odi case in 1999, in which a whole town was razed, houses bombed and 
over 2,500 people killed by the state forces (Environmental Rights Action 2000) tells much 
more about the brutal attitude of the Nigerian security system. This was a total abuse of 
military force, a case of genocide committed against the Niger Delta people, claimed a staff 
member of Human Rights Watch.
109
 An indigene from the Niger Delta concurred with the 
view above, offering:  
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With the sustained use of excessive force, continuous environmental degradation, 
underdevelopment and the amassing of riches at expense of the Niger Delta people by 
the government and oil companies, it is easy to understand why the phases of non-




Two young persons from the Niger Delta region explained what stimulated them to become 
involved in violence: “We became frustrated and resorted to violence as our goals and 
aspirations remained unresolved”.
111
In the same vein of thought, a conflict analyst added that 
the rise of militancy is a direct consequence of the use of brutal force to suppress non-violent 
protests in the region.
112
 These views side with Nnimmo‟s (2015)that the destruction in 
Ogoni Land, the massacre in Odi town, to name but two events, created the context upon 
which a militant leader, Asari Dokubo, in 2004, declared war against the Nigerian state. 
Subsequently, in 2005, several militant groups came together to form a coalition under the 
umbrella of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Jomo 
Gbomo (Olowu 2011). Other prominent groups include the Niger Delta People Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilantes. These groups, unlike their predecessors, 
were impatient with non-violent approaches and adopted a violent strategy.  
 
According to a conflict analyst, the group adopted guerrilla warfare as they implemented a 
number of organised violent assaults on oil facilities and staff. Their tactics involved the 
kidnapping of MNOCs‟ staff, seizure and bombardment of oil facilities, interruption of oil 
production and armed confrontation with state security forces.
113
 Egbemeile‟s (2015) 
research on the conflict-oil in the Niger Delta concurred and added that between 2008 and 
2009 about 243 attacks (174 inland attacks and 69 offshore attacks) have resulted in 128 
kidnap cases and over 1,000 lives lost. This led a Shell employee to claim that the region 
became a theatre of all sorts of violence including hijackings, the destruction of oil facilities, 
bombings and acts of piracy against the petroleum industry.
114
 The MEND was able to 
measure up to the Nigeria military‟s force due to the sophistication of their own armoury, 
mode of operation and deep understanding of the terrain. A source close to Shell‟s 
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development plan for the region believed that MEND‟s philosophy behind their modus 
operandi was to frustrate the oil production process, making it more expensive, although a 




While some (Ekpu 2007) saw the vandalism of the oil installations by indigenes as being due 
to the frustration of unemployment and poverty caused by the oil industry, it is also important 
to acknowledge that the oil companies and the government lost billions of dollars in oil 
income as a result of the militants‟ operations. This view is supported by a Niger Delta 
indigene
116
 and a conflict analyst that I interviewed during my fieldwork.
117
 As detailed and 
discussed in Chapter Six, with the continuous loss of revenue and the inability of security 
force to suppress the insurgency in the region, the state decided to grant amnesty to the 
militants in 2009. The states use of its military forces could not suppress the militancy; thus 
the MNOCs and government were forced to seek a non-violent alternative which took the 
form of an amnesty. This creates the impression that if you are peaceful in presenting your 
demands to the Nigerian government, you would be taken for granted, claimed an 
indigene.
118
 In other words, in responding to the needs of its citizenry, the Nigerian political 
structure only understood the logic of the gun, as shown by the actions of the Niger Delta 
youths. As reprehensible as the strategy of the militants might seem, it brought some fringe 
benefits to the region. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the appointment of Niger Deltans 
into key federal positions such as the Vice Presidency (Dr. Goodluck Jonathan), the Minister 
of State for Petroleum (Mr. Odein Ajumogobia), Chief of Defence Staff (General Andrew 
Aziza) and others was as a result of oil communities‟ actions. Unfortunately, this did not 




Despite the seeming effectiveness of the use of violence to get the state to respond, it came at 
a huge cost to the oil communities including the disruption of social services, loss of 
livelihood, environmental pollution and loss of lives. The militants‟ assaults on oil facilities 
instigated a brutal confrontation between the state security force and the local communities. 
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In many instances, the military force has mindlessly murdered, tortured, raped and 
imprisoned several innocent civilians, including women and children, in the region. Such 
cases happened in Odi (1999) with more than 2,500 civilians killed as mentioned before, 
Choba (2000) with 50 innocent civilians unlawfully arrested, Gbamaturu (2009) with 70 
individuals illegally arrested and killed, and similar events in several other communities 
(Egbemeile 2015; Nnimmo 2015). The invasion of the soldiers has left many of their towns 
and villages in ruins.  
 
Another unexpected cost to the oil communities is that the violence created an unflattering 
image for the Niger Delta groups both at local and international level. The frequency of 
hostage-taking, the destruction of oil facilities and other related crimes gave a wrong 
impression especially as several groups hijacked the struggle itself, for their personal 
enrichment. There were cases in which children and old people were abducted, something 
which brought into question the legitimacy of the struggle (Imbua and Inokoba 2010). The 
criminal element in the region eroded the legitimacy of the militant groups (Aiyetan 2007). 
Also, the activities of the militants disempowered other sections of the society who did not 
participate in such violent struggles, women, children and the elderly, as economic activities 
were disrupted by the increasing violence in the region. 
 
Drawn from various provisions as set above and in the light of my fieldwork results, I could 
argue that the struggle of the Niger Delta people started as a vocal demand by the indigenes 
before it turned into a more organised mass protestation, in which their demands, approaches 
and tactics to handle the oil-conflict changed substantially. The conflict in the Niger Delta 
has shifted from a peaceful contention – between the 1970s and1980s, to a violent 
confrontation – by early 2000.
120
 On the basis of my fieldwork research and in the light of 
Okoh‟s (2005:100) research, for example, one could argue that local communities used the 
written word as a means to voice their concerns regarding the exploitation of their resources. 
Conversely, in a focus group discussion in which three indigenes participated, they said that 
the first channel used by the oil communities to express their concern was the writing of 
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petitions. Writing petitions, according to these individuals, was the early conflict-
management initiative used by the oil communities to handle the conflict with the MNOCs.
121
 
Reflecting on the protracted violence in the Niger Delta, a peace and conflict researcher 
suggested that the first confrontation between oil-communities and the oil companies 
included sending community delegations to register their complaints to the oil companies and 
the Nigerian State.
122
 This respondent‟s view is backed by the Ogoni community‟s notable, 
for whom local communities tried to use the written word as a way toward settling the oil-
conflict that was emerging between them and the MNOCs. The writing of petitions, he added, 
consisted of the oil communities sending their message to the oil companies through their 
leaders. Although this practice was meant to be a peaceful way of resolving the conflict, it, 
however, brought few results, because the MNOCs barely responded to them, since they were 
not fulfilling their promises, he concluded.
123
 Evidence from my fieldwork supports this 
view, due to a few individuals saying that the Ogoni crisis was the result of the failure of 
Shell, the Federal ministry of Mines and powers in Lagos, as well as the State Ministries in 
River states to respond to the petitions and complaints of oil communities on the environment 
degradation caused by oil spillage. For these people, this issue was ignored by the officials 
above until it became a full-blown crisis.
124
 
The weakness of the state‟s judiciary system allows the oil companies to contend that most of 
the oil spill cases were as a result of vandalism by local communities to their oil facilities.
125
 
However, some other individuals counter to this view, believing that poor operational and 
maintenance standards, resulting in corroded and leaky pipelines spread all over the Niger 
Delta, has been at the origin of environmental degradation.
126
 The argument by the oil 
companies that the local communities are largely accountable for the environmental damage, 
contrasts Kaufman (2010), is absurd, since these companies initially try blaming others, 
eluding international scrutiny and overwhelming the local courts, as they are aware of the fact 
that these courts do have limited resources to counter their actions. As a conflict analyst of 
the University of Abuja concurred: 
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The use of flouting strategy by the oil companies has further weakened a poor legal 
and institutional framework, delayed court decisions, sustained the MNOCs to not 
comply with court orders and relatively exposed the legal system to corruption, with 




Some scholars (Ukeje 2001 and Jike 2004) have noted a strong correlation between the 
environmental degradation and the conflict in the region. This suggests to me that this is 
owing to communities being inadequately rewarded for the damage done to their 
environment. As local communities are poor and cannot sustain a long legal proceeding, they 
are compelled to find alternative means of conflict management as legal suits do not meet 
their hopes.  
The local communities have been at the origin of massive protests against environmental 
disaster caused by the MNOCs in their region (Holzer 2007: 287). These movements 
included actions that disrupt oil production through peaceful protestations and occupation of 
oil facilities and their demands spanned from simple demands for social amenities delivery 
and adequate compensation to a political demand for resource control and autonomy. 
However, the government and oil companies ignored their demands, instead, they preferred 
to quell any form of protest, something which turned into human rights abuse. Local 
communities‟ grievances were based on the wrong-doings going on in the region and what 
was needed to repair the damage. Local communities saw this as an opportunity to negotiate 
on issues that have been at the forefront for a very long time. However, the state response to 
their request was horrific military actions. Protests were quelled and resulted in killings, 
raping, burning down of houses etc. (Ibibia 2006). Data from my fieldwork supports this 
position
128
 and suggest to me that even if protests, rallies and occupation of oil facilities 
proved ineffective, as the oil and MNOCs attitudes remained unchanged, local communities, 
however, achieved some gains that fixed an irreversible momentum of popular mobilisation 
in the region. Three lessons could be learned from this; firstly, oil communities drew the 
world‟s attention to the plight of the Niger Delta people; secondly, they were also notable for 
their role in internationalising the struggle of the oil communities and thirdly, they drew 
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sympathy from several international NGOs that started advocating for their cause and 
concern on an international platform. 
Following the return of democratic rule in 1999, the attitude of government toward oil 
communities still remained repressive (Environmental Rights Action 2000). From a NGO 
staff member‟s view, it could be noted that the coalition between the MNOCs and the state‟s 
security was a total military abuse, also cited as a case of genocide committed against the 
Niger Delta people.
129
 As indicated by the findings of my fieldwork, excessive and continual 
use of force, ongoing environmental degradation, poverty and the depletion of resources by 
the government and oil companies have been the main cause of the switch from a non-violent 
struggle to a violent one.
130
 The Niger Delta youths, concurred a conflict analyst, became 
frustrated and were then motivated by violence as the ultimate means of achieving their goals 
and aspirations.
131
 The rise of militancy is a direct consequence of the use of brutal force to 
suppress non-violent protests in the region, added a source from the Niger Delta.
132
 These 
views are evidenced by the environmental destruction in Ogoni Land and the massacre in Odi 
town, to name just two examples. These situations set out favourable context for the 
militancy movement to arise and declare hostilities with both the government and MNOCs 
(Nnimmo 2015). As a result, militant groups decided to collaborate under the resistant and 
fighting organisation called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Olowu 
2011) for the kidnapping of the MNOCs‟ staff, seizure and bombardment of oil facilities, 
interruption of oil production and armed confrontation with state security forces.
133
 
Indications from Egbemeile (2015) hold how the region became a theatre of all sort of 
violence including hijackings, destruction of oil facilities, bombings and acts of piracy 
against the petroleum industry.  
Broadly, it could be drawn from the fieldwork experience that the MEND developed a violent 
conflict-management initiative that was able to counter the Nigerian military‟s force because 
of the sophistication of their armoury, their modus operandi and their knowledge of the 
terrain.
134
 Equally, the ideology leading their modus operandi – which is actually their 
                                                 
129
 Interviews conducted with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch staff members, Abuja, 17 
December 2015. 
130
 Interviews conducted with Niger Delta community members, Abuja, 15 January 2015. 
131
 Interviews conducted with a University researcher, Ibadan, 17 January 2016. 
132
 Interview conducted with Niger Delta community members, Lagos, 18 December 2015. 
133
 Experience drawn from my fieldwork research conducted in Nigeria, 2014-2016. 
134




conflict-management initiative or perspective, analysed a MNOC employee, was based on the 
frustration and sabotage of the oil production process in order to draw rent from militants‟ 
operations.
135
 However, it runs contrary to what has been said earlier: that some indigenes 
from the Niger Delta have been of the view that their militancy against the MNOCs and state 
is not only linked to the frustration of unemployment and poverty attributed to the oil 
industry, but also, to the institutionalisation of corruption and the pillage of oil resources by 




It suggests to me, however, that force used by the government to assault peaceful activists, 
rather than using appropriate conflict management initiatives, could not address grievances, 
rather it resulted in militancy. As a Niger Delta indigene put it; “if you are peaceful in 
presenting your demands to the Nigerian government, you will be taken for granted”.
137
 In 
the words of another individual from the Niger delta, it means that in response to the needs of 
its citizenry, the Nigerian government uses the language of violence, especially when it has to 
do with the Niger Delta activists. As reprehensible as militancy may be, it brought some 
fringe benefits to the region. For this individual, there is nothing sarcastic in admitting that 
the appointment of Niger Deltans into key federal positions such as the Vice President (Dr. 
Goodluck Jonathan), the Minister of State for Petroleum (Mr. Odein Ajumogobia), the Chief 
of Defence Staff (General Andrew Aziza), just to mention a few, is a lure which aims to buy 
some elites to the detriment of the poor people.
138
 
Overall, it might be noted that the use of violence as a conflict-management initiative to get 
the state to respond to the grievances brought a huge cost to the oil communities, including 
disruption of social services, loss of livelihood, environmental pollution and loss of life. The 
militants‟ attacks on oil facilities triggered rough reactions from the MNOCs and 
government, something that resulted in brutal confrontation between the state security forces 
and the local communities. This has left many of their towns and villages in ruins. As result, 
the image of the Niger Delta region worsened at both local and international levels. The 
frequency of hostage taking, oil facilities disruption and other related crimes created a bad 
image of the region, especially as several groups hijacked the struggle for their personal 
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enrichment. The activities of the militants disrupted economic activities and left those 
sections not directly involved in the violence, such as women, children and old people, 
without a voice in the struggle (Imbua and Inokoba 2010). Herein lays the importance to 
underline that the major short-coming of the conflict resolution in the Niger Delta region is 
the dearth of local community participation in decision-making regarding the development of 
their society. As is further developed in the following section, the government and MNOCs 
have been promoting the use of violence to settle the oil-conflict in the region, instead of 
listening to the needs of the indigenous population.  
8.5 The MNOCs and State Responses to Community Actions 
As indicated above, resource conflict in the Delta Niger region has seen some MNOCs 
reaching agreements with the youths of local communities to protect oil exploitations and 
facilities within their localities. Shell, for example, established CAST, which comprised two 
agencies for the recruitment of youths and specialised in the protection of oil pipelines from 
vandalism (This Day 2008). This conflict management initiative sounded productive in the 
short-term but limited for any longer. Suffice it to argue that the engagement of a group of 
youngsters in the protection of pipelines against unlawful oil bunkering and vandals was 
viewed as a way to empowering the youth economically in order to dissuade them from 
disrupting oil production.
139
 However, this engagement was criticised for apparently 
complicating the security issue of both the oil companies and communities, according to a 
freelance journalist in Ibadan.
140
 In the words of the Agence France-Presse (2003): “some of 
the young people who were recruited to work with the oil companies have been associated 
with militant groups that vandalise oil companies”. The kidnapping of 14 Chevron employees 
in 2003, for example, is believed to be linked to some indigenous youngsters, members of a 
security outfit employed to watch over Chevron‟s facilities. From another individual‟s view, 
it was put forward that security provision is not only a source of employment, but also a 
source of violent conflict among youth and other unemployed groups within communities.
141
 
Viewed from this perspective, it could be assumed that there had been a fragile, but 
opportunistic, deal based on the offer of material advantage, concluded between the MNOCs 
and militant groups in the region. My view meets that of a few individuals that I interviewed: 
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they ascertained that young people who have not enlisted to work for the oil companies were 
often the source of the assaults against oil installations and other forms of violence.
142
 This 
would mean that the MNOCs conflict-management initiative based on the hiring from certain 
social groups to the detriment of others was limited in terms of resolving the grievance, rather 
it aggravated it. In this case, the MNOCs have become a source of both employment and 
insecurity. As WAC‟s (2003) research on the MNOCs in the region put it, the oil companies 
disburse a huge amount of money to equip the vigilante groups with weapons to fight rival 
gangs and strengthen their capacity to protect their installations. In this case, MNOCs are 
playing a double game of divide and rule. WAC‟s stance upholds my view, as expressed 
above, that the MNOCs also bear the root-cause of the conflict dynamics in the region, 
something that has negatively affected the socio-economic situation in the region, thereby 
increasing the grievances and the culture of greed, particularly for those groups believed to be 




Conflict-resolution initiatives as applied in the Niger Delta are in reality the use of violence 
by all protagonists; therefore, hardly conflict management, which questions the use of this 
concept. Against the thought developed above and in light of my fieldwork experience, one 
could argue that the involvement of state security against anti-oil protesters in the Niger Delta 
region has been seen as a strong conflict-resolution mechanism, minimising the loss of 
human life that it may result in. From interviews that I conducted with a lecturer in peace and 
conflict studies at the University of Abuja,
144
 and with community leaders from 
Eruemukohwarien
145
 and Omoku in the Niger Delta,
146
 it has been said that several times the 
MNOCs resorted to force as their main strategy toward settling the conflicts in the region. A 
group of individuals and others from NGOs working in the region
147
 concurred with the fact 
that Shell, for example, used intimidation and state security forces as a means to quell oil 
related agitations. This opinion was supported by one MNOC source to whom the 
involvement of the state security forces in the oil companies‟ business helped to avoid the 
breaches of law and order and protect oil companies‟ installations.
148
 Since the Nigerian state 
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is the main shareholder in the joint venture with the oil companies and has the right to protect 
the oil rents, so the use of state security was seen as legitimate.
149
 Broadly, respondents have 
established that MNOCs have been using the state‟s security apparatus as a tool for the 
settlement of conflict with local communities. Shell, for example, resorted to using the Navy 
and police, even without any approval from the government, to suppress any form of protest 
held against them, opined Ibeanu (2000). The peaceful protest of the natives of Iko in the 
Niger Delta against Shell on its obnoxious practice of flaring gas was brutally dispersed by 
the mobile police force brought in by Shell (Okonta and Douglas 2001), likewise an unarmed 
community protest in Umuechem against the adverse effects of Shell‟s drilling operations on 
their farmlands was crushed by the mobile police force invited in by Shell (Douglas and Ola 
1990). However, this crude way of dealing with protestations did not resolve the conflicts, 
rather it awakened local communities‟ consciousness about the denial of their resources by 
the MNOCs, and so furthered the protests against oil companies in the region (Bello 1992; 
Rowell 1994; HRW 1995).  
 
In response to questions I asked of a Senior security officer and two civil society activists, 
respectively in Abuja and Umuechem, they said that the reliance on the state security force 
by the MNOCs in lieu of using classical conflict-management initiatives failed to bring about 
sustainable solutions to the conflicts between local communities and the MNOCs, rather it 
led the youths of the Niger Delta Region into militancy. The two activists further believe that 
militancy is a proportional strategy and response to the violent actions of the Oil Companies 
against anti-oil protesters in the region.
150
 This opinion supports Amunwa‟s (2012) who is of 
the view that despite the fact that Shell has a security budget of more than USD 1 billion, 
their installations are still subject to continued attacks. Security forces used by MNOCs to 
stifle activists‟ grievances and the activists‟ resistance to the MNOCs‟ violence have 
supplanted conventional conflict-management initiatives in the region. A cursory inventory 
of the continuing coordinated assaults occurring against oil installations and their employees 
shows that militant attacks stood at about 40 in 2006, 80 in 2007 and 90 in 2008, while the 
cases of abduction of oil companies‟ employees was 62 in 2006 and 172 in 2007. Conversely, 
the number of human rights abuses caused by security forces against activists exponentially 
ascended over the same period of time (Nnimmo 2015). Overall, one could infer that the use 
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of state security by the MNOCs and the recourse to militancy by the indigenes as conflict-
management initiatives have both exacerbated the tension in the region and developed local 
animosity against the oil operators. 
 
Beyond the reliance on the state‟s security system, as referred to early, the Oil Companies 
have other mechanisms, such as cash gifts and contracts to lure and materially dissuade local 
groups who are hostile to their economic activities in the region. In a focus group I conducted 
in Abuja with a Niger Delta native, I was told that one of the strategies used by the MNOCs 
to buy peace is to offer gifts and contracts to the most vocal and violent groups in the oil-
endowed communities.
151
 The strategy consisted of attracting the group most influential and 
capable of causing serious disruption to their oil exploitation operations.
152
 This strategy, 
offered an academic at the University of Abuja, became a vital warrant for a MNOC to 
operate peacefully in the region.
153
 In light of evidence gained from a militant from the Niger 
Delta region, it is argued that the initial agreement had to be signed between the oil 
companies and the community ruling elite. The MNOCs signed the accords with the leaders 
of the community to whom they gave money and contracts to be executed. Then, the contract 
would be awarded to a few people in the communities. Herein lies two important points to 
underline: firstly, by giving out cash and contracts to some of the oil community‟s elders, the 
oil companies had bought the community‟s silence over the side-effects of hydrocarbons 
exploitation on their society. Secondly, the oil companies did not monitor community leaders 
to see if the funds given to them were used exclusively for the development of the 
community. The lack of monitoring of funds allocated to the leaders led to the 
mismanagement and poor implementation of development projects within communities.
154
 
This form of patronage relationship in the region (Norimitsu 2002; HRW 2005; Watts 2007), 
enabled local elites to foster a strong bond with the MNOCs, as the MNOCs considered the 
elites as agents through which they would have access to resources, not only at low cost, but 
also in a peaceful operating environment.
155
In the substance as in the form, this conflict-
management initiative carries the germ of future conflict as it is still based on a top-down 
view and rules out local participation from its planning to its conclusion.  
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A cursory reflection on the conflict in the Niger Delta region suggests that community 
members have always been accusing their leaders of allowing the MNOCs to have access to 
their resources at an unacceptable price. In the view of these indigenes, local leaders have 
been induced and corrupted by financial gifts offered by the MNOCs, as they diverted project 
funds for personal enrichment at the expense of their people (Kemedi 2003). This stance was 
largely supported by a conflict analyst who I interviewed during my fieldwork, he claimed 
that over time, financial enticement and cash gifts offered by the MNOCs to the community 
leaders have been a source of fragmentation and weakened the social relations in the 
community, since in the view of the indigenes, their elites have lost authority and control 
over their subjects, especially the youths.
156
 A Niger Delta individual concurred and stated: 
we are being ruled by a poor leadership which has received a paltry compensation and failed 
to prevent the oil companies from destroying our homeland.
157
 This indigene‟s view sides 
with Osaghae et al.’s (2007), the youths no longer relied on their ruling elite and decided to 
challenge the sponsorship agreements existing between the oil companies and their traditional 
rulers. Hence, they embarked on guerrilla welfare damaging the oil companies‟ installations, 
something which heightened the insecurity in the oil communities (Ukeje et al 2002). As 
these youngsters had decided to disrupt the activities of the oil companies, they had also 
decided to ignore any instructions coming from the elders, since in their eyes the elders were 
considered to be conspiring with the MNOCs against local interests. The first evidence of this 
attitude is a clear fragmentation between youth and elders. This disintegration was further 
reinforced by the MNOCs buying the conscience of youth groups. As a result, this allowed 
the oil companies to adopt new strategies based on a direct cooperation with the youths, who 
had a growing capacity of destruction and disruption,
158
 thus making youths the object of 
patronage and power brokers (Ile and Akukwe 2001; Kemedi 2003).  
Considered as major protagonists in the conflict between the MNOCs and oil communities, 
youth groups became an unavoidable factor and started to play determining roles in taking 
major decisions within most oil communities, particularly on the distribution of oil rents.
159
 
Ikelege (2006), for example, noted that the MNOCs bought off youth factions by offering 
them significant support as they believed they were able to disturb their operations. As a 
result, different groups of youths within communities gave up the struggle over the patronage 
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and rent seeking. However, for more analysts (Osaghae et al.2007), this was the beginning of 
the fight for supremacy. This was a successful line for the MNOCs in the region to take, as 
they succeeded not only to divide and rule the youths, but also to have established a relative 
rapport of trust with some local representatives. Through these representatives they have been 
able to identify and influence the powerful stakeholders that could ensure a peaceful business 
operation for them.
160
 The “divide and rule” tactics of the Oil Companies was aimed at 
weakening any local community‟s attitude toward protest about the Oil Companies‟ activities 
in the region. However, there is a strong trend from my fieldwork data that these tactics 
actually contributed to a radicalisation of the youths vis-à-vis the MNOCs, as these oil 
companies relied on the power of violence in obtaining the cooperation of the oil 
communities. By the same token, as the use of violence by the youths appeared to be 
successful in having their demands met by MNOCs; they resorted to more violence to 
achieve their subsequent demands.
161
 The patronage relationship instigated by the MNOCs 
partly endorsed the culture of violence against the oil business by the youths, since as soon as 
a youth group is identified as the most powerful „enforcer‟ (by violence); the MNOCs then 
make a settlement with them.
162
 Overall, it is arguable that the conflict-management 
initiatives based on financial and material reward adopted by the MNOCs, and on militancy 
by the oil communities, has favoured the struggle for local power in order to access the oil 
benefits that come with such power, and which, in the long-run, gave rise to a culture of 
violence in the oil communities. Herein lays the importance of thinking of a new approach 
toward preventing and managing conflict in the Niger Delta region. This approach could 
involve an integrated conflict management approach which hinges around the contribution 
made by members of the local communities in the Niger Delta. It is also known as a bottom-
up or participatory approach to the conflict model. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has delved into local community opposition to the oil companies and the adverse 
effects on their lives in the Niger Delta. As its main argument, it posited that non-violent and 
violent actions by local communities are a direct response to the government and the oil 
companies‟ apathy to the issues that local communities are facing as the result of oil 
                                                 
160








exploitation. The top-down approach to the conflicts adopted by the governments and the 
MNOCs as a conflict-management strategy appeared to be working against the local 
communities, which had been purely peaceful, as they were guided by various non-violent 
strategies to resolve their grievances. Broadly, from the MNOCs‟ and state‟s conflict-
management actions towards the local communities‟ objections to the MNOCs and their 
activities, the local communities learnt the lesson that moving from non-violent to violent 
protests to address their grievances would be more productive. There were changes in their 
strategies and these changes were influenced by a few other actors including internationals 
NGOs and institutions. In order words, it is argued that the use of state security forces by the 
government and the MNOCs to respond to the oil communities‟ requests led the latter to 
engage with the MNOCs in more violent ways.  
Overall, local community opposition to the oil companies and the adverse effects on their 
lives was led by social movements through various mechanisms, as have been listed in 
chapter 8.3.  Essentially, the findings presented and analysed in this chapter addressed the 
fourth research sub-question: in what ways have the communities been affected by, and 
responded to, the issues of governance in the Niger Delta. The findings have also shown that 
oil communities‟ opposition to the government and the MNOCs‟ conflict-management 
initiatives towards the conflicts in the Niger Delta region is a result of their top-down 
approach which only takes into account the view of two protagonists – the government and 
the MNOCs and leaves out the view of the oil communities. The precedence of the 
government and the MNOCs‟ view in responding to local communities‟ grievances has failed 
and calls for a more integrated conflict management approach that would build around local 
community contributions to conflict settlement. Therefore, it would be crucial that the 
MNOCs, government and oil communities proceed with a bottom-up approach to conflict 
management in the Niger Delta, if conflict management initiatives for a sustainable peace and 
development in this region are really to be efficient. 
Finally, the examination of the findings has established that conflict in the Niger Delta is the 
result of grievances, bitterness and government indifference to the plight of the people and 
their environment. Most important is the degradation of the environment as a result of oil 
exploitation and the long-term effect on the health of the people and their livelihoods, in as 
much as their lives have not only become difficult, but there is also some hostility towards 
communities and people who previously had lived in peaceful co-existence. Data collected 




communities‟ proposals have been dealt with by the government and MNOCs as one of the 
causes of conflict. This has exacerbated the existing poverty and violence in the Niger Delta. 
Exploitation of the communities‟ resources by the MNOCs has been perceived as inimical to 
the peoples‟ wellbeing, while MNOCs‟ insensitivity to the plights and initiatives of the 
inhabitants became a popular concern. The lack of consideration of the initiatives made or 
proposed by local communities has created a missing link in the quest for sustainable 





Chapter Nine: Synthesis and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This research was conducted to enhance the understanding of the factors that have 
contributed to the violent conflict in the Niger Delta Region in order to adopt the most 
appropriate conflict resolution and management strategies that could help to set sustainable 
peace in this vast and severely deprived oil and gas-rich region. For a better understanding of 
the study being undertaken, the research has set the three main objectives as presented in 
Chapter 1.3. 
➢ To review other existing and unresolved issues driving and sustaining the Niger Delta 
conflict moving beyond economic and factor endowment. 
➢ To analyse the past trends of conflict resolution adopted in the region so as to 
highlight the weaknesses and potential pitfalls as to why they failed to address the 
issue. 
➢ To evaluate the effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies and reflect on what 
might help with bringing sustainable peace and preventing another cycle of violence 
in the region. 
In order to achieve these research objectives, this research has used the case study method, 
supported by qualitative data and aiming to analyse the following: the background and other 
causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta; detailed context of Nigeria and various dimensions 
to the Niger Delta conflict; the structural factors embedded in the very fabric of the Niger 
Delta region and those factors that fuel violence in the region; the role of the oil companies 
and the oil communities in tackling the contending issues in the region and the different tools 
toward conflict settlement initiated by the belligerents in the Niger Delta region. This chapter 
encapsulates the key findings of this research and appraises the achievement of the research 
to conclude the thesis. Drawing on this perspective and using the data collected from primary 
and secondary sources, this thesis contributes to enlarge our knowledge of the conflicts in the 




The main research question that this thesis has answered is: in what ways, and to what extent 
do the responses of different actors to the conflict in the Niger Delta contribute to its 
resolution? The research has addressed the following subsequent explicit research questions:  
1. What is the relevance of resource curse and rentier state theories to conflicts in oil-
bearing settings? 
2. What is the background to the conflict? What are its causes?  
3. In what ways has the state responded to the conflict in Niger Delta? And how 
successful have its initiatives been?  
4. In what ways have the companies engaged with the state and communities in their oil 
operations and production? What are the relevant factors that influence conflict-
management initiatives of oil companies in the Niger Delta? 
5. In what ways have the communities been affected by and responded to the issues of 
governance in the Niger Delta. 
This chapter summarises the main results of this research and weighs the achievement of the 
study to conclude its discussions and analyses. 
9.2 Main Research Findings 
The research began with a review of the conceptualisation of the conflict in resource-rich 
countries and the socio-historical thriving of the conflicts in the Niger Delta region, 
respectively in Chapters Three, Four and Five, to shed light on how conflict-resource, 
Nigerian settings, history of the Niger Delta and the various dimensions of the Niger Delta 
conflict are linked and feed on each other. The review of the conceptualisation of the conflict 
in resource-rich countries in Chapter Three provided that the presence of resources, the 
willingness of the oil companies to maximise their interests to the detriment of the oil-
communities, the corruption of local and national elites and weak governance trigger 
violence. This chapter revised the literature on domains that are pertinent to the research 
subject, specifically the theory of conflict and economic war, rentierism, paradox of plenty, 
the reaching of agreements in resource-based conflicts and conflict resolutions. 
The analysis of this chapter holds that in social interactions, conflicts are unavoidable since it 
is a major strand in social sciences. However, the issue lies in the way conflicts are managed 




violence, it could also yield sustainable peace and development, if appropriately handled. 
Hence, positive attitudes and behaviours are required to manage and transform conflict into 
societal development. The chapter also showed that conflict has thrived from interstate 
conflict to intrastate conflict, which is quite different from the conventional war in terms of 
scope, actors and methods of warfare and finance. The legacy left behind in the colonial 
states by imperialists has been blamed to be largely responsible for contemporary conflict. 
This legacy allegedly gave rise to weak states, characterised by unconsolidated democracy, 
illegitimate government and a divisive nation. 
Considering the nature of the conflicts in the Niger Delta as discussed in Chapter Four and 
Five, rentier theory and resource curse are highly influential in the analysis of resource-
oriented conflict. The analysis in these chapters has shown that rentier theory validates the 
bloated public sector found in resource-rich countries which serves the pockets of the ruling 
elites rather than the general society. The review of literature also depicts that an interaction 
between economic, political and cultural factors (normally historically formed) being 
heightened by severe group disparity in political involvement, economic resources and 
income and social access and well-being, constitutes the root causes of most conflicts. It 
derived from the analysis of the review that the strategies adopted in ending resource-
conflicts have proven to be inappropriate. These strategies included military action, economic 
sanctions and revenue-sharing. However, structural conflict resolution and management 
instruments offered a better solution to ending the crisis, as it sought to eradicate the 
conditions that brought forth violence in the society. 
The presentation of the conflict in the Niger Delta and the analysis of the crisis in the region 
in Chapters Four and Five demonstrated the importance of the inland context in which 
resources were unfairly exploited and distributed, which then induced violence and militancy 
in the region.  
Four elements explain the developing violence that originated from an uneasy quarrel dated 
back to colonial rule. Firstly, the existing ethnic and religious differences between the 
predominantly Muslim north and the mainly Christian south that were exacerbated and 
politicised by the different forms of colonial rule– and a deep split between the major ethnic 
groups and minority groups have brought forth fear of dominance among different local 
communities. Dispute over land ownership and traditional authority between the largest 
minority ethnic group –the Ijaw– and the minority ethnic groups –the Itsekiri, Urhobo and 




oil only intensified the ethnic lines giving rise to ethnic nationalism which has led the Niger 
Delta people to resort to ethnic patriotism rather than national patriotism by advocating for 
self-determination.  
Secondly, the vigilante groups became a law unto themselves and practiced extra-judicial 
killings, seizure of personal property, and other serious human rights violations, something 
which led to increased intra-community conflict. Struggles developed over threats to 
customary authority within communities; or new power-brokers emerged to challenge 
traditional leaders. Over time, the vigilante groups evolved into the militia groups bunkering 
oil and kidnapping foreign workers.  
Thirdly, following the country‟s independence in 1960, the political structure has always been 
characterised by over-centralisation of power and resources, a structure which lacks federalist 
institutions and values, although the political system is said to be federalist. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, the 1999 Constitution deters the federated states from having their own 
constitutions or enacting legislation that opposes national legislation (Obo 2005). This 
constitution monopolises regional revenues, which are mainly derived from oil, to the centre, 
a situation that creates dependent states relying in large measure on the decisions and 
resources of the federal government. The defective public service delivery in the Niger Delta 
thus stems from the political character of the country which is largely responsible for the 
underdevelopment, environmental degradation and insecurity that infects the region. 
Lastly, the havoc inflicted on the environment by oil multinationals went unnoticed for 
several years prior to the selling of oil production; a situation that destroyed farmlands and 
polluted surface and ground waters, thus negatively affecting the basis of the livelihood for 
the Niger Delta people. The environmental degradation and the lack of developmental 
infrastructure in the Niger Delta have subjected people to untold inhumanities and injustices. 
Most of the conflicts have arisen from complex environmental problems and a long history of 
neglect and social development of peoples who have seemed helpless, watching their land 
and water resources continually being devastated by the intense exploitation for hydrocarbons 
without deriving any appreciable benefits by way of investment in their own development. 
In Chapter Six, the examination of the conflict management strategies as applied by the 
Nigerian government in the Niger Delta depicted that government‟s policies regarding 
conflict management and resolution in the region have been largely defective and ineffective. 




yet they have still shown several limitations. It has been shown that consecutive 
administrations have approached the crisis from three major pedestals, namely: 
developmental interventions, increase of revenue allocation and the use of brutal force. The 
government has established several development intervention agencies to implement 
infrastructural and human development projects in the region. However, they did not live up 
to effectively fulfil their mandate. The appointment of politicians as the agencies‟ 
administrators, lack of consultation with the beneficiaries and unbridled corruption have been 
pointed out as factors that have hampered the effectiveness of the agencies. Similarly, even 
though the government increased the revenue allocated to the region through the increase of 
the derivation formula, the increased allocation did not improve the lives of the poor masses. 
Rather, it ends up in the hands of the prebandal network of the Nigerian state. The lack of 
transparency and accountability over oil revenue by political leaders in the region facilitates 
the mismanagement of public funds. One of the most adopted strategies by the government is 
the use of force which is aimed at violently repressing any form of threat or uprising against 
the oil business. This strategy worsened the crisis in the region as it inspired the Niger Delta 
people to develop a correspondingly violent response through the emergence of militancy 
movements to confront the state security agents. This situation culminated in the loss of life 
and property, as civilians were the victims of violence between state security agents and 
militants. Furthermore, the lack of professionalism by the state security agents in quelling the 
insurgency ended in severe harm to civilians, with many having lost their lives during public 
protestations. The amnesty offered to the militia groups was the master stroke that brought 
relative peace to the region. The willingness of the militia groups to surrender their arms 
illustrated that the youths preferred a legitimate means of livelihood than a life of crime. 
Thus, although the militia disbandment brought peace, the DDR programme was a diversion 
from the real issues that were sustaining the conflict in the region: deep-seated issues that 
were not being addressed. The chapter also delved into how environmental degradation, 
underdevelopment and unemployment still pervade the region. It derived from this that the 
absence of strong political will, the non-implementation of the NDDC‟s master plan, lack of 
consultation with the grassroots, poor funding, making mediocre appointments and a strong 
reliance on brutal force epitomises the hypocrisy of the Nigerian state towards bringing 
sustainable solutions to the root causes of the crisis. 
The analysis of the conflict in the Niger Delta in Chapter Six supports the abovementioned 
complex causalities and interactions. It has been proven from this chapter that different 




driven by decades of oil expropriation, negligence of environmental pollution, insensitivity 
and maltreatment of the local communities by the oil companies. Although the oil 
communities used various non-violent approaches to settle their grievances at the earliest 
period, many years after, however, the oil companies have resorted to use the state security 
force to intimidate their hosts rather than establishing a regime of corporate social 
responsibility and sensitivity to them. Subsequently, the oil communities took a more violent 
and forceful approach towards the oil business by occupying their facilities and disrupting 
their oil production. As the local indigenes became more hostile to the oil companies‟ 
business, the MNOCs changed their strategies and agenda by distributing oil benefits to a few 
selected and influential members of the oil-community. These approaches were not 
envisioned to solve the problem, rather to assuage the people in order to secure an 
uninterrupted business operation. The MNOCs have been colluding with the most powerful 
groups in a society in order to settle and establish their business and secure uninterrupted oil 
production. In doing so, they encouraged the selective empowerment of a cluster of 
individuals in the communities, hence polarising the existing peace in the already fragmented 
communities. This has culminated in further violent struggles among groups for access to the 
oil rents. The analysis in this chapter also depicted that the payment of the benefits to some of 
the people from different communities reinforced mistrust among indigenes. Ironically, this 
further threatened the security of MNOCs operations. As a result, local resistance emerged, a 
situation which eventually gave rise to a rag-tag army of lawless and agitated youths who 
started a regime of violent extortion of oil benefits from the oil companies. The MNOCs 
initiated a bottom-up community-driven development initiative in the region with the 
implementation of the GMOU models to counter the intensification of the conflict. The 
GMOU model categorised neighbouring communities in a MNOC‟s area of operations and 
helped them have a sense of collective ownership of community projects in their area. By 
using this model, the MNOCs have been able to deliver development projects and other 
social benefits to the region. This strategy appeared to be significant and encouraging. The 
MNOCS moved from uniting with the state, in order to suppress the local people, to 
partnering with local communities, in order to secure a cooperative and safe operating 
environment. The chapter additionally showed that the engagement between the MNOCs and 
the oil communities could assuage grievances relating to employment, livelihoods and 
poverty, and in the long-term, secure sustainable peace in the region. With this engagement, 
the oil communities could request the MNOCs to work assiduously towards cleaning up 




further impact on the environment and lessen confrontation with the local people. In the 
ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta region, two armed movements emerge; the one supported 
by, and fighting for, the MNCs and that backed by, and fighting for, oil-communities. While 
there seems to be an agreement that the ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta region is an oil-
based crisis, the examination of the link between oil exploitation, militancy and violent 
conflict in this region has underlined that the empirical analysis of the conflict incentives of 
the militants is extremely limited. Notwithstanding the limited analysis of the conflict 
incentives, some argue that oil exploitation and its corollaries are the major driver for the 
protracted conflict, or have become the principal incentive for the conflict. Others believe 
that the exploitation of oil and environment pollution pave the way for the conflict, or that the 
link between oil exploitation and conflict is a result of insecurity and federalism failure in 
Nigeria. In reference to the scholarly knowledge of the political economy of war, revised in 
Chapter Three, the economic agenda barely seems to be the leading reason behind most of 
armed conflicts, even if it is challenging to visibly draw the line between economic reasons 
and other factors, partially due to the fact that conflict dynamics and agendas depend on 
individual temperament and can switch over time. In the absence of an agreement on a set of 
conflict inducements, the prospect of riches from the availability of abundant natural 
resources and the effect of weak governance are essentially viewed as causing armed 
conflicts by the political economy of war.   
The observation above has been prominent in determining the responses, applying to the 
„conflicts in the Niger Delta approach in particular.‟ The responses thus focus on the task of 
analysing causes, impacts and management strategies with the aim of ending and resolving 
violent conflict. They also seek to improve governance since the „paradox of plenty‟ 
hypothesis suggests that weak governance is a fundamental variable in causing violence in 
resource-abundant countries. They are reverberated in the growing pressure on and 
standpoints of oil-exploiting companies examined in Chapter Seven. The oil-exploiting 
companies and national authorities are increasingly requested to take into account local 
communities‟ grievances instead of applying a strategy of „carrot and stick‟ by assuaging the 
use of force with placation intended to reach a „soft stalemate‟ in order to resume oil 
production. The analysis of state-sponsored conflict-management initiatives in Chapter Six, 
that of conflict-management initiatives by oil companies in Chapter Seven, and then local 
community opposition to the oil companies and adverse effects on their lives, in Chapter 
Eight expounds the very different perspectives between the Nigerian government and the 




Provided with the analysis of the nature of the link between oil-exploitation-production, 
regional violence or militancy and different views within local communities as alluded to 
above, Chapter Six appraised previous and current initiatives taken by the Nigerian state in 
managing and resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta region, drawing out their strength and 
weakness. Successive administrations have approached the crisis from three major pedestals: 
developmental interventions, increase of revenue allocation and the use of brutal force, none 
of which addressed the deep-seated issues at the origin of the conflict in the region. It rather 
complicated the crisis in the region since the government used force to violently repress any 
form of threat or uprising to the oil business; a situation which inspired the Niger Delta 
people to develop a correspondingly response to tackle the state security agents through the 
emergence of militia groups.     
Considering the particularity of the conflict management initiatives by the oil companies in 
the Niger Delta region discussed in Chapter Seven, this study has indicated that what are 
referred to as conflict-management initiatives are in reality the settlement of divergent points 
of view through the use of violence and the „divide and rule‟ tactic in order to privilege a 
small social group to the detriment of the rest of communities‟ members. Chapter Seven has 
also underlined the weakness of top-down policies implemented by the MNOCs to settle the 
conflict in the region. This principle, based on the MNOCs imposing a „modus operandi et 
vivendi‟ to the indigenes rather than listening to them, has rather exacerbated tension between 
local communities and oil companies in the region. Taking into account the local 
communities‟ concerns in the management of the conflict, which seems to be lacking in this 
context could remedy the limitations of the top-down policy implemented by the MNOCs. 
Similarly, any conflict-management initiatives by the MNOCs towards handling the oil-led 
conflict in the region of the Niger Delta would require the MNOCs and their ally the 
government to adhere to the local communities‟ plan regarding socio-economic development 
of indigenous communities. 
The willingness of the militia groups to surrender their arms indicated that the youths 
preferred a legitimate means of livelihood rather than a life of crime. However, the absence 
of strong political will, the non-implementation of the NDDC‟s master plan, lack of 
consultation with the grassroots, poor funding, mediocre appointments and a strong reliance 
on brute force could not resolve the root causes of the crisis. Additionally, there are no top-
down schemes that could be effective enough to resolve or even manage the conflict, as these 




management initiatives by oil communities in the Niger Delta and local opposition to 
MNOCs, respectively, developed in Chapters Seven and Eight painted the earliest period of 
the conflict in the Niger Delta region as a period when local communities were guided by 
various non-violent strategies to resolve their grievances. Nevertheless, the use of the state 
security force by the MNOCs to suppress oil communities‟ protests in lieu of establishing a 
regime of CDR and sensitivity led the indigenes of oil communities to engage with the 
MNOCs in more violent ways. The local communities‟ opposition to the MNOCs‟ and state‟s 
conflict-management initiatives in this context has been described as both non-violent and 
violent means to voice their grievances. The non-violent means used have previously been 
listed in Chapter 8.3.  
Chapters Seven and Eight have both shown the major short-comings of the conflict 
management initiatives in the Niger Delta region, as actions towards settling violence in the 
region are an imposition of the MNOCs views onto a local community, views associated with 
the use of violence. If it has been ascertained that the government and MNOCs have 
preferred the use of violence to suppress the local communities‟ grievances in the region, 
there is also the need for acknowledging that oil communities have also used violence to 
counter the MNOCs‟ actions. However, in such conditions, a bottom-up approach towards 
managing and resolving the conflict seems to be crucial in order to envisage a sustainable and 
efficient peace and development process in the region, but also to develop trust amongst 
different actors. 
The developmental interventions that were intended to contribute to developing the 
mechanisms towards managing the crisis in the region were discussed in Chapter Six. 
However, these interventions are characterised by a lack of transparency and accountability 
concerning the utilisation of oil revenue by political leaders in the region, something which 
facilitates the abuse of public funds. As they are developmental, rather than conflict-
management/resolution initiatives, they appear to be largely ineffective and inefficient. 
Furthermore, as they are voluntary initiatives, they have been poorly enforced, with little 
monitoring and accountability. They also lack the views and input from the oil-communities 
in their processes. Drawing on the above analysis of the linkages between oil-resource and 
violence in the Niger Delta region and the local ownership case, I have suggested how 
considering a host community‟s grievances and using a grassroots-up approach could be of 
interest in terms of conflict-management and conflict-resolution initiatives in the Niger Delta 




managing conflict, is thought to improve governance through more inclusive, transparent and 
accountable decision-making processes at a lower level with a higher participation of 
communities‟ members, my research has identified the marginalisation of oil-communities‟ 
grievances in most conflict-management and resolution initiatives and policies regarding 
conflicts in the Niger Delta region. Without factoring in the local communities‟ grievances, 
conflict-resolution mechanisms, like conflict-management initiatives, have been largely 
driven by the interests of the MNOCs, government‟s officials and some corrupted local 
leaders. These have freely ignored corporate social responsibility and MNOCs‟ legal duties; 
if they adhered to them that could lead to an appropriate approach towards resolving and 
managing the conflicts in the Niger Delta.    
The approach to the conflict in the Niger Delta region has determined what constitutes the 
oil-based conflict or to what extent the production of oil in the region actually triggers any 
violent conflict.  
Based on the federal and local multifaceted causalities of the conflicts in the Niger Delta 
region, in which unfair sharing of oil revenue and environmental disaster played a role in 
creating animosity between the MNOCs-government and oil-communities, may provoke 
grievances and violence. There is no concrete evidence as to what developmental plan based 
on oil dividend would prevent the Niger Delta militants from attacking MNOCs‟ facilities. 
Moreover, the oil-conflict management and resolution approach, with its focus on top-down 
processes, is a divide and rule tactic, morally dubious and invidious, aimed to buy off 
opposition in the oil-communities. It shifts the balance in favour of the government, MNOCs 
and a few corrupt local chiefs, and marginalises the rest of the oil communities.   
The marginalisation of the oil-communities‟ grievances and the dearth of grassroots-up 
approaches towards conflict-management and resolution initiatives, a major shortcoming 
singled out in this research, highlight the difficulty in genuinely resolving and managing 
conflict in the Niger Delta region, owing to the nature of the conflict in question. Local 
communities may be impeded by a shortage of resources or capacity to be able to participate 
meaningfully in the conflict management and resolution initiatives. However, their views 
regarding their grievances need to be taken into account and those communities‟ members 
who are taking part in militancy need to be integrated into the process and initiatives of 
conflict management and resolution. This is the point in which I seek to contribute to 
knowledge by enlightening the theoretical argument of applying a grassroots-up approach as 




and unfair sharing of resource. The concept of grassroots-up approach requires re-assessment 
of the imperfect environments to which it could be applied and a clarification of the extent to 
which the local communities‟ grievances should be factored in.    
In addition to the point above, the arguments offered in my thesis have contributed to 
ongoing academic discussions on conflict analyses and resolution, the adverse effect of 
resource hypothesis and the political economy of new war in particular. I have highlighted 
that managing and resolving the oil-led conflict in the Niger Delta region would need the 
MNOCs and government to consider the local communities‟ blueprint in regards to their 
socio-economic development, as community participation has already been proved to be one 
of the best ways to proceed, in line with conflict management and resolution, in the post-
conflict recovery process. My research has also offered empirical analysis and data on the oil-
based conflict, conflict resolution and conflict management in line with armed movements or 
militancy in the region of the Niger Delta. It has proved how the implementation of 
grassroots-up policies as a means toward ending the conflict could play the role of uniting 
people from different perspectives around one common objective.    
I have achieved the objectives of the research as set out in the introduction. The data and 
arguments have, I believe, confirmed this and shown that there is evidence to support that a 
grassroots-up approach could draw together several groups from different backgrounds and 
interests around a shared objective that could then tackle obstacles that prevent the MNOCs 
and oil communities to decide, and get on with, the development of the region. While it has 
provided insight into how and why the grassroots-up approach does contribute to the 
management and resolution of the conflict in the Niger Delta region, the research has a 
limitation, as shown below.   
The research subject is a continuing challenge and it is not possible to appraise the results of 
the grassroots-up approach at this current stage of activity. Some of the research findings are 
therefore not conclusive. This was evident from the start of the research; however, I still 
decided to conduct this research because the subject is extremely significant. Firstly, the 
subject is a serious illustration of the connection between poverty and resource curse, which 
exposes the developing world to chronic conflict; secondly, it requires a pressing reply for the 





9.3 Revising the Analytical Framework  
As discussed early in this thesis, the nature of conflict in the Niger Delta region is the issue at 
stake which may be classified into four variants, namely: inter-community conflict, intra-
community conflict, community versus oil companies conflict and community versus 
(federal, state or local) government conflict (Alao 2007). Although each variant bears its own 
characteristics and developmental pattern, they have all, however, contributed to the use of 
violence as conflict resolution by the oil-communities, government and MNOCs. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that conflicts in the Niger Delta involve socio-
cultural, political and economic dimensions which are interconnected with oil-related issues, 
namely: deprivation, marginalisation, environmental degradation, military intervention, and 
old rivalry between the communities (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011; Amunwa 2012; Nwokolo 
2012; Nnimmo 2015). 
In revisiting various discourses on conflict thriving in the region being researched, I might 
argue that conflicts in the Niger Delta are becoming more frequent and intensely violent, 
resulting in continued loss of life and property. On the premise of recent conflict resolution 
strategies, including the creation of such institutions as the OMPADEC and the NDDC as 
mentioned in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, the creation of local government areas/councils, 
the provision of social amenities and the payment of compensation for land, failed to end 
conflicts in the Niger Delta. As substantiated earlier in this research, I could concur with Alao 
(2007) and Williams (2016) that various conflict resolution initiatives as applied by different 
protagonists in the Niger Delta have shown their limitations, or merely failed. As a result, the 
crises have taken a turn for the worse; something that points to the need for re-examining the 
conflict resolution approaches of relations within and between communities and MNOCs, 
and communities and government, with a view to introducing conflict resolution approaches 
that would bring peace and sustainable development to an anticipated post-conflict Niger 
Delta region.  
The conflict resolution initiatives implemented in the Niger Delta were based on how each of 
the three stakeholders – communities, the oil companies and the federal or federated state 
governments, understands the problems of the Niger Delta and the approaches for dealing 
with them (Nnimmo 2015). Drawing from this perception, I could put forward that; firstly, 
the oil communities have come to the conclusion that their fates are in their own hands and as 
such they have always used strategies and tactics spanning from reactive pacifism to reactive 




political empowerment, increased fiscal allocation to compensate for resource exploitation 
and consequent environmental degradation, control of their resources, and overall 
development. The strategies used to make these demands have intensified tension, insecurity 
and conflicts in the region.  
Secondly, the MNOCs have observed that the basic need of the communities is for the 
mitigation of poverty through the delivery of basic social and economic infrastructure, as part 
of their corporate social responsibilities (Lapin and Rossiasco 2011; Amunwa 2012). In their 
view, these „hand-outs‟ fills the gap between them and the host communities; they provide 
the missing links needed to effect mutual co-existence between them and the militant 
communities. Unfortunately, the communities looked down on these efforts, viewing them as 
paltry compared to the apparent value of resource exploitation by the MNOCs and the 
revenue received by federal government. Consequently, violent conflicts continued unabated.  
Thirdly, the federal government has mostly regarded the conflicts in the Niger Delta as acts 
of rebelliousness to the nation. Hence its resolution „style‟ aimed to control the conflict 
(Amunwa 2012). This approach involved the use of control measures, force, coercion, 
impatience with dialogue and information gathering. 
Broadly, two strands of conflict resolution initiatives by the state for the Niger Delta have 
been put in place. The first involved a number of ad hoc measures, such as the use of force to 
suppress violent insurrection in a bid to compel the aggrieved communities into quiescence, 
or to coerce conflicting communities to avoid or accommodate conflict. Other such measures 
included: litigation, impromptu tribunals and judicial commissions of inquiry into such 
conflicts, special improvised committees, militant declarations and ultimatums, hurriedly 
organised symposia, workshops and conferences, peace talks, elders‟ forums, environment 
friendly publications and workshops organised by all or any of: the government, oil 
companies, NGOs, communities, traditional rulers, print media, pseudo-environmentalists 
and an array of nascent groups and movements.  
The second is based on the „paradigm shift‟ to the new view that the indispensable bond 
between peace in the Niger Delta, the oil companies and the Nigerian economy is to be found 
in community development projects. Such projects have involved the delivery of social and 
economic infrastructure, reparation for contaminated environment, a youth skills acquisition 




demand, specialised institutions, such as the OMPADEC and NDDC have been created to 
further pursue the aims and objectives of the community development paradigm. 
Notwithstanding these conflict resolution initiatives, violence has not ended in the Niger 
Delta.
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 The findings of my research fieldwork also suggest that the current government-
MNOC‟s initiatives, referred to as a top-down approach, to tackle the endemic conflict 
problem has failed to yield results that are both socially and economically sustainable. This 
failure could also be ascribed to the dearth of a common development framework and focus; 
something which could call for another and new approach that would meet this need.
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 The 
integrated conflict resolution, or participatory approach is hereby being suggested. The 
integrated conflict resolution approach, also referred to as the grassroots-up approach to 
conflict is a collaborative approach to problem-solving and decision-making. This approach 
places an equal importance on the relationship with the other parties and on a mutually 
satisfactory outcome. The strategies of the „problem-solving‟ conflict resolution approach 
involve building trust, communicating face-to-face, collecting information, interchanging, 
exchanging, valuing diversity, team building, having focus-group discussions, searching for 
alternatives and seeking „win-win‟ solutions (Downey, Bonds and Clark 2010; Kadafa 2012). 
Previous methods of conflict resolution in the Niger Delta have been adversarial, as they 
were based on bargaining from established positions, attacking the other party, applying 
whatever standards to be effective in achieving individual goals, and considering ways to 
advance specific parties‟ positions (Chidi 2010; Okunola and Ikuomola 2012). The integrated 
conflict resolution approach to conflict in the Niger Delta might be viewed as a collaborative 
and problem-solving methodology. It is also a democratic process, since it acknowledges the 
people‟s right and responsibility to manage and resolve their own affairs. It further allows 
antagonists to participate in making a decision by giving all participants an equal chance to 
express their views, generate options and influence the final decision (Reider and Haastrup 
2013). As a collaborative problem-solving methodology, the approach finally encourages 
honest and open communication and allows the sharing of information. It avoids fault-finding 
and blame-trading by the parties, while the reciprocally assertive attitudes remain future-
oriented and trust-building. In doing so, it encompasses some procedures including: 
negotiation, a focus on the problem and not on parties or persons, a search for common 
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ground, a search for a fair and objective basis on which to take decisions, and a search for 
options that may lead to mutual gains (Eno-Abasi 2011). 
The benefits of community participation in conflict resolution are effective simply because 
this approach has the potential to impact positively on social and economic progress (Eno-
Abasi 2011). Applied to the case of the Niger Delta, for example, some of the specific 
benefits of effective community participation would be effective in the context of situation 
analysis and policy making. Firstly, this implies that it would improve the quality of policies 
and services. It is worth underlining in this context that when various stakeholders are 
involved in decision making, the policy-makers benefit from their first-hand understanding of 
the issues (Ereibi 2011). Stakeholders provide reality checks, which facilitate the testing of a 
priori assumptions. Secondly, the grassroots-up approach helps to resolve complex issues: 
social, economic and environmental issues are nearly always multifaceted. The conflicts as 
they evolve in the Niger Delta offer a case where working together could raise the possibility 
of finding sustainable solutions. Thirdly, the grassroots-up approach builds trust and 
understanding. This could be most useful and interesting in the case being researched where 
these two strands of development are conspicuously missing. Communities build and develop 
confidence in a government or agency that overtly offer them opportunities to contribute to 
decisions that affect them. A foundation of trust becomes an invaluable component when 
strong decisions, as are required in the case of the Niger Delta, need to be taken. Fourthly, 
integrated conflict resolution helps to create an all-encompassing society. From my research 
experience, I could argue that when government works in collaboration with communities, 
the people feel more empowered, more justly treated and more valued. The collaboration 
between government and local community is useful for the creation of a peaceful 
environment in which the community members could be part of the solution to their own 
problems. Applied to the case of the Niger Delta, this would enable self-reliance and 
innovation leading to sustainable development. Fifthly, community participation is useful in 
evaluating progress, as active collaboration with the community would be valuable for 
monitoring policy outcomes. Finally, community participation in policy and decision making 
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However, the integrated conflict resolution approach has some limitations in that it faces a 
number of inherent challenges. Some of these challenges are due to its process. The extent to 
which an integrated conflict-resolution approach could reach its potential contribution 
depends fundamentally on the level of care with which it is applied. The integrated conflict-
resolution tool kits, for example, should only be handled by facilitators who have vast 
experience in doing so, and who understand the community‟s traditions, customs and, most 
importantly, language. This approach also faces other challenges such as: time pressure, fear 
of conflict, temptation to revert to the old ways of doing things, narrow or partial measures of 
success or achievement and the tendency to want to settle for partial measures of success and 
achievement (Ereibi 2011). All these challenges, however, could be more easily tackled if all 
the stakeholders could show their ability to overcome their private agendas to achieve a 
sustainable peace settlement. 
9.4 Key Recommendations and Future Research 
I would therefore suggest that future research should investigate those local views that are not 
currently being factored into, or included in, the various government decisions and policies. 
The research will need to go beyond the analysis of the nexus between the militancy and oil 
production, for example, by examining the issues and needs of the local communities. As this 
study has suggested, the oil communities face broader issues, including inequality and unfair 
sharing of oil resources, environment pollution, dearth of adequate infrastructures, poverty 
and insecurity. The next study will need to gather ideas about how these issues and needs 
could be tackled and what has prevented the improvement of the situations on the ground. 
Such research envisions improving policies and decisions for conflict resolutions, 
culminating in sustainable peace, development and security, by integrating these issues and 
the views of critical oil communities who are not organised or able to voice their worries and 
views. This further research also necessitates an anthropological approach through longer-
term observations of the political economy of oil to complement the scarcity of statistics in 
the Niger Delta Region. It also requires a holistic analytical approach to examine these 
statistics that could be borrowed from a sustainable livelihood approach or the concept of 
human security. Similarly, for the future research above to be able to improve decisions and 
policies, another set of research needs to be carried out to look at how best these oil 
communities‟ views could be communicated to the ongoing grassroots-up approaches. The 




grassroots-up processes may change their perceptions. For this research, an applied research 
study of the grassroots-up processes including facilitated dialogue with people from a wider 
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Appendix 4                              
 
Field Research Plan 
_____________________________________________________ 
Title of Research: Conflicts In the Niger Delta: Analysis of Causes, Impacts and Resolution 
Strategies, 1999-2016.  
 
Institution:   Coventry University, Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, 
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/cprs 
 
Principal investigator:  Habiba Musa Ahmed 
Email:musaahmh@uni.coventry.ac.uk 
 
Fieldwork:    2014-2016 
 
Objectives of Fieldwork 
 
Fieldwork Objectives 
Objectives ❖ To Interview officials of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) liaison office in Abuja, and Lagos.  
 ❖ To interview officials of private oil exploration and servicing 
companies based in Abuja and Lagos which includes Chevron, 
Shell and Mobil.  
 ❖ To interview officials of NGOs based in Abuja which 
includes: Niger Delta Peace Initiative;Actionaid Nigeria; 
ND-HERO, Environmental Right Actions (ERA) and Niger 
Delta Youth Movement (NDYM) 





 ❖ To Interview Professors at the Institute for Peace and strategic 
studies in University of Ibadan, lecturers in University Of 
Lagos and University Of Abuja. I also plan to visit the 




Type of Research Data, Instrument, Informants and data recording 
Type of Research Data: 
 Primary Data derived from Interviews with: 
- Oil companies representatives    - Niger Delta based organisations 
- Government Agency official                       - Niger Delta indigenes 
- Academic experts      - NGOs 
 
 Secondary data sourced from: 
Thesis, journals, conference reports, newspapers and books. 
 
 
Type of Research Instrument: 
 Interviews: 
 Semi-structured interviews which may include the following means of different 
communication technologies, such as email, phone and Skype, will be adopted 
to obtain useful information from a range of stakeholders. 
Method of recording Interview proceedings and analysis 
                  The method of interview recording below will be used based on research 
informant‟s preferences. 
 Audio recording: 
It will involve audio recording. The audio records will be transcribed. Information                   
gathered will also be grouped based on themes, commonalities, and patterns 
 Note-taking: 
It will involvenote-taking. The notes taken during the off record interview sessions will 




to themes and similarities. Codes will be generated for each category and a 
code record will be kept for proper documentation. 
Interview Venue 
                  The factors I intend to consider for the choice of the interview venue are; 
security, privacy and convenience for my research informants. The 
environment must be enclosed to ensure privacy and also be situated in 
location that is safe. Most interview will likely take place at respondents‟ 
office or a hotel, whichever, provided that is more convenient and secured. 
 
Timetable of Actions 
 
Pre-Field work Field work Post-field work 
❖ Document search 
through library, 
centres for studies 
and internet (2 
wks.) 
❖ Identify key 
informants for this 
study and schedule 




❖ Conduct interview 
(3 wks.) 
 
❖ Coding, Transcription and 
categorization of 
interview data; referring 








Place of stay and Movement specifics 
I will spend most of my time in Abuja and I will stay in my residential home. I intend to   
make short visits to Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu. During my visits, I intend to stay in a 
Hotel/Relative house. In Abuja, I intend to use my private car as a means of  transportation. 







Appendix 5  
 
Sample of Interview Questions and Schedule 
 
In-depth Interview   
 
Name of Interviewer------------------------------------  
Date-------------------------------------------------------  
Name of Interviewee-----------------------------------  
Position in the community-----------------------------  
 
Good morning. I am ________ (introduce self).  
This interview is being conducted as a part of my doctoral research. The aim of this session is 
to find out the effectiveness of strategies/actions that have been adopted in the Niger Delta 
crisis and generate possible solutions to bring sustainable peace in the region. I believe you 
are in a position to provide information that is vital for this research. 
Based on your choice, our conversation will either be tape recorded or note-taken so as to 
have a capture of the interview details. I also guarantee the confidentiality of your comments 




1 Can you please explain in detail the remote and immediate causes of the conflict in 
the Niger Delta?  
2 Are you familiar with the efforts that have been made in the past to resolve this 
conflict, if you do, can you shed some light on them?  
3 What is your opinion about the amnesty program?  
4 What do you think is the main reason (s) militants are participating in the program?  
5 In your opinion, who is a militant and what do you think is their prime motivation?  
6 Overall, what is your opinion about the amnesty program? Has it been successful in 
mitigating the conflict?  
7 In your opinion, do you think the issues surrounding the conflict have been 




8 What does peace in the Niger Delta mean to you? 
9 What role do you think the local communities (youth, elders and women) in the 
region can play in achieving sustainable peace in the region?  
10 What role do you think the international oil companies have in achieving sustainable 
peace in the region? 
11 What role do you think the NGOs have in achieving sustainable peace in the region? 
12 What facilities, structures, institutions, activities, events, and policies have been 
created to stimulate the economic development of the region? 
13 In your opinion, do you think these facilities, structures, institutions, activities, events, 
reforms and policies have been able to stimulate the economic development of the region? If 
no, please kindly explain the facilities, structures, institutions, activities, events, reforms and 
policies that can stimulate economic development in the region. 
14 Who benefits from peace in the region? Who benefits from the conflict?  
15 Over all, is there anything else you wish to tell me about the Niger Delta violence             
and the amnesty program? 
16 Over all, Is there any possible reforms, strategies and actions you feel that should be 
taken to bring sustainable peace and prevent the reoccurrence of conflict in the Niger Delta 
region? 
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Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Research: Conflicts in the Niger Delta: Analysis of Causes, Impacts and Resolution 
Strategies.  
 
Institution:   Coventry University, Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, 
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/cprs 
 




Purpose of This Research 
 
The main aim of this research is to explore the advantages of early conflict resolution. The 
research aims to investigate a way of providing a strategic and practical approach to handling 






This interview is designed to collect your views and understanding about the Niger Delta 
crisis. The compilation of your views would be analysed along with others. The research 
aims to provide recommendations that could be helpful in setting future conflict or crisis. The 
research will promote a method to handle conflict in that region. 
 
Possible risks or benefits 
 
There is no risk involved in this study. There is no direct benefit to you also. The study uses 
your views and understandings for analysis and to come to some conclusion regarding the 
Niger Delta Conflict. The results of the research may help to solve the issues surrounding the 
Niger Delta crisis and also aid in reconciliation, which will help improve the stability of the 
oil sector that in return can benefit Nigeria as a country.  
 
Right of refusal to participate and withdrawal 
 
You are free to choose to participate in the study. You may refuse to participate or withdraw 
any time from the study. There is no adverse impact to you from your withdrawal. 




You are free to choose how the interview proceedings should be recorded. You are free to 
choose, whichever that suits your comfort, either for the conversation to be audio recording 
or note-taking.  
Confidentiality 
 
All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence to the extent 
provided by the law and your name will not appear in any report or publication of the 
research. Your information will be assigned a code number. The list connecting your name to 
this number and this informed consent form will be kept in a locked file. When the study is 
completed and the data have been analysed, the list will be destroyed. 
 
For further information 
 
If you need more information about the interview or research program please ask me directly 




If you wish to take any queries further you are welcome to contact the Director of Studies at 
Coventry University: Dr Alan Hunter, a.hunter@coventry.ac.uk 











Participant’s Consent Declaration 
 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary.  Refusal to participate will involve no adverse 
effect to me.  I understand that I may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or 
loss of accrued benefits.  
 











I have explained and defined in detail the research procedures in which the participant has 
consented to participate. 
 








I witness the above signatures:  
 
 
Witness Signature: __________  Date: _________ 
 
